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ABSTRACT

THREE ESSAYS ON LEARNING AND
CONFLICT APPLIED TO DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
MAY 2021
AMAL AHMAD
B.A., AMHERST COLLEGE
M.Sc., SCHOOL OF ORIENTAL AND AFRICAN STUDIES
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor James Heintz

This dissertation uses microeconomics to study questions of learning and conflict in
developing countries. The first essay studies how much rural producers in developing
countries can learn from their own experience to redress important information gaps
about their crop. It builds a theoretical model of learning from experience and applies
it using a rich dataset on cotton farmers in Pakistan. I test whether farmers learn from
cultivation experience about the pest resistance of their seeds and use this information
to improve selection and productivity. I find no such learning effect and this conclusion
is robust to several parameters that could signal learning. The findings document the
vii

difficulty of parsing out information from cultivation experience alone and point to
the importance of external information provision by the government in these contexts.
The second essay studies how firms can learn from cumulative production experience to improve productivity and competitiveness, also known as learning by doing.
It argues that learning by doing may be particularly important in a development
context but that its popular conceptualization in the growth literature, as a passive
process in which higher output automatically improves productivity, falls short in
some important ways. I review case studies on firm behavior to show that a more
active process, in which workers must exert costly effort to learn from trial and error,
is a better approximation of how experience improves productivity. I compare this
type of learning, which I term effortful learning by doing, to other types of knowledge
acquisition, and use qualitative evidence to demonstrate its relevance to productivity
growth in developing country firms.
The third essay studies the ongoing absence of a solution in Israel-Palestine
through the lens of game theory. It shows that the game theoretic literature on
the conflict largely relies on unsupported assumptions about what the main actors
are trying to achieve. Specifically, a historical analysis of Israel’s settlement policy
suggests that Israel is not strategically interested in withdrawing from the occupied
territories in a “land for peace” deal, contrary to what most formal models assume.
I show that integrating alternative, more historically plausible, assumptions into a
game can generate results mirroring the settler-expansion of the Israeli state and help
explain the deteriorating prospects for a solution.
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INTRODUCTION

This three-essay dissertation uses the tools of theoretical and empirical microeconomics to better understand learning and technology change, and political conflict,
in parts of the developing world. The first two essays investigate how producers in
developing countries (farmers and firms, respectively) can learn from production experience in order to overcome information failures and to improve productivity. The
third essay turns to conflict behavior and uses microeconomic theory, in conjunction with historical evidence, to investigate the core roots of enduring conflict over
strategic territory.
Economic development is a process characterized by potentially severe and persistent information failures for both public and private agents, and agricultural producers are no exception (Foster and Rosenzweig, 2010). The first essay, Imperfect
Information and Learning: Evidence from Cotton Cultivation in Pakistan, studies
how small farmers in developing countries learn to adapt and effectively use new
technology amid such problems. It examines the case of Pakistani cotton farmers,
who account for the fourth largest production of cotton in the world, but who face
significant information failures about the seed biotechnology they buy, due in part to
the haphazard way the technology is imported into the country and in part to poor
labeling and certification by suppliers (Spielman et al, 2017). Therefore, cotton farmers in Pakistan largely do not know, at purchase point, whether or not the seeds they
are buying possess an important pest-resistant biotechnology. Since this technology
contributes to higher yield, imperfect information inhibits them from making optimal
purchase decisions and affects their productivity and profit.
1

I investigate whether, amid imperfect information, farmers can discover the “hidden” attributes of their seeds from cultivation outcomes, since learning from experience is particularly valuable when sources of external information are limited. I
provide a theoretical model of learning about input quality from cultivation experience, and use it to derive an econometric specification to test empirically for learning.
Applying these tests to a rich micro-dataset on cotton cultivation in Pakistan, I find
that farmers are unable to learn about the pest-resistance of their seed inputs even after they observe cultivation outcomes, due to the difficulty of distinguishing whether
the pest resistance of the crop is due to biophysical properties of the seed or to
exogenous environmental conditions. The findings suggest that information failures
in agricultural markets in developing countries can be severe and persistent, with
negative consequences for affected farmers, in the absence of external information
interventions by the government.
Learning from experience may be relevant not only to agricultural producers aiming to overcome information problems and optimize input choice, but also to firms
starting at low levels of productivity and aiming to improve their production knowhow and competitiveness in domestic and global markets (Figueiredo and Bell, 2012).
The second essay, Effortful Learning by Doing: A Preliminary Synthesis, studies
the way in which firms can learn to improve efficiency this way, through production
experience. Also known as “learning by doing”, this process has been popularly represented in the growth literature as one of firms automatically learning to reduce
costs as they produce more. The key implication of learning by doing, that production scale improves competitiveness, has been used in various models to explore
subsequent growth outcomes (Thompson 2010) and to make a case for infant industry
protection in developing countries (Wade, 2003).
Given the mixed empirical evidence on whether or not production experience im2

proves productivity and competitiveness, I explore the concept of learning by doing
more closely using case studies of firm-level behavior in both developed and developing countries. I synthesize findings from firm-level research in management studies,
organizational behavior, and evolutionary economics to show that any improvements
of productivity from scale are mediated, in part, by the expenditure of significant
time, energy, and effort during production to uncover tacit information and to learn
from trial and error. I term this deliberative and costly process “effortful learning
by doing”, as opposed to passive learning by doing, and argue that it is particularly
challenging in a development context. With effort mediating learning from scale,
the relevant incentive structures to induce effort come into focus. I explore this in
reference to two historical episodes of failed learning-by-doing in infant industries in
developing countries.
Therefore, the first two essays highlight how different types of producers in developing countries may face challenges pertaining to information and knowledge acquisition, and the extent to which they can use their own production experiences to
overcome these challenges and improve productivity.
The tools of microeconomics can be useful for understanding not only economic
challenges but also political challenges in parts of the developing world. The third
essay, Land for Peace? Israel-Palestine Through the Lens of Game Theory, studies
the ongoing conflict in Israel-Palestine from the perspective of the theory of games
and strategic behavior. Past international efforts to produce a two-state solution in
the region, seen as the legally just and feasible resolution, have failed spectacularly. A
key question is why such a solution, also referred to as a “land for peace” deal in which
Israel withdraws from the territories it occupied in 1967 in exchange for Palestinian
compliance with Israeli security demands, has failed to materialize. Game theory, as
the study of the interdependent strategic interests of rational actors, may help answer
3

this question in a methodical way that does not resort to concepts of zealotry nor to
wishful thinking about the motivations of the parties involved (Blattman and Miguel,
2010).
I study the application of game theory to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and highlight how the assumptions about the key players’ strategic interests inform the analysis. Specifically, I survey the existing game theoretic applications to Israel-Palestine
and show that the majority of formal models assume that Israel is strategically interested in withdrawing from the occupied territories pending resolvable security concerns. In this interpretation, land for peace has failed because some or all Palestinians
are unwilling to meet Israel’s security concerns. I follow by using a historical analysis
of Israel’s settlement policy in the occupied territories during 1967-2020 to criticize
this assumption, and to argue that Israel is interested in maximizing its control over
the land under all circumstances. I incorporate this alternative assumption into a
dynamic game and show that the game produces results matching what we see on
the ground, namely Israeli expansion and deteriorating prospects for a solution. I
conclude that the absence of a two-state solution is aligned with, and not contrary to,
the strategic interests of the militarily powerful party, Israel, and that game theory
can help bring these issues into sharp focus.
To conclude, this dissertation uses the tools of microeconomics, integrated with
interdisciplinary analysis where appropriate, to address questions of economic and
political importance in parts of the developing world. The questions, methodologies,
and findings help shed light on two broad themes. The first is why knowledge acquisition and technology change are difficult in a developing country context, both in a
rural and industrial setting, and how producers may use their experience to overcome
these difficulties. The second is why conflict over strategic territory may endure and
escalate and how this relates to the strategic behavior of the parties involved.
4

CHAPTER

1

IMPERFECT INFORMATION AND
LEARNING: EVIDENCE FROM COTTON
CULTIVATION IN PAKISTAN

1.1 Introduction
Economic development is a process characterized by potentially severe and persistent information failures for both private and public agents. Given the salience
of agricultural production in developing countries, the information failures faced by
farmers are particularly important to understand. A large literature exists on the information problems that farmers in Africa, South Asia, and other parts of the world
face in securing credit (Ghosh et al, 2000), in managing risk (Poole, 2017), and in
learning and adapting agricultural technologies (Foster and Rosenzweig, 2010).
This paper contributes to the latter literature, on how producers in developing
countries learn to adapt and effectively use technology, with a focus on imperfectly
known seed-based technologies. Seed technologies arise out of mechanical hybridization or lab-based genetic engineering and can improve characteristics such as resistance to pests, reduction of spoilage, or nutrient profile. Developing countries account
5

for the majority of GMO crop production in the world in terms of acreage and production (ISAAA, 2017) but regulatory mechanisms in these countries are notoriously
weak including around seed assurance and quality control standards (FAO, 2009).
Combined with the inherent information problem that one cannot deduce the attributes of a seed by physical inspection, and the compounded problem that much
of these technologies originate from non-local expertise, this can create significant
difficulties for farmers in selecting and cultivating high-yield crops.
I investigate whether, amid imperfect information, farmers can discover the “hidden” attributes of their seed from cultivation outcomes, since learning from experience
is particularly valuable when sources of external information are limited. I first provide a simple theoretical model in which an agent can learn about a profit-maximizing
attribute from cultivation experience and uses this to enhance variety selection in the
next period. The model elaborates this strategy and demonstrates the conditions
under which the quality of the crop on the market improves and monetary benefit to
farmers are generated.
After modelling the behavior that results from learning, I use it to derive a specification to test empirically for learning and apply it to a rich panel dataset on cotton
cultivation in Pakistan. The difficulty in testing for learning from own experience is
that the information must be inaccessible to the farmer somehow, so that there is
space for learning and discovery, but accessible to the researcher to allow them to
verify whether the right information was learned. This is the opportunity provided
by the unique structure of the dataset I use, the Pakistan Cotton Survey (PCS).
Pakistan is the fourth largest grower and exporter of raw cotton in the world,
making cotton central to the country’s economic development, but farmers have limited information about the pest resistance technology of the varieties they purchase.
Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) cotton, which is a genetically modified crop engineered by
6

US-based Monsanto in 1996 to be toxic to bollworm pests, is the most popular type of
cotton in Pakistan. However, it was introduced in the country haphazardly, through
unlicensed borrowing of the original Monsanto-developed Bt variety and trial-anderror mixing with local varieties (Spielman et al, 2017). Local hybridization was
accompanied with poor breeding methods and improper genetic checks, and there are
now many “Bt” varieties in Pakistan with different amounts of Bt effectiveness (pest
toxicity) (Spielman et al, 2015).
As a result of haphazard technology adoption and the weak capacities of the state,
the Pakistani government has failed to ensure that cotton varieties are accurately
labeled, standardized, or verifiable in the seed market, and seeds are often sold without
appropriate packaging or labelling. Most cotton farmers purchase seeds and rely on
the seller to tell them what the variety is and whether it is Bt effective or not, without
being able to verify the information. To the extent that Bt effectiveness improves yield
outcomes, missing knowledge about this key input is an impediment to productivity.
Using a representative sample, the PCS survey team tested the level of Bt in
individual farmers’ plots in 2013 and only revealed the results to them two years
later, enabling me to use farmer behavior and decisions between 2013 and 2014 to
study whether they learned from cultivation about information that was unavailable
to them ex-ante. I can test whether farmers, after observing the performance of
their 2013 crop, accurately assess the pest resistance of the variety and whether they
respond as predicted by the model, switching varieties next year if they learned that
their variety was lacking in pest resistance and vice versa.
The results show that farmers are unable to learn about biophysical resistance
by observing cultivation outcomes, with Bt content informing neither farmer perceptions of pest resistance nor seed selection next year. Regression analysis also confirms
this is because it is difficult for them to distinguish whether good pest resistance
7

performance is due to the biophysical characteristics of the plant or to exogenous
environmental conditions. Since cultivation experience is not sufficient to redress the
information gap, the results suggest that policy, in the form of stronger certification
standards by the government or information provided externally to farmers by agricultural extension services, might be necessary for farmers to make more informed
choices.
A rough back-of-envelope exercise suggests that the lack of learning I document
in this paper leads to large productivity losses. Based on the size of Pakistan’s
cotton cultivation industry and the documented effects of Bt on damage abatement, I
estimate that failing to learn about Bt content and to purchase maximum effectiveness
seeds results in long term losses up to 170 million USD, or 12.5% of industry value
in 2013-2014. Therefore, this paper has implications not only for microeconomic
behavior but also for productivity growth at the industry level.
This study contributes to three related but distinct strands of literature. First it
sheds light, theoretically and empirically, on how producers may use own experience
to learn under imperfect information. The literature on agricultural producers in developing countries has more commonly explored learning from external information,
typically from extension services (Murphy, 2017; Emerick et al, 2016; Maertens et al,
2018), or from social networks (Munshi, 2004; Conley and Udry, 2010; Crane-Droesch,
2017). This paper instead focuses on the ability of farmers to uncover information
organically, without the aid of externally verified information and through own experience. Own experience is important to understand because external information
provision is rare and often expensive,1 and because heterogeneity in growing conditions can mute social learning or peer effects (Foster and Rosenzweig, 2010).
1
The lack of focus on extension services is particularly appropriate for this study; the farmers
indicate the near absence of any help from NGOs, farmer cooperatives, or other extension services.
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Within the literature on learning from own experience in rural parts of the developing world, this paper complements the findings of, but is distinct from, Hanna et al
(2014) and Bold et al (2017). In Hanna et al (2014), Indonesian seaweed farmers deal
with a traditional technology, pod size, on which information can be readily available
but which they fail to notice because they do not know the significance of pod size for
yield and because there are many competing demands on their attention. By contrast,
this paper deals with a relatively new biotechnology, whose significance the farmers
(from their survey answers) clearly comprehend but whose facets can be very difficult
to deduce from production experience despite exerting the effort to notice. In Bold
et al (2017), Ugandan maize farmers deal with unknown levels of fertilizer effectiveness, which they have trouble learning about due to noisy yield signals; the findings
are generated by calibrating a learning model to outcomes from researcher-managed
experimental plots to simulate what farmers would or would not learn. The findings
of my paper also suggest that noisy yield signals can make learning from cultivation
experience very difficult, but I test for learning by applying theory directly to farmer
behavior in the field.
Second, this study provides insights on consumer learning when goods’ attributes
are hidden or not easily observed. It demonstrates whether key attributes of an important commodity, agricultural seeds, can be evaluated by the consumer (farmer)
after experience/use or if these attributes cannot be revealed even after use. The literature on this subject terms the former an experience good and the latter a credence
good (Darby and Karni, 1973; Girard and Dion, 2010). In this paper, genetically
modified seeds that are not properly labeled are either experience goods, if farmers
can learn about their attributes from experience, or credence goods, if they cannot
evaluate said attributes even post-experience.
Therefore, the main question in this paper can be reformulated as an inquiry
9

into the information-characteristics of a key commodity in rural developing markets.2
Since the government can greatly ameliorate the information problem for consumers if
it provides credible labeling and certification (Dulleck et al, 2006; Dulleck et al, 2011),
the paper also demonstrates the consequences of weak government capacities and high
costs of certification for developing-country agents facing information problems.
Third, the paper contributes to the development literature more broadly by demonstrating how information problems generated in the technology acquisition stage in
a development context can trickle down and hinder effective use after adoption. The
information problem in this case emerged during the acquisition of the Bt gene, due
to constraints on effective local adaptation and governance.3 Challenges with technology import and local adoption are widely acknowledged in development economics
(Dosi, 1988; Bardhan and Udry, 1999; Khan, 2010) but it is unclear how much information failures generated at that stage persist post-acquisition. This paper’s results
demonstrate high persistence in one such market.
In turn, high persistence can point to potential spillage into other markets and the
deepening of other information problems. For example, in rural financial markets, the
agent, if borrowing to purchase inputs, may face difficulty evaluating input quality
and the ability to pay back the loan. In this case, incentive-compatible mechanisms
to overcome principal-agent problems will not be sufficient to give the lender all
the relevant information. Missing information in developing countries is often not
strategically hidden but unknown, and corrective strategies must operate accordingly.
2

Few studies address the credence goods problem in developing countries; none except Auriol
and Schilizzi (2015) focus on agricultural seeds. Even that paper is a theoretical investigation of the
costs of certification, not an empirical application.
3
Agents in developing countries are also innovative and constraints do not imply lack of agency.
The local mixing of the Monsanto protein with the local germplasm, while haphazard, afforded
the farmers stronger pest resistance into their crop that they would not have had otherwise. The
Pakistani state, though it struggled with regulating the seed market, used its power to prevent
Monsanto from pushing for a patent in Pakistan, affording farmers the space to create local hybrids
under legal cover.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides background to the information problem in the Pakistani cotton seed market. Section 1.3 builds a model of
learning from experience and response behavior, and shows the relationship between
information costs, learning, and market outcomes. Section 1.4 describes the dataset.
Section 1.5 outlines the econometric methodology derived from the theoretical model
and explains the identification strategy and sample selection. Section 1.6 presents
and discusses the empirical results. Section 1.7 considers and rules out alternative
explanations of the findings and offers robustness checks. Section 1.8 summarizes and
concludes.

1.2 Background
Producing around 8 million 500 pound bales per year, Pakistan is the fourth largest
producer of cotton in the world and also its fourth largest exporter after China, the
US, and India. In 2019, it was estimated that over 1.6 million farmers cultivate cotton
in Pakistan, with cotton cultivation accounting for 15% of all arable land during the
Kharif (April-July) season and 26% of all farms in the country. The downstream
textile industry is also integral to the country’s economy, employing about 10 million
people and generating 50% of all foreign exchange (USDA, 2019).
Pakistan’s cotton farmers, based almost completely in the Punjab (75%) or Sindh
(24%) provinces, have increasingly adopted the genetically modified bollworm-resistant4
Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) cotton over the past fifteen years, and evidence suggests
that Bt use has reduced crop damage and improved yield (Ali and Abdulai, 2010;
Kouser and Qaim, 2013). However, the way in which Bt has been adopted has been
haphazard and largely unregulated. Bt cotton can rely on different cry proteins to
4

A bollworm is a moth larva that attacks cotton and is a major pest concern for producers.
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generate toxins that confer the bollworm-resistance criterion, but the majority of Bt
cotton varieties in Pakistan “rely on the cry1Ac gene from the MON-531 event developed by Monsanto [in 1996].” (Spielman et al, 2017; p.2) In the mid-2000s, lacking a
formal system for proper Bt-variety acquisition due to Monsanto’s iron-clad patents,5
Pakistani farmers began introgressing this specific gene into local germplasm to create
locally specific hybrid Bt varieties. Local Pakistani farmers were hence able to use
trial and error and mixing with local germplasm to “effectively” introduce Bt to their
cotton crop, despite intellectual property barriers.
Since adoption, the release and marketing of Bt cotton has been largely unregulated in Pakistan. Seed varieties are often missing labels or contain incomplete or
unregulated labelling. There is a lack of “regulatory systems.. [to properly] enforce
rules requiring seed sellers to provide technical information on quality alongside their
product.. [and] the judicial system does not provide sufficient recourse for farmers
defrauded by seed sellers” (Spielman et al, 2015; p.1). Due to the inherent information problem in seed markets (a farmer cannot look at a seed and infer its quality),
farmers are subject to a serious information asymmetry when purchasing seeds in the
absence of proper regulatory mechanisms.
Local mixing, which can result in poor breeding methods or improper genetic
checks, and poor regulatory capacities have resulted in the promulgation of lowquality seed-based technologies in Pakistan’s cotton seed market. In a survey of 20
districts in 2008-2009 with farmers who thought they were planting Bt cotton, Ali
et al (2010) found that 10% of the samples from Punjab did not test positive for
the cry1Ac gene and of those that tested positive, only 36% contained concentrations
sufficiently lethal to kill bollworms; the numbers were 19% and 41% for samples from
5

Monsanto had patents in the US but not Pakistan; it tried very hard to obtain a patent in Pakistan after realizing local farmers were introgressing the cry1Ac gene but the Pakistani government
refused to grant it one.
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Sindh. In a later study on the 2011 season, Ali et al (2012) used different technology
on another sample and found that 30% of all varieties tested were not positive for
any cry gene.6
The survey team that gathered the dataset on which this paper draws, the Pakistan Cotton Survey 2013-2014, sheds more light on these issues through two main
papers. In Spielman et al (2017), the authors compare what the farmers are really
planting to what they think they are planting. They find that a large portion of
farmers particularly in Punjab believe they are planting Bt when their variety is not
actually Bt effective. They also run a logit model to predict the inaccuracy of belief
and find the only significant predictor is education, with more educated farmer less
likely to hold erroneous beliefs. However, they do not test for learning by linking
Bt content with possible behavioral outcomes in the next season that could signal
learning, as this paper does. In Ma et al (2017) the authors explore the cotton yield
of the sampled farmers and find that, in a nonlinear damage abatement model, Bt
effectiveness as measured by the PCS has a significant positive effect on farmer yield,
when other input use is controlled for.

1.3 Theoretical model
We expect farmers who learn to behave after discovery in ways that reflect their
knowledge. With seed-based technologies, one possibility is that farmers alter the
variety they purchase next year, with those who discover their variety was high in
that attribute being more likely to repurchase it, other factors constant, and vice
versa. I illustrate this response strategy and how it can be affected by the costs of
6

These results echo earlier findings about China, with Pemsl (2005) highlighting the lack of
regulation, ubiquity of information imperfections, and subpar Bt effectiveness in China’s Bt cotton
seed market at the time.
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gathering and processing the relevant information. I also show the conditions under
which learning improves market outcomes, in terms of the average attribute level
on the market. In Section 1.5, I use this theoretical model to derive econometric
specifications to test for learning from experience.
Suppose an observable outcome for farmer i at time t, Yit , is a function of the
unknown level of some attribute Bit and of other factors eit , so that Yit = f (Bit , eit ).
In this case, for example, Yit could be pest damage. Farmers may discover Bit ex-post
(in t + 1) if f is known and eit is easily observable, so that Bit is deduced by exclusion.
Conversely, if it is difficult to know f or observe eit or both, then discovering Bit
ex-post is less likely. This deduction is not necessarily a costless process, as I discuss
below.
Let there be two periods t = 1, 2 and let Bt denote the price-adjusted level of
a profit-enhancing attribute in period t. In this case Bt is the Bt level in the seed
variety per rupee spent on the variety, but the model can apply more generally to other
markets and attributes. For Pakistani cotton farmers, Bt content as (one) driver of
variety selection is plausible since the farmers cite bollworm-toxicity as important in
their seed selection process. It should be noted that the farmers (from their answers)
do not store cotton seed for use in the next cultivation period; those who report
cultivating the same variety in 2014 bought that variety again in 2014.
I assume there is a market surplus each period, with more seeds available for sale
than being bought. Specifically, there is general excess supply, so that a farmer can
select any variety in either period. Though somewhat stringent, this assumption is
backed by the responses of farmers in the survey, who suggest there is easy access to
seeds and that seed prices are not at all prohibitive.
Excess supply also suggests that demand shifts in the second period can be met
without a large relative change in prices, so that high-yielding varieties do not be14

come too expensive and hence less desirable. Even if the relative price of in-demand
varieties increases, as long as the relative Bt differential is still higher, the qualitative conclusions of the model hold. To simplify, I assume that the relative prices of
different varieties are fixed between the two periods.7
Let the Bt of seeds for sale in the first period B1 be a random variable distributed
normally at (E(B1 ), σ 2 ). To differentiate between varieties consumed and the wider
supply pool, I will notate the Bt level of varieties consumed with a tilde, as B̃t . Due
to the pervasive information problem, when farmer i purchases a variety in the first
period, they receive a single random realization B̃1i . They cannot identify B̃1i at
purchase point due to poor labeling and certification standards; while on average
the farmer receives the mean level on sale, so that B̃1i = E(B1 ), what each farmer
actually gets deviates from this amount by a random error component and may be
above or below the market average.
However, while the farmer does not know B̃1i (what they are getting), they have an
expectation, V1∗ , about it at purchase point. I assume all farmers who think they are
purchasing Bt share the same ex-ante expectation (I address the importance of fixed
expectations in the empirical section). It is possible that expectations correspond to
the mean quality in supply, so that V1∗ = E(B1 ), or that there is systemic error in
the farmer’s assessment, V1∗ = (B1 ) + γ. In the second period, seeds available for sale
have Bt level B2 which is a random variable with the same distribution as the year
prior, E(B2 ) = E(B1 ).8 .
Given the persistent absence of certification standards, producers that switch vari7

If we relax the assumption of excess supply so that some of the high Bt seeds become less
available next period, the qualitative results of the model hold but the extent of switching and
benefits from learning decreases. The “real-world” would lie somewhere between the scenario of
too-low supply where farmers cannot purchase a better variety if they wanted to, and this opposite
limiting case of general excess supply.
8
If producers do not offer the varieties that “did not sell” in the previous season, so that E(B2 ) =
E(B̃1i ), this still holds since E(B̃1i ) = E(B1 )
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eties from t1 to t2 will simply be going back to the supply pool and picking at random
from it once more. Letting s be the switching decision, then:

Ei (B˜2i ) = E(B2 ) [= E(B1 )]

if

si = 1

(1.1)

For those who do not switch varieties, in a perfect market, buying the same variety
again would mean getting exactly the same Bt content again: B˜2i = B˜1i , so that at
least those who“stick” with their old varieties would no longer have an information
problem once they “discover” the Bt content of one package. However, given that
the varieties are poorly labeled and certified, it is possible that something being sold
as the same variety actually has a different level of Bt in the next season. Let p be
the probability that the farmer gets the same Bt content again if they do not switch
(variety integrity), and 1 − p be the probability that they get something completely
random from the overall pool even though the variety is being marketed as the same
one.9 Then for those who do not switch, their expected second-period Bt content will
be
Ei (B˜2i ) = pB˜1i + (1 − p)(E(B2 ))
(1.2)
= pB˜1i + (1 − p)(E(B1 ))

if si = 0

To see when producers switch, we note that profit is a positive function of priceadjusted pest resistance: πt = π(Bt ), where π 0 > 0. Farmers will only switch varieties if they believe expected content next period with switching, V1∗ , is greater
than expected content without switching, pB˜1i + (1 − p)(V1∗ ). So, s = 1 only if
9
The higher p is, the more functioning the market is - variety names are meaningful. In the other
extreme, if p = 0, a packet’s variety name does not reflect a standardized variety at all.
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V1∗ > pB˜1i + (1 − p)(V1∗ ), or V1∗ > B1i :

si =




0 if B˜1i ≥ V1∗

(1.3)



1 if B˜1i < V1∗
Therefore, if farmers are able to discover Bt content from experience, they will switch
varieties next year if Bt content this year fell below expectations and keep the same
variety otherwise. This is represented in Figure 1.1:

si
1

0

V 1*

B1i

Figure 1.1: Discrete switching
Figure 1.1 shows whether or not producers switch varieties next year if learning about Bt
content is possible. Those who find out Bt content exceeded their expectations do not
switch and vice versa.

This setup assumes that farmers can accurately pay attention to, identify, and act
on the difference B˜1i − V1∗ even when that difference is very small. However, the is
strong evidence that people do not always use or act on available information because
cognitive limitations make it costly to pay attention to, and process, information
(Sims, 2003). This phenomenon of “rational inattention” suggests that optimizing
17

agents may rationally ignore or not pay attention to information if the benefits are
small relative to the cost of acquiring and processing it, especially when there are
many competing demands on their attention. More concretely, as attention costs
become very large, agents pick deterministically from an option that was best exante; they do not appear to be optimizing even though they are acting rationally by
taking cognitive costs into account. Only as attention costs go to zero do they pick
the best option in that state, acting as would be expected by classical theory (Dean,
2019).
Farmers have numerous competing demands on their attention and need to make
many decisions. Moreover, the relative cost versus benefit of exerting attention and
processing information to uncover B˜1i and act accordingly may depend on the absolute
difference |B˜1i - V1∗ |. It is likely that, as B˜1i is “extreme” (very high or very low), it
is more immediately obvious or easier to parse out from other factors that affect pest
damage. It can also be verified (below) that the benefit from subsequent switching
increases as B˜1i is more extreme relative to V1∗ . Therefore, greater |B˜1i − V1∗ | would
be accompanied by lower costs and higher benefits of gathering and processing the
relevant information, and vice versa.
This suggests that as |B˜1i − V1∗ | falls, farmers are less likely to exert the sufficient
(costly) effort to uncover B˜1i and more likely to simply choose an ex-ante best strategy,
which is a tossup between switching or not. Conversely, as |B˜1i − V1∗ | increases,
farmers are more likely to deduce B˜1i and act according to Equation (1.3). The result
is that, if learning is possible, farmers are more likely to switch when Bt content is
much lower than expected and more likely to keep the same variety when content is
much higher than expected. Switching becomes probabilistic instead of discrete, and
involves the smoothing of the curve in Figure 1.1, as shown in Figure 1.2. This
smooth curve can have a general function for the probability of switching P rob(S),
18

so that P rob(S) = g(B˜1i − V1∗ ) where g 0 < 0.

Prob(s)
1

0

V 1*

B1i

Figure 1.2: Probabilistic switching
Figure 1.2 shows switching as a smooth function of Bt content. Learning occurs but is
easier at the extremes; farmers are more likely to switch the further below expectations Bt
content is.

The rational inattention framework can also help explain the absence of learning.
If learning is impossible, the idea is that there are prohibitive cognitive limitations on
the economic agent - that nobody can observe Yit and deduce B˜1i , perhaps because
the effects of other confounding environmental factors are hard to separate out (i.e. eit
is impossible to observe or measure). In this case the attention costs needed to parse
out the relevant information are infinitely large and farmers are unable, at all points,
to discern Bt content and to act accordingly. The slope would be flat and farmers are
most likely to choose the ex-ante best strategy (tossup) at each realization, so g 0 = 0,
as shown in Figure 1.3.10
10

This is distinct from the failure to notice that results from misunderstanding the attribute or
its relevance to production, as in Hanna et al (2014). The Pakistani cotton farmers surveyed in
PCS understand what Bt is, know how long they have been purchasing (what they think are) Bt
varieties, and can identify their varieties’ complex titles.
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Prob(s)
1

0.5

0

V 1*

B1i

Figure 1.3: No learning
Figure 1.3 shows that if it is impossible to deduce Bt, the probability of switching is constant
for all values (here, a tossup).

This model is useful not only for conceptualizing the learning process, but also
for estimating the benefits to industry from such a process. In Appendix A, I show
that if g takes a simple linear form, then it is easy to calculate how much learning
(or lack thereof) about Bt content helps (or harms) industry revenue.
Specifically, I assume a linear form P (S) = −α(B̃1i − V1∗ ) + g0 , where α > 0;11
the parameter α is the learning (and response) parameter. It measures the extent
to which farmers act, through variety selection in the next period, on the deduced
difference between Bt content and expectations. The intercept g0 captures the rate
of switching when values matches expectations; it can be 0.5 as in Figures 1.2-1.3
to generate a tossup, or it can be any other constant capturing the effect of other
variables on switching; this value does not affect any results. I also still allow for a
discrepancy between expectations and true market averages, V1∗ = E(B1 ) + γ.
11

The function would be bounded between 0 and 1.
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When these functional forms are used to calculate the expected change in Bt
content for each farmer with initial realization B̃1i from t1 to t2 based on their probabilistic switching decision, and to sum across all farmers to find the expected change
in Bt content averaged across the market, it can be shown (detailed calculations in
Appendix A) that:

E(∆B̃) = αpσ 2

(1.4)

The model therefore shows that as α, the extent of learning and response, and
p, the extent of variety integrity, increase, average Bt quality consumed rises in the
second period; this improvement is greater the larger the variance of Bt in the population. Conversely, if there is no learning, α = 0 (or no variety integrity, p = 0) then
average pest resistance is stagnant. Importantly, these conclusions are not affected
by farmer expectations: as long as the farmers have a uniform ex-ante expectation
V1∗ it does not matter that this expectation is accurate on average (γ = 0) or not.
The probability of switching may also depend on the standardized deviation from
expected content:
#
B̃1i − V1∗
+ 0.5
g(x) = −α
σ
"

(1.5)

In that case, Equation (1.4) is amended as follows:

E(∆B̃) = αpσ

(1.6)

With the average change in consumed Bt in the market E(∆B̃) in hand, we
can, with additional information on the effect of Bt on yield, estimate the extent
of monetary benefit to farmers from said improvement in average Bt. Appendix
B illustrates how different values of α and p translate to expected Bt improvement
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E(∆B̃) for a fixed σ, and how, using evidence-based benchmarks on the effect of Bt on
yield and revenue, this would then translate into sizable revenue gains for Pakistani
cotton farmers in one year.
In Section 1.5, I use Equation (1.5) to derive an empirical specification to test
the value of α or the negative of the slope of the curve in Figure 1.2, linearly
approximated. This would allow us to test for the presence of learning. With this
estimate, and for given values of p and σ, we can also infer how much average Bt
would improve from one period of learning and switching, and estimate monetary
gains.
There is a qualifier to this approach. If tests show that α is positive (Figure
1.2), we can conclude that farmers learn from experience and respond accordingly.
However, while absence of learning necessarily generates a zero slope (Figure 1.3),
the converse is not always true: having a zero slope or null coefficient does not
necessarily imply farmers have not learned. There remains the possibility that farmers
are able to gauge Bt levels from observing the crop’s pest resistance but do not respond
with switching varieties, and this would occur if they believe p = 0.
To see why it is rational for farmers to not respond to learned information through
seed selection if they believe p = 0, note that the expected content from switching (Eq.
1.1) and from not switching (Eq. 1.2) become equivalent, so the profit maximization
exercise that drives switching is invalidated.
Therefore, the empirical section will also gauge whether farmers believe p = 0 or
not. It is not possible from the data to test actual variety integrity, but it is possible
to gauge whether farmers believe switching varieties in response to low resistance is
an effective strategy i.e. if they believe that p > 0. Only then can we interpret a null
α coefficient (flat slope) as absence of learning.
Finally, I can check the underlying logic of the model and learning more directly.
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Farmers learn when attention and information costs are low enough to discern the
effects of the plant’s biophysical properties on resistance performance from the effects
of other factors. A positive α should be accompanied by analysis showing that higher
Bt content improves perceptions of the variety’s bollworm-resistance, while with a
null α we would not expect this relationship.

1.4 Data
I use data from the Pakistan Cotton Survey, which consists of four sequential
in-person surveys and one biophysical sample survey. The surveys were conducted by
the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) along with local agricultural
scientists between March 2013 and January 2015, on a random stratified sample of
727 farmers in Punjab and Sindh. These provinces account for 99% of all cotton
production in the country, and the sample is nationally representative.12
The first survey, Round 1.1, collected preliminary background data on 727 cotton
farmers through face to face interviews in March 2013, prior to the beginning of sowing
for the year. The farmers were asked about their personal and farming background
and history and various plot characteristics.
The second survey, Round 1.2, followed up with the farmers in October 2013,
after sowing was complete for the season but before harvest was completed. Only 601
of the farmers ended up sowing cotton in 2013. Farmers were asked, among other
things, about the variety purchased, whether they think their variety is Bt, cotton
cultivation by plot, input use (water, fertilizer, and pesticides), and access to social
networks and to credit.13
12

The surveys are accessible publicly from the Harvard Dataverse website.
Farmer answers show that social networks such as farmer coops are nearly nonexistent and that
the use of cash credit is negligible.
13
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The third survey, Round 1.3, followed up in January 2014 and at this time the last
picking was complete. The farmers were asked about input use, quantities harvested
and sold, revenue, and performance perceptions, as well as assets owned, general
consumption patterns, and decision-making by gender.14
The fourth survey, Round 2.1, went back to these farmers in January 2015 and
asked farmers the same questions as in Rounds 1.1-1.3, but this time for the 2014 harvest. The number of participants narrows further, as only 535 of those who cultivated
cotton in 2013 also did so in 2014.
The Biophysical Sample Survey took place in July and August of 2013, between
Round 1.1 and Round 1.2. Unlike the above, which were in-person interviews lasting
hours at a time, this survey involved the team first obtaining the farmer’s consent and
then, for those who sowed cotton in 2013, randomly selecting a few cotton leaves and
bolls at 70 and 120 days after sowing. The samples were taken to national laboratories
where they were tested for the presence of specific genes and toxins that contribute
to Bt expression; the methodology is detailed in Ma et al (2017).
Crucially to this study, the farmers were not made aware of the biophysical sample
results for the 2013 crop until early 2015, by which point the 2014 growing season
was also finished.
Figure 1.4 illustrates the timeline of the surveys and corresponding cultivation
stages. To my knowledge, this dataset has not been utilized beyond the studies conducted by the survey teams in Spielman et al (2017) and Ma et al (2017).

14

Nearly all decision makers in the dataset are male.
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Figure 1.4: Timeline of surveys and cultivation
Figure 1.4 describes the structure of the Pakistan Cotton Survey, chronologically and
content-wise. For each survey, I note the date it was taken, its title, and some of the
pertinent questions asked.

1.5 Econometric methodology
1.5.1 Specifications
To measure the extent of learning α, I regress variety switching in the next year
on standardized Bt content, or [(B̃1i − E(B))/σ], in the current year. This derives
directly from the specification in Equation (1.5), and generates a regression coefficient
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that is the slope of the linearized function in Figure 1.2. Bt content is seed-price
adjusted by including seed price as a control in the regression. It does not matter
whether or not E(B1 ) = V1∗ since subtracting any constant from the numerator does
not affect the value of the regression coefficient. By contrast, a heterogenous V1∗
would require farmer-specific fixed effects for empirical assessment, untenable in this
dataset because this is not multi-year panel data.
To ensure the assumption of homogenous expectations V1∗ holds, I only run the
regression on farmers who when they bought the seed said they believe it is a Bt seed.
This would roughly fix for ex-ante expectations.
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The main regression is:

Changei = β0 + β1 BtLeveli +

X

βj Controlsji + i

(1.7)

Change takes a value of 1 if the farmer switched varieties in 2014 and 0 otherwise,
Bt level is the (standardized) Bt effectiveness of the farmer’s 2013 variety as measured
by the Biophysical Sample Survey, and controls are other factors, occurring in 2013
or beforehand and including seed price, that can affect variety change in 2014.
I expect β1 < 0 if learning is present, with farmers who discover low Bt content more likely to switch and vice versa; β1 is equivalent to −α in the theoretical
model. Given that farmers did not have external information about the Bt content
of their variety, any learning about this attribute reflected in an impact on purchase
decisions in the next season would have been uncovered from cultivation experience.
Conversely, if there is no learning, Bt of the 2013 variety would not affect seed choice
the following year and I would expect β1 = 0.
Given acceptable controls, identification is straightforward. Bt level is measured
15

In the robustness checks in Section 1.7, I also include observations from farmers who thought
they were not purchasing Bt, or those who did not know, and I control for these different beliefs
using dummy variables. I show that the results do not change.
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for the 2013 variety while the choice to change varieties is made the following year.
Even without the time lapse, feedback in the other direction is ruled out: it is not
clear how farmer choice can affect a biological characteristic of the crop which is not
known in any verifiable way to the farmer themself ex-ante.
Next, to verify that farmers would resort to switching if they learned about Bt
content, I look at farmer perceptions. As explained in Section 1.3, farmers will only
switch from low-Bt seeds if they believe there is some variety integrity in the market.
In Round 1.3, immediately after the 2013 harvest was complete, farmers were asked
to evaluate the bollworm resistance of their crop as poor, moderate, or very good.
If farmers believe switching is an effective strategy for improving pest resistance (if
they believe p > 0), we expect them to switch varieties in 2014 if they felt their 2013
variety had poor resistance, all else constant. The relevant regression is:

Changei = γ0 + γ1 ResistanceP erceptioni +

X

γj Controlsji + i

(1.8)

If farmers believe p > 0 we would expect γ1 < 0: farmers who evaluate bollworm
resistance as lower are more likely to change seed variety next year; they do think
switching is an effective strategy for improving seed effectiveness. This would support
the behavior outlined in the theoretical model, so that a null β1 in Equation (1.7)
would signal the absence of learning as opposed to farmer unwillingness to switch.
The perceptions variable can also be used to sharpen the insight on the learning
process. Farmers learn about Bt content if they can distinguish the extent to which
pest resistance performance is driven by the biophysical attributes of the plant versus
environmental and other factors. We can regress perceptions on Bt content and on
those controls:

ResistanceP erceptioni = θ0 + θ1 BtContenti +
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X

θj Controlsji + i

(1.9)

θ1 > 0 would be a direct indication of learning, since it implies higher Bt content
improves the farmer’s perception of bollworm resistance. Therefore, we expect θ1 > 0
in Equation (1.9) to be associated with β1 < 0 in Equation (1.7). Conversely, if
learning is difficult, Bt effectiveness remains unknown because it is difficult to discern
the effect of the biophysical attribute of the plant on performance (θ1 = 0). This
would imply no impact of Bt on variety choice (β1 = 0). In both scenarios, however,
I expect γ1 < 0 from Equation (1.8), to signify that farmers believe there is some
market integrity and act as the model predicts.
Finally, it is possible to diverge from the theoretical model in Section 1.3 and
test whether farmers respond to low Bt content by increasing pesticide use during
cultivation instead of changing variety. The specification is:

P esticidei = φ0 + φ1 Btcontenti +

X

φj Controlsji + j

(1.10)

Pesticide measures pesticide use per acre in 2013. Learning would imply φ1 < 0,
since farmers realize that the plant itself is emitting toxins lethal to pests so that
they can use less pesticide. With no learning, φ1 is close to zero and insignificant.
However, this regression is only valid if farmers can learn about Bt content before
cultivation is over, so that there is room for adjusting input decisions in the same
season. It is not clear if this is the case or if input use in that season is predetermined
relative to Bt content. Therefore Equation (1.10) is not the focus of the discussion
but used as a supplemental result.
Table 1.1 summarizes the possible coefficient combinations and interpretations.
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Table 1.1: Coefficient combinations and interpretation
β1
<0
=0
=0
=0

γ1

θ1

<0
=0
=0
<0

>0
>0
>0
=0

φ1

Interpretation

<0
=0

Farmers learn and change variety accordingly.
Farmers learn but do not change variety.
Farmers learn but respond by changing input.
Farmers are unable to learn.

Table 1.1 summarizes the possible meaningful combinations of coefficients and their corresponding economic interpretations. The coefficients in Columns 1-4 are derived from
Equations (1.7)-(1.10). β1 measures the effect of an increase of Bt level on the probability
of variety change; γ1 measures the effect of improved perceptions of bollworm resistance on
the probability of variety change; θ1 measures the effect of an increase of Bt level on the
probability of having improved perceptions; and φ1 measures the effect of an increase of Bt
level on the use of pesticides.

1.5.2 Sample
The above empirical exercises inform my sample restriction to 301 households.
First, only 535 households sowed cotton in both 2013 and 2014. I restrict my sample
to those where the biophysical sample was taken from the “main” plot, as each farmer
can farm multiple plots but the data is comprehensive about what each farmer identifies as their main plot. Out of those, I need households that farmed only one cotton
variety on the plot from which the biophysical sample was taken in 2013, because
otherwise it is impossible to tell which variety the lab tests correspond to. Finally, it
is important to fix ex-ante expectations, in line with the theoretical model. I focus
only on farmers who believed they were cultivating a Bt variety in 2013, answering
’Yes’ when asked, pre-cultivation, if their variety is Bt effective.
In Section 1.7, I check that this sample construction does not bias nor inform my
results. First, I use the farmer’s qualitative answers to show that those who exited
production in 2014 cited environmental reasons such as high water logging or personal
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reasons such as preference for another crop; none cited problems with bollworms.
Second, I run regressions that include the handful of farmers who cultivated more
than one variety, using “pseudo” Bt results for them through information from other
farmers who cultivated the same variety. Third, I run regressions that include farmers
who did not think they were planting Bt, or who did not have an opinion on what
they were planting, and fix for these expectations using dummy variables. In all
robustness checks, the results hold. Finally, I show that the key characteristics for
farmers in and out of the sample are not statistically different.

1.5.3 Variables
Key variables are constructed as follows. Change is binary: it takes a value of 1 if
the farmer changed the variety they cultivated between 2013 and 2014, and 0 if they
cultivated the same variety both years. Resistance perception is a three-level dummy
variable connoting “poor”, “moderate”, and “very good”. When used as a dependent
variable in Equation (1.9), however, I cluster it into binary levels “poor/moderate”
and “very good” to allow for a linear probability model; I check that results are
similar with an ordered multi-level logit. Pesticide measures effective pesticide use
for the 2013 season per acre, which I construct by weighing the quantity of different
pesticides used (in mL) by their percentage strengths, adding them, and dividing by
acres of cotton cultivated. Using a measure without weighing by percent strengths
does not affect results.
The main independent variable of interest, Bt level, is the standardized expression
level of the Bt cry protein as measured by the labs’ sandwich ELISA tests for the
2013 varieties. It is measured in micrograms of the protein per gram of leaf tissue.
A higher level indicates more toxin, therefore a greater effectiveness in targeting and
eliminating bollworms. For each farmer/variety, the survey team randomly collected
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2 leaf and 2 boll tissues from the main plot, at both 70 days after sowing and 120
days after sowing, and measured the toxin expression for each of these. My variable
is an average of the measurements 70 days after sowing for each variety. The data for
120 days after sowing is less complete and has more variation per observation, but
the results do not change even when I include it in the analysis.
For controls, in Equation (1.7) and (1.8) I control for other factors that can affect
variety selection:
• Farmer characteristics that may influence how the farmer deals with their crop
(education, years of general farming experience, years of experience cultivating
what they think is Bt cotton, land owned as proxy for wealth).
• Planting history for the specific 2013 variety.
• Price per unit of the seed variety purchased for the 2013 season.
• Price per unit of post-harvest cotton fetched by the 2013 variety.16
• Input intensity (irrigation, Nitrogen fertilizer, labor, and seeds sowed, all per
acre of cotton cultivated).
• Dummies for geographical district, since the observations belong to 22 districts,
each of which share ecological and cultural properties that very likely affect
cultivation attitudes.
The controls are all measured in 2013 or beforehand, hence predetermined relative
to the dependent variable Change.
In addition to the above controls, for Equation (1.9), exogenous pest intensity
affects resistance performance and should also be controlled for but no reliable infor16

Cotton selling price is distinct from yield performance and captures desirable qualities such as
whiteness of the cotton and quality of the lint.
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mation on this is available. Since it appears that pest intensity is time- and spacedependent, I assume that controlling for time-of-sowing and geographical district can
be roughly sufficient. For Equation (1.10), I also control for soil type (since it can
impact pesticide absorption).
Appendix C details how these control variables are constructed. It also illustrates their distribution, as well as the distribution of the key dependent variables, in
the data.

1.6 Results and discussion
1.6.1 Results
Table 1.2 shows the results from four versions of Equation (1.7). All are linear
probability models to facilitate interpretation, with robust standard errors (adjusted
for heteroskedasticity) including in subsequent tables. The 95% confidence intervals
are noted below each coefficient.
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Table 1.2: Effect of Bt level on variety change

Dependent variable:
Changed variety
(1)
Bt level (standardized)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.001

−0.002

0.002

0.004

(−0.061, 0.064)

(−0.065, 0.062)

(−0.061, 0.064)

(−0.060, 0.068)

0.008

0.014∗∗

0.013∗∗

(−0.004, 0.020)

(0.003, 0.026)

(0.001, 0.025)

0.008∗∗∗

0.007∗∗

(0.002, 0.014)

(0.001, 0.013)

Education
Farming experience

∗∗∗

−0.078∗∗∗

−0.074

Years variety grown

(−0.128, −0.020)

(−0.132, −0.023)

∗∗

−0.036∗∗

−0.040

Years Bt grown

(−0.075, −0.006)

(−0.071, −0.001)

∗

Land owned
Purchase price (seed)
Selling price (cotton)

−0.007

−0.007∗

(−0.014, 0.001)

(−0.014, 0.0001)

−0.0002

−0.0004

−0.0003

(−0.001, 0.0003)

(−0.001, 0.0002)

(−0.001, 0.0002)

−0.024

−0.023

−0.023

(−0.054, 0.006)

(−0.054, 0.007)

(−0.055, 0.009)
−0.0001

Irrigation

(−0.0002, 0.00003)
−0.0003

Fertilizer

(−0.002, 0.001)
0.030∗∗

Seed amount

(0.005, 0.055)
Labor

0.0004
(−0.0002, 0.001)

Pesticide

0.00000
(−0.00004, 0.00005)

District FE
Observations

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

301

301

301

301

R2

0.217

0.229

0.283

0.307

Adjusted R2

0.149

0.153

0.201

0.212

Residual SE

0.459 (df = 276)

0.458 (df = 273)

0.445 (df = 269)

0.442 (df = 264)

∗

p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Table 1.2 demonstrates the results of Equation (1.7), taking into account different control specifications to show robustness. Across specifications, Bt content does not influence
variety change in the next year.
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Column 1 regresses Change only on standardized Bt level in 2013 and on district
controls. Column 2 also takes into account variables that may be correlated with
Bt level and impact the dependent variable: education, seed purchase price, and
cotton selling price. As argued in the theoretical model, controlling for seed price is
important because Bt content should be price-adjusted. Meanwhile, cotton selling
price must be controlled for if it is correlated to Bt, i.e. if bollworms cause damage
not only to yield but also to quality, which is captured in the cotton selling price
variable.17
Column 3 adds variables which are exogenous to Bt level but may affect variety
choice, whose inclusion therefore improves precision: farmer characteristics such as
farming experience, planting history, and wealth. Column 4 adds the input variables
whose role in the decision making process is more questionable. Farmers that intensify
input use and obtain higher yield may be more inclined to keep the same variety the
next year, or, behaving more rationally, they may distinguish that higher yield is due
to own input choices thereby leaving variety choice unaffected. Yield is not included
in the regressions because it qualifies as a bad control: the effect of Bt content, if
learned, on farmer choice would operate largely through its effect on yield.
The consistent result is that the Bt level as measured in-lab bears no effect on the
proclivity to keep or change the seed variety in the next year. Point estimates are
very small and close to zero. They indicate that a one standard deviation increase
in Bt level is associated with a change in the probability of variety change of −0.5%
to +0.2%, depending on the specification. A 95% confidence interval can rule out
negative effects larger than 7% in absolute value across all specifications.
The coefficients on the control variables possess the expected signs. Higher cotton
17

Cotton selling price is exogenous to each farmer’s production since the farmers are small and
therefore price takers.
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selling prices reduce the chance that the farmer will change the variety the next year,
but seed purchase prices have coefficients that are close to zero and insignificant,
confirming the qualitative evidence in the surveys that seed prices are neither high
nor prohibitive in the Pakistani cotton market. The input coefficients are nearly all
close to zero and insignificant, implying that farmers who raise yield through input
use realize that higher yield is due to input intensity and not necessarily seed quality,
leaving variety choices unaffected.18
Farmer characteristics are evidently important: higher education and general
farming experience increase the rate at which farmers change their varieties, suggesting that these farmers are more informed about different varieties and willing to
experiment. Experience with Bt cotton cultivation and with the 2013 variety reduces
the probability of variety change, suggesting that farmers become more comfortable
with that variety over time and/or know how to cultivate it more efficiently, reducing
the extent of variety change.
Table 1.3 shows that the results change significantly when we assess the impact of
farmer perceptions of bollworm resistance on variety change. Column 1 regresses the
dependent variable, Change, only on perceptions and district fixed effects, Column 2
adds farmer characteristics, seed purchase price, and cotton sale price as these can
improve precision, and Column 3 adds two variables, pesticide use and yield, which
may affect Change but whose exogeneity to perceptions is not clear.19
18
The exception is seeds sowed which is positive and significant. Possibly, varieties sowed more
intensely were ones failing to grow properly, hence a higher likelihood that the variety is changed.
19
Pesticide use may be driven by resistance perceptions, and yield and perceptions are likely
correlated but it is not clear which affects which.
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Table 1.3: Effect of perceptions on variety change

Dependent variable:
Changed variety

Moderate
Very Good

(1)

(2)

(3)

−0.112
(−0.271, 0.047)
−0.175∗∗
(−0.346, −0.004)

−0.152∗
(−0.307, 0.003)
−0.191∗∗
(−0.354, −0.028)
0.016∗∗∗
(0.004, 0.028)
0.008∗∗∗
(0.003, 0.014)
−0.072∗∗∗
(−0.126, −0.019)
−0.044∗∗
(−0.078, −0.010)
−0.007∗
(−0.014, 0.001)
−0.0004
(−0.001, 0.0001)
−0.021
(−0.052, 0.011)

−0.125
(−0.287, 0.036)
−0.164∗
(−0.332, 0.005)
0.016∗∗∗
(0.004, 0.027)
0.008∗∗∗
(0.003, 0.014)
−0.074∗∗∗
(−0.127, −0.020)
−0.045∗∗
(−0.079, −0.011)
−0.007∗
(−0.014, 0.001)
−0.0004
(−0.001, 0.0002)
−0.020
(−0.052, 0.012)
0.016
(−0.129, 0.160)
−0.071
(−0.171, 0.030)

Yes

Yes

Yes

301
0.229
0.159
0.456 (df = 275)

301
0.297
0.214
0.441 (df = 268)

301
0.302
0.212
0.441 (df = 266)

Education
Farming experience
Years variety grown
Years Bt grown
Land owned
Purchase price (seed)
Selling price (cotton)
Pesticide
Yield (log)
District FE
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual SE

∗

p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Table 1.3 demonstrates the results of Equation (1.8), taking into account different control
specifications to show robustness. Across specifications, improved perceptions of bollworm
resistance decrease the probability that the farmer will change varieties next year.
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The result across specifications is that farmers are less likely to change the variety
purchased in 2014 when their perception of bollworm resistance for the 2013 season
is more positive. Depending on the specification, farmers who viewed resistance as
moderate are 11.2 to 15.2% less likely to change variety in the next year than those
who viewed it as poor, and this is significant or almost significant at the 10% level.
Farmers who viewed resistance performance as very good are 16.4 to 19.1% less likely
to change variety next year than those who viewed it as poor, and this is consistently
significant at the 5 or 10% level. Therefore, farmers do change variety more often
when they assess that the crop has exhibited poor resistance to bollworms. The
controls possess similar signs and interpretations to those in Table 1.2.
Next, Table 1.4 explores the role of Bt content in informing farmer perceptions.
From the null result in Table 1.2, we would expect that farmers are unable to
accurately assess the degree to which perceived resistance is an outcome of biophysical
attributes (Bt), and this is corroborated.
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38
301
0.284
0.190
0.446 (df = 265)

Yes

301
0.287
0.187
0.447 (df = 263)

Yes

0.00005
(−0.0004, 0.001)

−0.021
(−0.073, 0.031)
0.006
(−0.007, 0.018)

−0.019
(−0.071, 0.032)

301
0.289
0.177
0.450 (df = 259)

Yes

−0.021
(−0.074, 0.032)
0.006
(−0.007, 0.019)
−0.0002
(−0.006, 0.006)
0.002
(−0.054, 0.057)
0.003
(−0.033, 0.040)
0.0001
(−0.0004, 0.001)

(3)

∗

p<0.1;

301
0.292
0.177
0.450 (df = 258)

Yes

∗∗

−0.022
(−0.076, 0.031)
0.007
(−0.006, 0.020)
0.0002
(−0.006, 0.006)
0.001
(−0.054, 0.057)
0.001
(−0.036, 0.038)
0.00005
(−0.0004, 0.001)
−0.00002
(−0.0001, 0.00003)

(4)

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

301
0.294
0.201
0.443 (df = 265)

Yes

0.111∗∗
(0.013, 0.209)

(5)

Table 1.4 demonstrates the results of Equation (1.9), taking into account different control specifications to show robustness. In
Columns 1-4, Bt content does not systematically influence farmer perceptions of the bollworm-resistance performance of their crop.
Column 5 shows that yield is positively correlated with farmer perceptions.

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual SE

District
& sowing-time FE

Yield per acre(log)

Pesticide

Seed price

Years Bt grown

Years variety grown

Farming experience

Education

Bt level (standardized)

(2)

(1)

Perception (Very Good)

Dependent variable:

Table 1.4: Effect of Bt level on perception formation

The dependent variable is perception of the farmer about bollworm resistance
in 2013, lumped into Poor/Moderate or Very Good, and taking a binary value of 0
and 1 respectively, and the key independent variable is standardized Bt content. I
lump the dependent variable so I can perform a linear probability model, for ease of
interpretation, but I perform robustness checks with an ordered logit (Section 1.7).
Identification comes from the fact that the biophysical attributes can impact
farmer perceptions six months later but not vice versa, and multiple specifications are
estimated. Column 1 regresses perception on standardized Bt content and on time
and district controls (omitted). Column 2 adds education and seed purchase price
because they may be correlated with Bt level and perceptions, while Column 3 adds
years of experience and planting history to improve precision. Column 4 adds pesticide whose exogeneity is not clear: pesticide use may affect perceptions or existing
perceptions may dictate pesticide use, or a combination of the two.
In all specifications Bt content does not inform perception formation. The coefficients on standardized Bt content are small and insignificant, and positive effects
greater than 3% can be ruled out in all specifications at the 95% level. The coefficients
on farmer characteristics, planting history, and input use are also insignificant. Dummies on sowing time and district controls (omitted) are the only ones carrying some
significance, indicating that perceptions are dictated largely by exogenous (time- and
space- dependent) pest intensity or other unobservable or unmeasured factors.
Column 5 explores the possibility that perceptions of bollworm resistance are
driven by yield outcomes. Yield cannot be included in the other regressions because
it would be a bad control, so I regress the dependent perception variable only on
log of yield per acre and on sowing time and district controls. The association is
positive and significant: a 1% increase in yield per acre is associated with 11% greater
likelihood of viewing resistance as very good instead of poor/moderate. This result
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is not causally identified: it is unclear whether yield informs perception or whether
perception drives behavior that affects yield, since both responses were elicited from
farmers during the same survey round. Nonetheless, this correlation result is robust
including when inputs are controlled for.
Finally, Table 1.5 examines the possibility that Bt content can be uncovered and
impact not variety choice next season but pesticide use in the same season. Identification comes from the fact that the biophysical property of the variety purchased
(Bt content) is not driven by the farmer’s (subsequent) input choices.
Column 1 regresses pesticide use only on standardized Bt content as well as time
of sowing, district, and soil-type controls (omitted). Column 2 adds education which
may be correlated with Bt content and impact pesticide use, while Column 3 adds
farmer characteristics, area cultivated, and the intensity of seeds planted per acre to
improve precision. Column 4 incorporates irrigation and fertilizer use per acre since
different inputs may be used in complementary quantities, though the direction of
causation is not identified.
Across specifications, Bt content does not affect pesticide use. Other results are
that more educated farmers use pesticide more, sowing seeds more intensively needs
greater pesticide use, and fertilizer and pesticide use are complementary.
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Table 1.5: Effect of Bt level on pesticide use

Dependent variable:
Pesticide use

Bt level (standardized)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

−0.007

−0.008

0.001

0.001

(−0.076, 0.063)

(−0.077, 0.061)

(−0.069, 0.071)

(−0.065, 0.068)

∗∗

Education

0.012

(0.001, 0.024)
Farming experience
Years variety grown
Years Bt grown
Land owned
Area Cultivated

∗

0.012

0.011∗

(−0.0002, 0.025)

(−0.002, 0.024)

0.0005

0.001

(−0.005, 0.006)

(−0.004, 0.006)

−0.018

−0.018

(−0.062, 0.025)

(−0.062, 0.026)

−0.022

−0.022

(−0.056, 0.012)

(−0.055, 0.011)

0.0002

0.001

(−0.006, 0.006)

(−0.005, 0.007)

−0.001

−0.001

(−0.006, 0.004)

(−0.007, 0.004)
−0.00001

Irrigation

(−0.0001, 0.0001)
0.002∗∗

Fertilizer

(0.0001, 0.003)
∗∗

Seed amount

District, time,

0.036∗∗∗

0.035

Yes

Yes

(0.007, 0.063)

(0.009, 0.063)

Yes

Yes

and soil FE
Observations

301

301

301

301

R2

0.303

0.319

0.350

0.366

Adjusted R2

0.199

0.214

0.232

0.245

Residual SE

0.385 (df = 261)

0.381 (df = 260)

0.377 (df = 254)

0.373 (df = 252)

∗

p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Table 1.5 demonstrates the results of Equation (1.10), taking into account different control
specifications to show robustness. Across specifications, Bt content does not affect pesticide
use.
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1.6.2 Discussion
The results are consistent and suggest that farmers are unable to learn about
an important attribute of their seeds through cultivation experience, at least after
one round of harvest. They are unable to distinguish the role of the seed itself in
resistance (Table 1.4) and to switch varieties next year accordingly (Table 1.2).
This is evidence of lack of learning, and not of unwillingness to switch, precisely
because farmers do use switching to combat what they perceive as poor resistance
(Table 1.3). Inability to discover Bt content through cultivation may also be evident
in the absence of an appropriate response through input use (Table 1.5). The results
correspond to row 4 in Table 1.1, with β1 < 0, γ1 < 0, θ1 = 0, φ1 = 0.
The absence of learning implies that market outcomes are stagnant. Average
Bt content does not improve and farmers do not benefit from gradually enhanced
varieties on the market. To calculate the extent of losses from lack of learning, I
rely on informed estimates of the size of Pakistan’s cotton cultivation industry and
of the effect of Bt on damage abatement, detailed in Appendix B. Those estimates
suggest that if average Bt improves in the long run from the in-sample level of 0.88
µg
g

to the maximum-effectiveness level of 1.59

µg
,
g

yield would have improved by up

to 170 million, or 12.5% of industry revenue in 2014.
Of course, these results are market and attribute-specific. Learning about an
unknown attribute that has a clear effect on an observable outcome, because of the
absence of confounding factors eit , would be significantly easier. For example, in
cotton, fiber whiteness is the outcome primarily of the seed’s biophysical property,
so white-fiber varieties could probably be deduced easily ex-post. Such examples
notwithstanding, it is likely that many properties that are important for productivity
are confounded by other factors, and are therefore difficult to deduce from cultivation
experience alone, in the absence of certification standards or information provision.
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1.7 Alternative explanations and robustness checks
The results from the following exercises are all presented in Appendix D.

1.7.1 Learning from others
The above assumes that if information is learned about Bt content, it is through
the farmer’s own cultivation experience. Neighbor effects are not included because
for each farmer there are very few other farmers within the same village (smaller unit
than district) who can therefore be possible peers. Also, there is no information about
how far the villagers are, geographically or socially, so it is possible (even likely, with
a stratified sample) that the farmers in each village are far apart and less relevant
to each other than true next-door peers. This makes it very difficult to construct a
measure of peer effects without a large degree of error and without introducing bias
in the regression.
Nonetheless, as a robustness check to incorporate some measure of peer effects,
I identify the other farmers in the same village as potential peers. If there is social
learning, we expect a farmer to be more likely to switch the higher is the Bt of peers
who purchased a different variety. Table D1 shows the results when a “peer” variable
is integrated into the main regressions (of Table 1.2). The coefficient on the peer
variable is null (as is the coefficient on the farmer’s own Bt level) indicating that there
is little to no peer learning.

1.7.2 Different behavioral responses
It is possible that farmers react to low Bt content by switching suppliers in the
next year instead of changing variety. I do not have data on supplier switching because
suppliers are not named but I construct a best guess estimate for 207 observations (the
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others did not answer the questions necessary to construct this estimate). I assume
the supplier changed if the farmer lists a different type of supplier institution in 2014
or if the farmer lists the same type of institution but the commuting time changed
significantly. Based on this, I estimate that two-thirds of the farmers did not change
their supplier. Figure D1 shows no correlation between the change in supplier and
Bt content. It appears unlikely that learning occurred and drove supplier switching.
Another possibility is that the farmers uncovered Bt content but reacted by exiting cotton production altogether. There is insufficient information to control for
factors that influence exit, but, qualitatively, farmers who exited cite predominantly
environmental reasons in the surveys as shown in Figure D2. Additionally, Figure
D3 shows no difference in the mean Bt gene expression between the group that exited
and the one that remained.

1.7.3 Sample selection bias
It is possible that farmers who planted more than one variety are naturally those
who experiment more and learn better from their crop, which would make their exclusion in the sample bias the results downward. To address this issue, it is impossible
to know, for farmers who planted more than variety, which variety the laboratory Bt
results correspond to, but I construct a “pseudo” Bt variable for these farmers per
variety. This is based on the average Bt for that variety found for the other (onevariety per plot) farmers in the sample. Table D2 includes these formerly-excluded
observations (41 observations across 20 farmers) to the main regressions (of Table
1.2), and shows that the main results of no learning still hold.
In the sample, I also focus on farmers who believe they are farming Bt because
they are the vast majority (301 observations) and to maintain ease of interpretation
with fixed beliefs. However, it is possible that adding farmers who did not believe they
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were planting Bt (37 observations) and those who “do not know” (62 observations),
and fixing for these beliefs using dummy variables, can add information that alters the
results; this would be a question of external validity. An issue is whether it is sensible
to consider the second largest group, the “do not know”, as having homogenous
ex-ante expectations. Still, to examine roughly this question of external validity, I
interact the Bt variable with these belief dummies to observe whether the results from
Table 1.2 change; Table D3 indicates that the main regression results hold. It can
also be shown that combining both excluded sampling levels, by including farmers
who cultivated more than one variety and those who have different beliefs, leaves the
result of no learning unchanged.
Finally, Table D4 shows that the farmers in sample (301) and out (426), out
of the total 737 farmers surveyed in Round 1.1 (but of whom only 535 finished all
rounds), are similar in average age, education, years of farming experience, the area
of the main plot they operate on, and the total area of land they own. The significant
difference is province: the in-sample group is more heavily skewed toward Punjab than
Sindh. Hence, the results from the in-sample regressions are likely representative, at
least roughly, of farmers in the survey, who are in turn nationally representative.

1.7.4 Measurement error
It is possible that the behavioral models, empirical specifications, and sampling
methods are sound, but that insignificance is due to attrition bias from measurement
error in the key explanatory variable. The Bt variable is based on a sample of two
random plants from each farmer’s plot, taking a leaf and a boll from each plant.
Whereas leaf values seem to be significantly correlated between the two plants for each
farmer, the boll values seem to be much less correlated. Therefore, it is possible that
that sample does not accurately represent the “true” Bt Level for the variety grown
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by that farmer (which we could only know by sampling all plants, i.e. destroying the
plot).
In Table D5 I redefine Bt content variable to reduce possible measurement error
and rerunning the regression in Column 3 in Table 1.2. In Column 1, I use an average
of the leaf values only instead of leaf and boll. In Column 2, I still use the leaf values
but with one value as an instrument for the other.20 In Column 3, I use a subsample
where the leaf values per farmer are nearly identical. As shown, the results do not
change in any significant way. Therefore, while the size of the biophysical sample
per farmer is small and measurement error may certainly exist, it does not appear
that Bt content, even measured more restrictively, impacts seed choice as expected if
learning is present.
Finally, one point of reassurance about the biophysical samples not being too far
off mark are the findings in Ma et al (2017) that, in a damage abatement model,
Bt content based off of the measurements 70 days after sowing significantly improves
yield, holding all else fixed, for these farmers in the Pakistan Cotton Survey.

1.7.5 Additional robustness checks
To further check the robustness of the main regression, I focus on Column 3 in
Table 1.2 and introduce in Table D6: (i) a squared term for Bt level to allow for
nonlinear effects, (ii) an interaction variable of Bt level with education to allow for
differential effects by education level, and (iii) a variation where the variable “years
that variety is grown” is a sequence of dummy variables, to allow for a nonlinear
effect of cultivation years on variety choices. I also (iv) re-estimate the model with a
logistic regression, using Firth’s bias-reduced version of the logit which penalizes to
20

The idea is that this will eliminate correlated noise or measurement error; a similar approach is
used in Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994).
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prevent overfitting and small-sample bias. Therefore, this latter check in particular
is very useful. To check the effects of clustering the dependent variable in Table 1.4,
I estimate Column 3 as an ordered logit, with perceptions taking all three values and
ordered as such (Table D7).
Finally, the above checks introduce a few alternative specifications. To test robustness much more widely, I utilize specification curve analysis, where all the plausible
and valid controls are combined and/or omitted in hundreds or thousands of different
ways, and the coefficient of interest estimated and plotted across all specifications
(Simohnson et al, 2015; Rohrer, 2018; Orben et al, 2019). The results are shown, for
all four specifications in Equations (1.7)-(1.10), in Figure D4, Figure D5, Figure
D6 and Figure D7, respectively.
In all of these, the findings in Section 1.6 remain robust.

1.8 Conclusion
In developing countries, information challenges are ubiquitous and pronounced.
It is often difficult to accurately evaluate financial borrowers, to design incentivecompatible mechanisms, to assess which technologies maximize efficiency, to know
how to best adapt new technical and organizational skills, and to assess which government policies are most likely to support growth.
Agricultural producers in particular face rife information problems, including when
they import and adapt foreign technologies for which local government certification
and standardization are weak or nonexistent. With imported and adapted seedbased technologies, farmers are likely to not know important attributes if varieties
are not certified, leaving room for potential learning ex-post by observing cultivation
outcomes. In the absence of externally verifiable information and if heterogeneity of
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growing conditions mutes learning from peers, such a process of learning from own
experience is particularly valuable. Learning about and plugging information gaps
is not just a question of microeconomic behavior; at the macro level, if it allows
farmers to make more informed choices over time then it improves productivity, with
implications for growth and competitiveness.
Drawing on this context, I model a process whereby farmers can learn about the
variety through cultivation experience and make more informed decisions in the next
season. I then use this model to derive econometric specifications to test for learning, since whether agents can learn and redress information problems is ultimately
an empirical question. Using a rich dataset, I apply the empirical exercises to cotton cultivation in Pakistan, where there is imperfect information about an imported
and adapted pest-resistance technology (the Bt gene). I use a number of behavioral
outcomes to evaluate whether farmers can learn about this attribute of their seed on
which they lack prior information.
The results indicate that cultivation experience is not sufficient to redress the
information gap. Farmers are unable to uncover the Bt content of their crop even
after cultivation and harvest are complete, likely because of the existence of other
confounding factors that are difficult to measure or parse out. As a result, Bt content
does not inform farmer perceptions of their crop’s pest resistance nor their choices
about variety purchases in the next season. This impedes gains at the farmer level as
well as wider improvement in crop productivity in the Pakistani cotton market. The
absence of learning is robust across different specifications and behavioral outcomes
that can signal learning, and points to a persistent information failure in the absence
of external policy intervention.
Nonetheless, the prescription of external information provision as a solution is
qualified. In the case of the Pakistani cotton market, information provision by the
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government is itself difficult, given that the weak capacities of the Pakistani state
contributed to the proliferation of information failures in the first place. Therefore,
the paper illustrates the dual dilemma in many developing countries, where market
failures must be addressed by potentially equally limited government institutions.
Any policy solution to address information failures must take both private and public
constraints into account to be effective.
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CHAPTER

2

EFFORTFUL LEARNING BY DOING:
A PRELIMINARY SYNTHESIS

2.1 Introduction
Economic theorists have long understood that experience on-the-job can generate
knowledge and improve technology and productivity. In his pioneering article on
endogenous growth in 1962, Kenneth Arrow suggested that contrary to then-popular
theories of exogenous technology change, technical change is a process of learning
about the environment in which we operate, whereby “learning is the product of
experience.” (p.155) Arrow argued that this process of learning by doing, whereby
people learn to improve their productivity by solving similar problems repeatedly
during the very activity of production, is central to how firms operate. Since then,
theoretical work on learning by doing has been expansive (Thompson, 2010), as has
work on other mechanisms of endogenous knowledge creation including research and
development (Sveikauskas, 2007) and human capital (Fleischhauer, 2007).
The economics literature on learning by doing has largely conceptualized learning
on the job as a passive process, whereby production experience automatically reduces
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costs per unit, therefore improving productivity. To measure production experience,
the early literature used cumulative investment (e.g. Arrow, 1962; Sheshinski, 1967)
but later literature has focused on cumulative output as the measure of experience.
Despite these and other points of differentiation, the unifying assumption in this
literature has been that greater production experience definitively and automatically
leads to lower costs and improved productivity in the future. The real theoretical
focus is not on the learning process, but on the implications of this assumed process
for issues such as market structure, trade policy, and pricing policies, among others.
Applied to developing countries, a core implication of learning by doing is that infant
industry policies that help new industries achieve scale when they are still at low levels
of competitiveness will facilitate productivity growth and development (Bardhan,
1971; Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1988; Wade, 2003; Chang, 2007).21
Despite the salience of the assumption of automatic learning by doing in numerous
economics models, empirical evidence for this process, through firm-level regressions
of productivity on cumulative output, has been mixed at best as well as methodologically problematic (Thompson, 2012). And in the context of developing countries and
infant industries, government support of nascent industry expansion has been both
successful and unsuccessful in generating sizeable productivity gains (Bell et al, 1982;
Khan, 2010; Juhasz, 2018). The mixed outcomes suggest that learning by doing is
a highly differentiated and context-based process, and that at least some important
factors are necessary to facilitate the effective acquisition and use of knowledge (i.e.
learning) from production experience.
Motivated by the potential importance of learning from experience in developing countries, alongside the lack of evidence that this process is (anywhere) a simple
21
This would be the case in the presence of market failures that prevent firms from being able to
privately loss-finance in the initial stages of production.
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byproduct of scale, this paper draws on firm-level case studies to reexamine how
firms actually learn with production experience. These case studies can be classified
broadly into two groups. The first are case studies from management and organizational theory; this literature is focused on advanced economy firms and on implications
of experiential learning for the firm’s strategic practices rather than wider economic
implications, but it still offers rich and detailed insights into how firms acquire and
effectively use knowledge with practice. The second are case studies, largely in the
evolutionary economics tradition, which explore how developing country firms build
nascent production and innovation capabilities; this literature provides useful insights
into knowledge acquisition during the development process but is less concerned with
providing a systematic assessment of the organizational underpinnings of these learning processes.
I show that in the case studies, across the board, mastering and applying new
knowledge from production experience is neither a guaranteed nor straightforward
byproduct of production. Instead, it involves the conscious dedication of time, energy,
and resources to uncover tacit knowledge and learn from trial and error on the job,
and to apply these problem-solving skills to improve performance. I also argue that
the gulf between passive learning by doing and how learning is actually acquired from
experience is especially vast in developing country firms. This is because adverse
initial conditions necessitate highly deliberative efforts to benefit from any production
experience. When learning is elicited from production experience, it represents an
important vehicle for productivity growth in these firms, underlying the need to
understand this process beyond simplistic abstractions.
I synthesize these case-based findings to argue that learning by doing is an effortful process. I use “effort” to describe costly and deliberative investments which
are distinct from “pure” production costs, which condition learning from experience,
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and whose costs are incurred on the site of production.22 I show why this process,
which I term effortful learning by doing, is distinct from processes whereby resources
that emerge externally to production, such as R&D and school-based human capital, augment learning from experience.23 When learning from scale is conditioned by
additional investments in a costly resource, then what constitutes these investments
(efforts) and the costs (relative to benefits) of financing them will determine whether
learning is forthcoming or not. I argue that the effort conditions necessary to generate learning from scale in a developing country context have not been sufficiently
explored and that this area would benefit from further case-based research.
To illustrate the potential usefulness of an explicit analysis of effort in the learning
by doing process, particularly in a development context, I examine two case studies of
failed historical episodes of state-assisted learning by doing in history, one in Thailand
from 1963-1969 (Bell et al, 1982) and one in Pakistan from 1949-1971 (Khan, 1999).
Both studies suggest that at least in infant industry experiences where governments
were involved in loss-financing initial stages of learning, one possible reason (out of
others) that results have been so mixed is varying political willingness or ability to
elicit the effort necessary to learn from scale, even when scale itself is incentivized
through direct or indirect subsidization of production costs. This includes failure to
institute credible reward and penalty systems for the evaluation and fulfillment of key
productivity targets on the job. In turn, the absence of effort breaks the link between
doing and subsequent learning. In explaining why appropriate incentive structures
were not put into place, the first study stresses policy shortsightedness and failure,
22

Effort can include intangible investments such as attention and focus, as well as tangible investments such as monitoring, documenting, and evaluating response strategies to problems encountered
on the job.
23
Different resources (effort endogenous to production and skills exogenous to production) can
facilitate learning from experience all together, but the point remains that they are conceptually
distinct investments.
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while the second emphasizes deeper political economy constraints that evolved from
the broader society and polity.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it directs attention to the importance of integrating insights from management studies, organizational behavioral
theory, and evolutionary economics into theories of learning by doing.24 This has been
neglected likely due to methodological boundaries between the models of mainstream
economics and the use of qualitative case studies in other approaches and disciplines.
In contrast to the passive learning by doing literature, I provide details about the
“how” of learning by doing and why it matters, albeit informally. And, in contrast
to the management and organizational behavior literature, I embed this discussion
within broader concerns of economic growth. This paper is closest to the evolutionary
economics tradition, in its focus on the firm as an adaptive organization operating in
an uncertain environment (Nelson and Winter, 1982) and in its integration of questions of development, but it adds value by providing a more explicit treatment of the
process of deliberative and costly learning by doing.
Second, the paper contextualizes this issue of how people learn on the job in
a development context. It uses the discussion to highlight why plans to increase
scale for productivity purposes are not straightforward and why these issues are most
useful when discussed with explicit attention to the necessary incentive structures to
elicit effort in learning from production experience. Though this is by no means new
insight, I argue that it has not been subject to systematic analysis in the development
literature and would benefit from further research.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 overviews the main tenants of the economics literature on passive learning by doing and the mixed nature of econometric
24

The paper provides a preliminary qualitative synthesis of the key issues. How this may be done
formally is left for future research.
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evidence. Section 2.3 turns to a closer examination of what it means to learn from
production experience, with reference to case-based evidence from management studies and organizational theory. Section 2.4 uses case studies on developing country
firms to reinforce the findings in the previous section, and it explores why underdevelopment may heighten the complexity (as opposed to passivity) of the learning
process. Section 2.5 situates what I term effortful learning by doing relative to other
modes of knowledge acquisition, such as R&D and human capital, and discusses some
implications for the incentivization of effort. Section 2.6 briefly examines the usefulness of this paradigm with reference to two case studies of past learning-by-doing
failures in developing countries. Section 2.7 summarizes and concludes.

2.2 Passive learning and mixed empirical support
The fundamental assumption of the learning by doing literature is that productivity improves as a byproduct of producing on the job. This assumption is usually
denoted in a simple equation whereby some indicator of previous production experience, y, has a downward effect on cost per unit:

ct = f (yt , θt )

f0 < 0

(2.1)

In Equation (2.1), ct is cost per unit at time t, yt is a measure of cumulative production
experience, and θt encompasses other separate factors that impact cost. Accordingly,
within this literature, three possible points of differentiation arise.
First, models may differ in what constitutes y. In his seminal paper on learning
by doing, Arrow (1962) uses cumulative investment as the measure of experience, so
Rt
that yt = 0 I(s)ds where It represents the investment flow at time t; early models
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of learning, including Levhari (1966), Sheshinski (1967), also use cumulative investment to proxy for experience. However, later models have largely moved away from
this conceptualization, due perhaps to the difficulty in empirical work of identifying
the effect of experience (measured this way) from the effect of capital expansion on
productivity (Thompson, 2010). The majority of learning by doing models thereafter
Rt
have used cumulative output to connote experience, so that yt = 0 x(s)ds where xt is
output produced at time t. One other possible expression for cumulative experience
is simply the passage of time, but this is rarely used and has been met with little
validity in empirical work (Argote, 1993).
Second, models may differ in how they specify f . Often, f is left general, with
specifications on the shape of the function to be downward sloping and convex so
that gains from learning are highest in the beginning (e.g. Spence 1981; Dasgupta
and Stiglitz, 1988; Cabral and Riordan, 1994). When specified, usually to solve
for strategic behavior between two or more firms (e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole, 1983;
Cabral and Riordan, 1997), the feedback from cumulative experience to productivity
has commonly been expressed as a power rule, taking the following form:
ct = c0 yt−β

β>0

(2.2)

In Equation (2.2), c0 denotes initial costs and β is the constant exogenous elasticity of
learning; its value specifies whether learning is bounded (β < 1) or not. Empirically,
the power rule is commonly used to derive a test for learning by doing, as a log-log
model with a β coefficient for the elasticity of learning.
Third, models may differ in what constitutes θ. Other determinants of cost are
usually understood as raw inputs or other inputs, and their effects on cost are taken
as separable from the effect of y. This makes them irrelevant to the analysis of
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learning by doing, regardless of what exactly constitutes these miscellaneous costs.
One exception is the group of hybrid models whereby θ stands for new vintages of
capital on which passive learning by doing take place. These models condition passive
learning by doing on the continuous arrival of new capital, without which learning by
doing would eventually dry up; new capital is either introduced exogenously to the
model (Stokey, 1988; Jovanovic and Nyarko, 1996) or modelled as a process of R&D
(Young, 1993; Stein, 1997).
Despite these points of differentiation, the assumption f 0 < 0 in Equation (2.1)
unifies this body of work. Experience, usually cumulative output, automatically
reduces per unit costs and increases productivity.25 Since this is essentially a scale
effect, this type of learning can also be called dynamic external economies of scale.
This is distinct from economies of scale that arise from fixed costs, or static economies
of scale, since the benefits from learning by doing can materialize in the absence of
fixed costs.
These models of passive learning by doing are not, in substance, models of learning
per se. The learning by doing process is simply assumed at the outset, in forms as
simple as Equation (2.1), sometimes with casual reference to how “practice makes
perfect” and other times with no accompanying commentary. The analytical focus
is not learning but what this assumed form of learning implies for various issues
including pricing and output decisions (e.g. Rosen 1972; Spence 1981), heterogeneity
of behavior among firms (e.g. Petrakis et al, 1997), strategic behavior under duopoly
(e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole, 1983), predatory pricing (e.g. Cabral and Riorda, 1997),
strategic trade policy (e.g. Redding, 1999), and optimal state learning policies (e.g.
25

Even in the hybrid literature in which R&D sustains learning by doing, passive learning by
doing still occurs but eventually plateaus and does not generate long-run growth in the absence of
new capital vintages. Moreover, in all cases, these vintages emerge through efforts exogenous to the
production process.
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Melitz, 2005; Greenwald and Stiglitz, 2014).26 When f is specified Equation (2.2),
learning is just the exogenous constant elasticity parameter β.27
Thompson (2012) surveys the empirical evidence generated by estimating Equation (2.2) in different firms and industries (in advanced economies) and shows that
the evidence for passive learning by doing is mixed at best. Superficially, there has
been extensive evidence that β > 0 in advanced economies; however, at a deeper look,
the relationship is “surprisingly tenuous” (p.205).
First, progress ratios - or the estimates of β generated - vary widely across over
the 270 studies that Thompson surveys. The differentials cannot be accounted for
by differences in technologies across industries and products, with documented variations in rates of learning for the same technology between different plants and even
within the same plant. Second, when other determinants of cost are controlled for,
passive learning by doing often reaches terminal productivity fairly quickly. Third,
high degrees of serial correlation between shocks and cumulative output (even when
the latter is lagged) introduce upward bias in the estimation of β, with few studies
using instrumental variables to overcome this problem.28 Fourth, the exclusion of any
variables that are correlated with both cumulative output and costs but unobservable
26
In some models, the benefits from learning by doing diminish over time so that the gains in cost
are eventually bounded to an upper limit. In the models that incorporate broader macroeconomic
growth parameters, the implications for whether or not learning by doing drives long-run growth
vary widely; see Thompson (2010) for an overview of these issues.
27
By contrast, there exists a learning literature that addresses more richly learning from experience, usually in the form of target-input models where individual Bayesian producers observe
previous rounds of production and update their beliefs about the quality or optimal quantity of
their inputs (e.g. Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Bardhan and Udry, 2000; Conley and Udry, 2010).
However, this literature is not couched in the language of learning by doing (which tends to describe
models assuming Equation (2.1)), it has largely been applied to farmers and raw input use, and it
presents a link between rounds of production (harvest), not production scale, and falling costs. In
this literature increased rounds of production improve learning, albeit to varying extents depending
on the noise of the signals observed by the Bayesian learner.
28
This is in addition to problems of spurious correlation between two trending variables (output and cost) in earlier studies. The author shows that when a time trend is included and when
cumulative output is lagged, the resulting β magnitude sometimes turns negative or insignificant.
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to the researcher would result in omitted variable bias. This problem becomes apparent in studies such as Sinclair et al (2000) whose authors have access to unusually
detailed cost data at the firm they study, and who show how absent this information
estimates of β would have been inflated through proxying for other cost-reducing
investments.
Thompson’s documentation of the mixed evidence for passive learning draws in
part on Dutton and Thomas (1984), an earlier survey of the empirical literature on
learning by doing. The authors examine Equation (2.2) which they more accurately
term a progress curve, since it effectively measures cost progress along output increases; this can capture learning by doing but also other processes such as pure scale
effects (static economies of scale) if these are not accurately controlled for. Surveying
the results of over 200 empirical studies from 1920-1980, the authors show that the
power exponent is highly variable and context-dependent, even within the same firm.
Dutton and Thomas suggest that the tenuous nature of the evidence signifies
that the learning parameter is, in fact, influentiable and endogenous to managerial
decisions (p.240):
“What is evident from an examination of progress curve studies is that
the [learning] parameter is neither fixed nor automatic. In many instances
improvement rate is an outcome of managerial policy decisions [...] Once
it is realized and accepted that the rate of improvement is not a given, the
question immediately shifts to the issue of how the rate of improvement
may be managed.”
The authors argue that the “steepness of cost decline frequently is controllable via
creative managerial efforts,” (p.238) and provide a qualitative discussion of the types
of managerial decisions that can increase learning from scale.29 They also suggest
29

Their discussion encompasses other sources of productivity gain from scale, including new capital
vintages and static economies of scale. On the labor learning component (learning by doing), they do
not offer a detailed analysis. Rather, they suggest broadly that further research should examine what
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that the lacuna is driven by a schism between theories of learning by doing and of
organizational behavior, observing that “relations between organizational behavior
and firms’ progress functions are largely unexplored.” (p.241) This literature “has
not been well integrated” because it is “traditionally separated by academic discipline
barriers.” (p.238) As will be shown by my overview of evidence from organizational
theory and management studies below − and the extent to which these insights have
(still) not been integrated into the economics of learning by doing − their points
remain largely valid nearly four decades later.
Last but not least, and in addition to the mixed empirical evidence on learning by
doing in advanced economy firms, there is mixed evidence on the success of learning
by doing in firms in developing countries, where much of the attention has focused
specifically on state-backed infant industries. An extensive amount of scholarship in
the past three decades has documented and popularized the success stories of learning
(partly) from production experience, with initial support from the government, in
East Asian economies (e.g. Amsden 1989; Wade, 2003). But there is also significant
evidence of failure to learn from scale in infant industries in other parts of the world
(Bell et al 1984; Mlawa, 1995; Luzio and Greenstein, 1995; Khan 1999). The wide
variety of outcomes reinforces the notion that learning from production experience is
mediated by important factors that vary endogenously with the context at hand; these
issues are expanded on further, in relation to infant industries, in Sections 2.5-2.6.
managerial decisions affect this parameter, and that this controllable policy variable would be an
investment on which managers would assess the benefits (from inducing learning) versus costs. What
that would look like would depend on how exactly the learning parameter is endogenized. They do
suggest one relevant managerial choice could be the introduction of new capital to stimulate learning,
in which case the learning process ends up resembling the hybrid models of learning by doing with
R&D.

60

2.3 Case studies: knowledge acquisition on the job
In contrast to the standard representation of learning by doing in economics as a
passive and poorly understood link between cumulative experience and improved productivity, scholars in management and organizational theory have studied extensively
how individuals and organizations acquire knowledge, including with production experience. This literature tends to be largely case-based, following the experiences
of particular workers, firms, or industries over an extended time period and with a
rich amount of detail. Some of these case studies complement their findings with
econometric analysis, but in all cases the focus is on connecting qualitative organizational theory with evidence of routines, practices, and institutional patterns at the
firm level.
The focus of this literature tends to be not gains from scale per se but how
knowledge evolves and shapes an organization, in what is sometimes known as the
“knowledge-based view” of the firm (Curado and Bontis, 2006), and why some organizations are better at learning than others. In this literature, implications for
managerial practices are of paramount importance. But these concerns still overlap
significantly with questions of technology change and productivity growth and, in
opening up the black box of learning on the job, can be very helpful in informing
inquiries in the economics discipline on these topics and on what drives experiential
learning.
In this section, I highlight three major interconnected themes that emerge from
the case-based organizational literature that help illuminate important dimensions of
learning by doing.30 First, much of the knowledge acquired by organizations is not
explicit but tacit or hidden, and acquiring it involves the need to discover solutions to
30

I do not provide a comprehensive review of this research by any means, but rather a snapshot
of existing scholarship to illustrate some of these key themes that are relevant to this paper.
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ill-structured and largely uncodified problems through problem solving. Second, this
problem solving process which generates knowledge involves putting effort in, and
paying attention to, learning from trial and error, with learning from failure being
particularly important for future improvement. Third, this process largely occurs in
situ during production, which generates both the stimuli for trial and error and offers
the clues and testing space for problem solving. Therefore, these themes help clarify,
in relation to learning by doing, what is learned, how it is learned, and where it is
learned.
Case studies in this tradition, and accordingly in this section, largely follow the
experiences of firms in advanced economy firms. In Section 2.4, I show how these
insights are reinforced and elaborated further in a developing country context.

2.3.1 Types of knowledge
In his books Personal Knowledge (1958) and The Tacit Dimension (1967), Michael
Polanyi introduced the concept of “tacit knowledge” to describe knowledge that is
difficult to transfer to another person by verbalizing it or writing it down. The basic
underlying message of Polanyi’s work was that “we know more than we can tell”
(1967; p.4) and that tacit knowledge is in fact a central part of scientific knowledge,
embodied in people’s skills, experiences, and mental models, without being easily
expressed or transferred. Simple examples from everyday life of knowledge with a
strong tacit dimension include one’s knowledge of how to ride a bicycle, to recognize
the face of someone they know, or to understand humor.
Nelson and Winter (1982) clarify on the concept of tacit knowledge further in
An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, arguing that it is a matter of degree
and that it is central to organizational knowledge acquisition. Inspired by “Nelson’s
[case] studies of the detailed processes of technological change [...which demonstrate]
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the uncertain, groping, disorderly, and error-ridden character of these processes,”
(p.vii) the authors critique the representation of firms as profit maximizers with highly
reliable information. Instead, they view firms as adaptive organizations that evolve
based on certain capabilities as well as decision rules informed by their interactions
with an uncertain and error-filled environment. This environment includes not only
explicit knowledge which is easily codifiable and knowable, but also tacit components
that must be uncovered and learned through repeated practice with trial and error.
From this perspective, Dosi et al (1988) suggest that technical change is an exercise
in solving problems for which no codified solution exists, largely because much of the
pertinent knowledge is tacit. Specifically, “the problems [involved] are ill structured,
in that the available information does not provide by itself a solution to the problem.
An innovative solution involves discovery and creation [...] and the use of information
drawn from previous experience and formal knowledge.” (p.1126)
In an overview of ethnographic case studies on service technicians in large corporations, Brown and Duguid (1991) support the view that problem solving on the job
is different from any codified training manuals, because the latter inevitably smooth
over the variability of decisions to be made in changing conditions. The authors
describe how the technicians invest significant time and effort to solve the problems
that arise on site, and the extent to which creativity, attention to context, and drawing from previous experience is necessary to discover appropriate solutions. They
document that while abstract codified manuals and routines can be helpful as an
initial template for problem solving, these can, if highly detached from the details of
practice, actually impede learning.
Relying on surveys of managers of various Japanese manufacturing firms as well
as an illustrative case study of a particular manufacturing plant, Nonaka (1994) and
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) argue that both tacit and explicit knowledge combine
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and interact in different modes, including the conversion of one to the other, to form
the knowledge basis for the firm. One such conversion process is “externalization”,
where parts of tacit knowledge are laboriously translated to explicit knowledge. The
authors argue that this process is laborious but necessary for enriching and systematizing (explicit) knowledge.
Edmonson et al (2003) show that tacitness extends beyond applications in the
manufacturing sector. Studying new surgical technologies in a hospital setting, the
authors identify the degree to which a given technology has a tacit component by
asking surgeons to describe how they learn to effectively use this technology. They
find a consistent pattern where respondents describe specific technologies as needing
physical presence (in the operating room) to learn, with mastery coming from hands
on practice because the application is context- and patient-specific, while other technologies are described as easily applicable from information manuals.31
The above research is a very small part of a large management literature, in
which the concept of tacit knowledge has now been widely accepted and on which
scholarship has been prolific in the past two decades (Hadjimichael and Tsoukas,
2019). For the purposes of this paper, the importance of tacit knowledge is in how it
makes production experience a mode and site of potential learning.

2.3.2 Effortful trial and error
If there are significant tacit components to knowledge, and since these components
are experiential and context-specific, then trial and error from experience becomes
important for knowledge acquisition. Specifically, trial and error arising from production provides a natural laboratory for evaluating previous gaps in knowledge and for
31

In evaluating the impact of these technologies on surgical performance, the authors find that the
dimensions of performance that rely on more tacit components are more heterogenous than those
that rely on more codified components.
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sending signals about the efficacy of different strategies in the given context, thereby
helping uncover the tacit elements necessary to improve performance. More generally, learning from the errors that arise with experience is paramount when knowledge
acquisition is a search process in an uncertain and partly unfamiliar environment.32
Consistent with this prediction, a number of studies find that learning on the
job is acquired in large part through the exertion of effort on learning from previous
errors and failures. For example, Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) find that Honda engineers understand their successes as born of mistakes. Leonard-Barton (1995) studies
product development across five firms and finds that learning from failure is a hallmark of product innovation, while Maidique and Zirger (1984) describe how product
development in the electronics industry often relies on past failures help fill gaps in
knowledge and to contribute to subsequent commercial success. Tax et al (1998) focus
on consumer complaints as a source of information on failures, and use examples from
various industries (from mail delivery to insurance to hospitality) to show how firms
leverage customer complaints to identify and generate process improvements. Cannon
and Edmondson (2001) draw on research on work teams to argue that the process of
learning from failure involves identifying the failure, discussing and analyzing it, and
dealing with conflict and disagreement about solutions productively.
In a particularly illustrative study of learning on the job from trial and error, Rerup and Feldman (2011) follow the evolution of recruitment practices in a new Danish
research institution over eight years, and show that errors are often not “inherent”
mistakes but decisions that are incompatible with the broader context of the organi32

Trial and error is the process while learning is the potential outcome. This helps avoid making
trial-and-error a tautological concept defined by its outcomes. To see the distinction between the
two, note that there can be learning with no trial-and-error if codified information or inspiration
are enough to provide new and improved ideas. Conversely, in an environment where errors depress
morale instead of stimulate innovation, it is possible that learning stagnates. Usually, however, the
assumption is that trial and error is a driver of learning.
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zation and that are only identified and adjusted with practice. They document how
recruiters begin from a certain codified schemata, face a problem that arises from performing the routine in the context at hand, and react to problems (errors) by trying
different adjustments (trials). For example, the government-commissioned institution
they study envisioned recruiting top researchers by paying them 40% higher salaries
than traditional academic institutions in Denmark; this plan started out smoothly but
eventually ran into serious and unexpected problems with Danish bureaucracy, which
had the last word on payment schedules. In response to this “error”, leadership tried
different templates to reconcile its vision with these demands, and sometimes each
of these adjustments was met again with resistance and readjusted accordingly. This
study points to the possibility that trial and error, beyond solving technical problems
and improving productivity in a narrow sense, can be necessary for solving more socially and politically embedded problems and maintaining the flexible functioning of
an organization.
While the above evidence is qualitative, Madsen and Desai (2010) provide the
first econometric evidence about the relevance of learning from past failures on the
job for improving organizational performance. The authors collect extensive data
on the orbital launch vehicle industry’s operations (a space-based industry) since its
inception in the 1950s, and find that, controlling for other variables, the number of
an organization’s prior failed launches reduces the likelihood of later launch failures
to a significant extent. Moreover, this effect is larger than the effect of prior successful launches in reducing future failures. The authors suggest that these results
support the anecdotal evidence about how organizations learn through “problemistic
search” that they engage in after experiencing failure (Sitkin, 1992), with failures not
only motivating search but also providing indications as to where the gap might be,
therefore improving the ability to extract meaningful knowledge from experience.
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If learning occurs largely through identifying errors and finding solutions that are
context-appropriate for ill-structured problems, then it is not a costless process, and
this is clarified further by the theoretical research on the role of attention and effort
in the accumulation of experiential knowledge.
Dating back to Cyert and March (1963), the behavioral theory of the firm has
viewed organizations as problem-solving entities with limited attentional capacities.
Ocasio (1997) elaborates on this and advances the “attention-based view” of the
firm, which focuses on how attention shapes organizational adaptation. Attentional
engagement is defined as the focus of time, energy, and effort by decision makers on
how to make sense of their environmental stimuli and to choose among competing
courses of action, with consequences for organizational performance. Levinthal and
Rerup (2006) argue that attentional engagement involves the mindful processing of
information (POI) so as to be able to respond to unanticipated cues and signals;
this is distinguished from less mindful information processing which is automatic
and relates more to routinized behavior. The authors hypothesize that mindful POI
generates learning whereas less mindful POI reinforces learning. Dutton and Ashford
(1993) describe how attention can mediate even indirect learning from experience,
suggesting that top-level decision makers use input from middle managers’ production
experiences to focus their own attention on specific issues, to interpret stimuli, and
to evoke decision activity.
Case studies on attention tend to focus on aspects other than learning from experience,33 but the importance of effortful attention in mediating experiential learning
can be gleaned from a few of these studies (in addition to indirectly from accounts of
learning on the job described throughout this paper). Ocasio and Joseph (2008) study
33
For example, Bouquet and Birkinshaw (2008) examine the factors that affect the distribution of
managerial attention to subsidiaries in a multinational company.
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strategic planning at General Electric from 1940 to 2006 and demonstrate that the
attention of decision makers is channeled by planning processes and that it provides
opportunities for building on organizational experience and for identifying new goals
for the organization. Rerup (2009) focuses on learning from rare events and crises
at a leading conglomerate for diabetes care, and describes how attentional stability,
vividness, and coherence34 are critical for identifying weak cues in the environment
and for preventing a crisis from reoccurring; organizational learning is therefore not
just a cognitive activity but involves developing new behaviors through attentive engagement embedded in practice. Nigam and Ocasio (2010) look at health care reform
proposals in the United States in the 1990s to illustrate how experiences create opportunities for cognitive realignment if they can attract and compel attention by
institutional actors. In particular, events or experiences that attract ongoing attention can trigger new ways of understanding the relevant environment, in ways that
are ultimately conducive to institutional change.

2.3.3 Situated learning
The above studies suggest that a significant amount of learning may be situated
on the job because experience offers the opportunity for acquiring knowledge about,
and for improving performance in, a largely tacit environment with ill-structured
problems. However, while experience provides an opportunity for learning, this opportunity is actualized with the expenditure of costly time, energy, and effort on
learning from trial and error. Before examining these issues in a development context
in the next section, it is useful to clarify further why the situatedness of learning in
34

Attentional stability refers to the focalization and concentration of the consciousness on core
issues, vividness refers to the ability to analyze relationships between various issues and to draw
on the broader organizational context for interpretation, and coherence refers to the deliberate
coordination of collective attention across people and units in the organization when necessary.
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the physical space of the job may matter. To do so, I draw on insights from Tyre and
von Hippel’s (1997) detailed case study of a number of manufacturing firms in early
factory days dealing with new production equipment.
Tyre and von Hippel’s central contention is that the physical context and setting
of the job may be central to adaptive learning and problem solving. Their case study
documents interactions between technicians who use the new production machines
and engineers who are responsible for their design/maintenance and who typically
work in labs separate from the production plant. When technicians would encounter
mechanical problems with the machines, they would communicate these problems to
engineers, who in nearly 80% cases had to physically go to the plant for problem
solving at some point. Interviews with engineers reveal three main reasons they use
the plant as a main site of problem-solving, even as they are involved in other types
of knowledge creation (lab-based R&D) as well.
First, the engineers often had to see the problem themselves to diagnose it, since
what people “see” depends on their experience, and the technicians often did not
see the aspects relevant for diagnosing machinery malfunction (could not adequately
describe the problem by phone). Second, the skills that the engineers as problem
solvers could apply depended partly on where they were, and running diagnostic tests
or collecting data from the malfunctioning equipment was often facilitated by direct
contact with the artefact. Third, incentive-wise, the engineers cited that technicians
looking over their shoulder in the plant actually instilled a sense of urgency in problem
solving that was not matched by problem-solving in the lab.
This study, albeit somewhat dated given new advances in communication technology to facilitate distance-based learning and problem solving, offers one detailed
example of how locally embedded clues facilitate learning by doing and of how people
use their physical setting to find and interpret relevant information. The authors
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suggest that physical context is important in settings when dealing with unfamiliar,
unstructured problems, and where users’ skills are largely tacit. In these settings,
“we would expect that problem solvers would need to observe actual patterns of use
in the operating setting before they could understand and diagnose problems.” (p.80)

2.4 Case studies: the development experience
By definition, firms in developing countries do not operate at the world technology
frontier, and their productivity depends largely on the extent to which they can learn
to transfer or emulate existing technologies and adapt them appropriately to local
production and market conditions (UNCTAD, 2014).35 Therefore, whereas the literature on experiential learning in firms in advanced economies explores how firms can
improve efficiency within a well-defined competitive environment, the big questions in
a development context concern the extent to which learning by doing can facilitate the
local “translation” and effective use of foreign technology, for raising competitiveness
(to a global level, for infant industries) in an initially adverse environment.
In this section, I show that the development-focused case studies, which use a
largely evolutionary understanding of the firm,36 emphasize most or all of the themes
in Section 2.3. In particular, they demonstrate that learning on the job to adapt
and effectively use foreign technology is a highly involved and effortful process. In
addition, when learning from production is forthcoming, it emerges as an important
vehicle for productivity growth. However, though this point is rarely made directly in
35

Local markets are especially important in initial stages and before competitiveness can be
achieved in global markets; see Lo (2012) for example on the importance of local markets to China’s
rapid productivity growth in the twentieth century.
36
Explicitly or implicitly, these studies use an evolutionary economics perspective in which firms
are not profit maximizers but organizations operating with specific capabilities and under uncertainty
and path dependency. A major point of interest is how their capabilities are built from the bottomup to constitute specific technological “paradigms” and trajectories. See Cimoli and Dossi (1995)
for a discussion.
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this literature, I also argue that contrasts between the passive learning assumptions
and the details of learning by doing are heightened with economic underdevelopment:
not only is effort necessary to facilitate learning from experience, but operationalizing
learning may also become more difficult.
Because learning by doing is important but also highly involved and potentially
challenging, examining this learning process is valuable in a development context.

2.4.1 Relevance to development
Drawing on time spent studying the steel industry Brazil and the textile machinery industry in Korea, Dahlman and Westphal (1981) distinguish between technological knowledge and technological mastery in developing countries’ trajectories of
industrial development, defining knowledge as the possession of information about
physical or organizational processes and mastery as the ability to use this knowledge
effectively. While knowledge-as-information can be imported, the key to transitioning
from knowledge to mastery is the application of “technological effort”, which they define as “the use of technological knowledge together with other resources to assimilate
or adapt existing technology or create new technology” (p.13). In subsequent work
(1982), the authors clarify that effort is “the employment of resources to not just create technological knowledge, but also to master it” (p.1, emphasis added), which to
date remains the clearest definition of the concept in the relevant literature.37 Echoing the managerial literature, the authors find that production experience serves as
a stimulus for effort because it provides the space for the problem solving involved in
37

This is the definition I build off on Section 2.5, where I define effort as the additional resources
invested to learn from production but clarify that this includes only resources whose costs are
incurred with production. This definition excludes resources acquired exogenously to production
but which can augment learning on the job, like school-based human capital, since their cost is
defined ex-ante. However, it does include any additional time, energy, and attention necessary to
apply these resources to learn from production experience.
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adapting or creating new technology, and that production and effort together enable
producers to adapt foreign technology and improve productivity.
More broadly, reviews of early case-based work point to the importance of conscious, costly, and effortful learning from production experience in a wide range of
industries and countries. Bell et al (1984) survey research on productivity changes
with scale in 32 industries38 across several countries in Latin America, Africa, and
South Asia. They show that generally only modest productivity growth rates were
achieved in these firms along with output expansion, and that very few firms achieved
and maintained international competitiveness. From their reading of the evidence,
they suggest this is because “few of the enterprises studied were undertaking multidirectional efforts, manipulating their production technology to reduce the cost of
capital, labor, energy, and materials” (p.114). Dahlman and Sercovich (1984) review the experiences of 26 manufacturing firms in Latin America and India that were
largely successful in increasing scale with production and eventually in exporting.
They show that while nearly none of these firms achieved large technological breakthroughs, they all took significant efforts to assimilate and adapt foreign technology
to local conditions - including skill availability, local demand, and technology infrastructure - and, as these conditions changed over time, additional efforts were taken
to cope with them.
Aside from this early work, a number of more recent and in-depth case studies
have offered rich insight into the process of knowledge acquisition and skill development on the job, in specific developing-country firms. These studies are generally not
framed as explorations of learning by doing, but of capability building.39 Nonetheless,
38

Some of the case studies they survey are on single firms while others are on groups of firms in
an industry.
39
They rely on the innovative capability framework that distinguishes between “production” versus
“innovation” capabilities (Bell and Pavitt, 1993); producers accumulate different sets of capabilities
relating to simply producing the good versus producing it efficiently.
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their findings emphasize the above themes of effortful learning by doing, since they
show that efficiency (or “innovation capability”) increases largely with gradual process improvements, while R&D, patents, or product innovation may be very limited
especially at the outset. Importantly, these studies also offer concrete examples of
what may constitute such innovation efforts on the job.40
For example, Figueiredo (2002) studies two different steel plants in Brazil as they
learn from experience, showing how they learn to build capabilities41 of gradually increasing complexities. At the basic level, they learn (among other things) to actively
monitor the plant units, to coordinate production better, to replace and test component performance, and to replicate steels efficiently. At higher levels, they learn to
monitor and control expansion studies, to manufacture components at higher certification standards and without foreign technical assistance, and to routinize preventative
maintenance of equipment. As described, all of these actions are deliberative, effortful, and expand on basic production capabilities, and they occur in lockstep with
production experience. They are also sequential, with the improvement of the routine operating capabilities (the basic level) forming the basis for accumulating and
sustaining the higher capabilities.
Other case studies by the above author and colleagues illustrate what can be
described as deliberate and effortful learning from experience in other industries.
Figueiredo (2014) examines the pulp and paper firm industry in Brazil from 19502010 and demonstrates that significant efforts in improving pulp harvesting, project
40

I focus on the handful of studies that look specifically at the details of capability building
through learning from production experience. By contrast, there is a huge and growing literature
that studies the development of technological capabilities in developing countries more generally,
including capability development through FDI, research and development, and human capital. This
literature does not focus on, and is of limited helpfulness in understanding, the microeconomics of
learning on the job.
41
In the author’s framework, these are all innovation capabilities, in that they improve the efficiency of production to varying degrees.
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management, and process organization were necessary to allow firms to eventually
become globally competitive; experience was also predicated on, and furthered by,
efforts to adjust the pulp and papermaking processes to account for differences in
raw input availability at the local level. Figuieredo and Piana (2020) document the
“doing, using, and interacting” sources of learning in large Brazilian mining firms
during different periods of industrial growth since the 1940s; they show that learning
on the job advanced in complexity as the industry matured, and, in later stages,
increasingly interacted with R&D to generate international competitiveness.
More broadly, in a survey of existing work on latecomer firms and within the dynamic capabilities framework, Figueiredo and Bell (2012) note that a plethora of studies covers productivity growth in advanced economy firms and in leading developingcountry firms that have already acquired significant production and innovation capabilities, but that significantly less research looks at learning by latecomer firms
needing to initially build these capabilities. Still, based on the available evidence, the
authors provide a wide list of efforts of different complexity undertaken by successful
latecomers; some, which are operationalized with and applied to production experience, include experimentation on the shop floor, collective learning through sessions
of discussion and debriefing, documentation of activities developed in the production
process, and the socialization of what may have been tacit or located in isolated parts
of the organization. Whereas these activities signal explicit and active investment,
not just doing, the authors argue that “frequently this has been ignored in discussions
about trade and industrial policies for latecomer firms and industries.” (p.29)

2.4.2 Additional challenges in a development context
The above studies suggest that effortful earning on the job may be important
in developing country firms’ attempts to acquire knowledge and capabilities and to
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accelerate productivity. Though this emphasizes the difference between passive and
effortful learning described in Section 2.3, it is likely that the gulf between passive
and active learning efforts is even greater in developing country firms, due to the
challenges of adapting technology that originated in a very different context.
In his pioneering paper “The Market for Know-How and the Efficient International Transfer of Technology”(1981) Teece argues that know-how, understood as the
possession of knowledge and the ability to use it effectively, is challenging to transfer
across borders. This is because know-how will include some inherently tacit components that are difficult to codify as they are embedded in personnel skills, and
because tacitness is compounded by the divergence in context between the transmitting and receiving countries. The thrust of his argument is that relative to market
transactions, multinational companies internalize some of the costs of transfer and
facilitate effective use, for example by linking up specialized teams across borders and
providing specialized on-site training.
Context-based differences include, among other things, demand conditions, input
supply, the institutional environment, and manufacturing capabilities, but Zander
and Kogut (1995) highlight the role of the latter in particular in influencing technology transfer. They argue that the ease of imitation (which involves local adaptation)
increases when the imitator shares common manufacturing capabilities with the original producing country and vice versa. This argument is not far-fetched, and the
difficulty of imitating technology from countries too far ahead in the world frontier
perhaps helps explain neighbor-based transfers in successful stories of development,
such as Southeast Asian countries learning from Chinese technologies.42
More generally, the importance of context in influencing the learning from experience trajectory can be understood within Winter and Szulanski’s (2001) concept of
42

See Ku (2006) for an overview and discussion of these linkages.
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an “Arrow core” in technology transfer. The authors focus on replication efforts to
produce a similar outlet serving a similar product, such as in fast food franchises, and
argue that even replication is a large scale adaptation effort and an involved process
constituting a complex set of interdependent routines that are discovered, adjusted,
and fine-tuned by doing. Most importantly, it involves identifying what the authors
call the “Arrow core”: the attributes that are replicable and worth replicating. This
core, which is the ideal informational endowment for the replicator, is not known at
the outset even if a good template exists. It must be discovered through experiential
learning from trial and error, after which its value and effectiveness must be tested
through production. The authors conclude that when the template is complex or
causally ambiguous, the replication efforts are more costly and slow. Embedded into
this discussion, contextual similarities can be understood as representing the possibility or existence of a useful template, which helps reduce but does not eliminate the
search costs for the core involved in learning-by-doing adaptation.
There is little direct research on the extent to which contextual differences complicate on-the-job adaptation efforts in developing country firms. Still, to appreciate
the extent to which the effective adaptation of technology may be difficult in poor
countries imitating technologies that originate in distant advanced economies, and of
doing so through production experience on their own (not under multinational corporations), it is useful to look at adaptation “ease” even when these adverse conditions
are reversed, on which more evidence is available.
Case studies on technology transfer within multinational corporations and between
organizations of similar manufacturing capabilities, where teams on both sides are
incentivized to facilitate transfer, show that significant effort in figuring out how to
adapt technologies locally is still required. For example, Kostova and Roth (2002)
document the challenges that a specific US-based multinational corporation faces
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in transferring technology to international subsidiaries, including having to account
for differences in the regulatory, cognitive, and normative institutions of the host
country, and how the eventual transfer is actualized with multiple efforts to adapt to
local context. Jensen and Szulanski (2007) follow the transfer of Xerox technology
across different branches within fifteen western European countries and document
a host of implementation problems during transfer; these problems are eased but
not eliminated by the presence of templates that describe in detail the essential and
nonessential details of the technology.
Carlile and Rebentisch (2003) illuminate how technology transfer can be challenging even when both transmitting and receiving units are capable, motivated, and
institutionally linked, and how these challenges complicate but are eventually resolved
by active learning from production experience. They follow a joint venture between
US and Japanese chemical companies, and describe how the seemingly straightforward
transfer of a technology from the US to the Japanese partner quickly revealed a flaw
after implementation. Production revealed (to the Japanese partner) a surface-level
aberration that did not matter to the US market but would have been highly detrimental in the Japanese market, given the higher value of the aesthetic for Japanese
consumers. In turn, the resolution of this problem took “protracted experimentation
and troubleshooting at different facilities in both countries”(p.1185). For this and
other transfer problems that arose, “the partners discovered, usually by trial and
error [...] what was needed to reproduce a specific capability at a new site.” (p.1184)
This discussion hints at the difficulties that may be encountered by firms in underdeveloped countries engaging in learning by doing to adapt technology originating
in an advanced economy. First, the technology to be adapted is often created to fit
a very different context in terms of market demand, input access, and manufacturing and organizational capabilities. Second, the costliness of the learning process is
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compounded further when the market transfer of technology is prohibitive legally or
financially, so that some combination of haphazard adoption and reverse engineering
is pursued, as has been common in the global South (Mansfield, 1993). This obliterates space for assistance through official templates or collaboration with the original
manufacturers of the technology, exactly in contrast to multinational company structures which expand this space to the extent possible. In these cases, although the
superficial cost of obtaining the foreign technology may be low, the cost of effective
technology acquisition (learning and adaptation) will be high. Discussions of transfer
to developing countries that focus on the former only will underestimate the difficulty
of technology acquisition and learning by doing in these countries.43

2.5 An integrated view: effortful learning by doing
Corresponding to the case-based evidence presented above, this section provides
a systematic treatment of what I term “effortful learning by doing”. I define the
concept, expand on its basic properties, and compare it to other modes of knowledge
acquisition along these dimensions. I also provide a qualitative discussion of the
implications for incentivizing effort, and of possible complications in a developing
country context.

2.5.1 Basic properties
Effortful learning by doing can be defined as a process whereby learning agents
expend effort, understood as a costly resource investment, in order to learn from the
43

As mentioned above, developing country firms may benefit from closer neighbor-based transfers.
But this presupposes the existence of a neighbor that is sufficiently similar socially, sufficiently
differentiated and advanced technologically, and which has an incentive to facilitate the learning of
its neighbors through linkages in the supply chain. The role of Japanese transfers, and later Korean
and Taiwanese transfers, in East Asian’s development experiences (Tho, 1993) comes to mind.
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production process, with the following properties:
• The cost of effort is distinct from the cost of raw materials for production, as is
the function of effort versus raw material: whereas the latter produces output,
the former facilitates learning from production.
• In addition, the cost of effort is incurred during the production process; therefore, effort as defined excludes additional investments that may augment learning on the job but which materialize ex-ante and independently of production.
• Effort generates largely rival knowledge, since the knowledge obtained from trial
and error is embodied within the unit that undertakes these investments.
This definition has several implications. First, understood this way, “effort” as a
costly investment includes both the intangible investments of energy and attention
and the tangible investments involved in, for example, identifying errors and coming
up with trial solutions, monitoring and evaluating the outcomes of such strategies, and
adjusting strategies accordingly.44 It excludes investments such as R&D or schoolbased human capital, which may be considered an additional (separate) resource if
they also augment learning from experience, but it does include additional time, energy, and resources needed to apply these skills to learn from production. Second,
effort not only conditions learning from production, but it is also only possible to operationalize with production: for example, attention cannot be paid to the production
process or to trial and error if nothing is being produced. Third, the learning agent
or unit weighs the benefits versus costs of investing effort on the job when making
the decision to learn.
44

Effort is the resource invested, while learning is the potential outcome. This prevents a tautological definition of effort as the actual learning outcome, as implied for example in Figueiredo and
Bell (2012). To see the distinction, note that two people may need to exert different levels of effort to
generate the same learning outcome, depending on their inherent abilities or previous firm-specific
experience.
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It is useful to contextualize effortful learning by doing relative to other concepts
of endogenous growth and technical change. The three properties above, in addition
to the implication about agency considerations determining the extent of learning,
can be compared to those same dimensions in models of R&D, human capital, and
passive learning by doing.
The defining feature of the R&D literature is the assumption that technology
progresses through effortful discovery of new ideas in a setting external to production,
which can then be used to improve production. Therefore, the discovery of new
productivity-enhancing ideas is costly to undertake and occurs with a separate labor
force from that which is involved in production.45 Another feature is that the ideas
created are essentially nonrival blueprints: once a new idea is created in the R&D
sector, infinitely many people can use it at the same time. Nonetheless, patent rights
may impose excludability, preventing or restricting access to these ideas by different
agents. Together, cost and partial excludability imply that agency considerations
will determine how much is invested into the R&D sector. The central tradeoff the
firm faces will be that allocating resources to R&D is costly but, due to partial
excludability, it can generate rents from sales of new ideas to the final goods sector.
In the (schooling-based) human capital literature, productivity is a function of
labor-embodied skills obtained from years or quality of schooling. Human capital is
a costly investment since it only accrues with investing time in education and foregoing labor earnings. By definition, it develops in a setting outside of production,
and, in models where the worker can only be in school or work, time spent in schooling directly takes away from time spent in production. Unlike blueprints developed
in R&D, human capital generates rival skills since these skills are embodied in the
45

In models where total labor quantity is fixed, allocating more labor to R&D directly takes away
from labor dedicated to final goods production.
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worker herself, and therefore also perfectly excludable. Excludability guarantees future benefits from schooling which, combined with the cost of investment, implies the
agent faces a tradeoff whereby more schooling builds her human capital but is costly,
reducing her time in the labor force.
Technology change in passive learning by doing models is distinct from the above
approaches in that there is no distinct cost of developing productivity-enhancing
ideas or skills. Knowledge is acquired by the labor force as a costless byproduct
of production; effectively, then, the only relevant costs are those of “raw” inputs
into production. Regarding the nature of the productivity-enhancing knowledge,
though the literature is not always explicit on this point, it can be best understood as
nonrivalrous. That is, production scale automatically generates better “blueprints”
for how to produce, whose use may be legally excludable or not. In models without
excludability, the cost-benefit analysis of production is not affected, whereas in models
with excludability, firms will produce more in the first period to generate cost savings
in the next period (e.g. Spence, 1981; Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1988). In all cases,
however, no strategic considerations exist beyond those of the production problem,
since to stimulate production is by definition to stimulate learning.
Table 2.1 compares effortful learning by doing to these other theories of endogenous growth along the dimensions explored above. It is at once clear that effortful
learning by doing is conceptually closest to human capital, not to passive learning by
doing. The fundamental difference between effortful learning by doing and human
capital is that the former is acquired during the production process while the latter
is acquired in time orthogonal to production. It is for this reason that studies on
“firm-specific human capital”, such as Hatch and Dyer (2004), articulate a process
very similar to that described by effortful learning by doing.
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Yes

Yes

No

No

Strategic decisions aside from how much final good will be produced

Yes

Effortful LBD

a

No

Yes

Human capital

Passive LBD

Yes

Non-production cost? Occurs in production?

R&D

Literature

Yes

No, but could be excludable

Yes

No, but partially excludable

Rival?

Table 2.1: Different characteristics of productivity growth models

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Agency considerationsa

2.5.2 Incentives for effort
If effort is necessary for learning, the question turns to the determinants of effort.
Since effort is an investment in a (particular type of) resource into the production
process, then this costly investment, as any other, will be forthcoming only when its
gains outweigh its costs. So far, the simple reduced-form assumption has been that
a learning unit can exert effort and recoup its benefits, so that a simple cost-benefit
calculation is sufficient to deduce the extent to which effort is forthcoming.
To discuss behavior relating to this investment in more depth, however, it becomes
necessary to clarify the key actors and their dynamics. This includes who the learning
agent that exerts effort is, whether they are the same as the residual claimant that
compensates the cost of effort and recoups its benefit, and, if not, whether principalagent problems complicate the motivation of effort. All of these facets can change
depending on the context and research question. For example, research on managerial
practices of the firm may consider specific employees the learning agents and ask how
effort can be motivated by management as the residual claimant. Or the focus may
be on how shareholders interact with management, with the latter as the relevant
learning unit. A study concerned with the effect of government technology policies
in nationalized or nationally-supported firms may consider the firm as a whole as the
learning agent and investigate how learning can be facilitated by the government as
a “claimant” that maximizes some social welfare function. Strategic considerations
relating to moral hazard may or may not exist in all of these relationships, depending
on the extent to which effort and its effect on efficiency are observable.
Unfortunately, the question of incentives and strategic behavior is barely discussed, whether superficially or in-depth, in the case studies of experiential knowledge
acquisition in firms. This is also true in studies that highlight the role of deliberate

83

investments of time, energy, and effort in learning from experience.46
Studies of experiential learning in firms in advanced economies, such as those discussed in Section 2.3, implicitly assume that the appropriate incentives for compelling
effort with scale exist, and the main questions (and insights from these studies) are
what such learning looks like and how it improves performance. This core assumption
and its underlying logic are not made explicit, but they may be understood as follows.
The residual claimant in the firm is able to compensate agents for their additional
efforts on the job (beyond simple production/raw labor efforts) and to extract effort this way, with principal-agent problems being negligible or well-controlled. With
effort applied to production, the subsequent efficiency gains from learning are captured in reduced operating costs, and outweigh the additional cost of driving learning.
These net gains are particularly desirable in a competitive environment where competition on the basis of efficiency is necessary for survival. Overall, then, the residual
claimant is motivated and able to improve production and organizational efficiency,
including by investing in on-the-job learning.
While these may be reasonable assumptions in some cases, it is doubtful that
they generally apply to latecomer firms in nascent industries of poor and developing
countries. In this case, the issue of incentives for effort cannot be justifiably sidelined.
The exact challenges will be context specific; for the purposes of this paper, it is
46
With regard to work on developing countries, the issue of motivating effort appears as an afterthought, if at all. Dahlman and Sercovich (1984), for example, briefly suggest that “it appears
that the pressure of having to compete overseas is one of the key determinants that motivates Korean firms to [..] focus on technological efforts that lead to greater productive efficiency,” (p.45)
without further explanation. Figueiredo (2002; 2014) mentions the presence of import substitution
policy regimes only in passing without touching on the conditions under which they would or would
not be efficient in stimulating learning. Zollo and Winter (2002), who stress that learning on the
job is deliberative and not passive, do not engage in a systematic discussion of incentives for effort.
One exception is the somewhat at-length discussion, in Bell et al (1984), of the difference between
one-off incentives for effort that spur only temporary efficiency improvements, and consistent stimuli
for change from product or input markets. For a detailed criticism of the neglect of incentives and
strategic behavior in firm-level studies of tacit knowledge acquisition more broadly, see Cowen et al
(1999).
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informative to look specifically at the infant industry problem.
First, the firm owner(s) may not be able to finance learning independently. This
includes not only financing the effort investment, but also, if the firm operates from
a very poor competitive baseline and produces very little or nothing at all, financing significant scale expansion. Depending on how much more competitive foreign
producers are, any output produced must be priced much lower than its base cost in
order to sell. Therefore, learning will need “loss-financing”, which the firm may not
be able to secure if there are market failures that prevent it from borrowing in the
market against its anticipated future earnings.
Second, in this case, as per the logic of the infant industry argument, learning may
not be forthcoming without the state assisting in the loss-financing, whether through
subsidies to the domestic firm that reduce its losses or tariffs on its competitors that
artificially raise its competitiveness (Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1988). In formal models
of infant industry protection, the state is typically modelled as maximizing a social
welfare function, but more broadly it may wish to support learning because it places
a high political or strategic imperative on a strong and competitive national industry.
Third, as with any dynamic where the principal pays the cost of effort and recoups
the benefit, the principal must condition payment on performance to actually elicit
effort (Laffont and Martimort, 2002).47 However, conditioning on performance may
be more complex when the principal is the state if, for example, monitoring effort,
as well as the ability to condition payment on performance, are easier to carry out
within the hierarchical employment relationship.
Fourth, even if the firm can receive some of the benefit from efficiency gains so
that it is self-motivated to learn, conditionalities on performance may still be impor47

If the state as the residual claimant receives the benefit of learning, then in a strictly technical
sense, the firm will prefer to receive the subsidy and not exert effort, unless the subsidy is conditional
on performance.
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tant. The firm will be less interested in exerting costly effort to learn if, with the
ability to produce supported by subsidies, it can raise the profit margin on its output
in less costly ways.48 More broadly, conditionalities on performance may be necessary when there is little efficiency-based competition in the market, which applies by
construction in infant industries. Competition must, in a sense, be artificially driven
down initially in order to enable the firm to kickstart production. For this reason,
then, there need to be other incentive structures in place such as clear productivity
targets and credible penalty of withdrawal of subsidy if these are not met over time.
Fifth, tying reward or penalty to performance must be executed with nuance to
prevent counterproductive strategic behavior. The intuition of state-assisted loss financing is that, as efficiency increases, the need for subsidies will decline. When the
speed of learning is endogenous to the incentive structure (as in effortful learning by
doing), this may actually encourage behavior whereby firms retard their learning in
order to prolong their receipt of subsidies, especially when there is little competition
and less costly ways of making profit on their output. Therefore, conditionalities
must be specified credibly ex-ante, articulating that, without improvements in efficiency over a specific timeline, subsidies will be withdrawn even though technically
the learning process has not finished.
The above discussion suggests that, whereas infant industry protection can be
successful, it is also possible to have instances where it fails in generating learning
and competitiveness. For example, at a surface level, the principal may not understand the necessity of conditionalities on performance, and assume that learning will
be automatically forthcoming with scale. At a deeper level, the environment in which
the principal operates may evolve to reduce its interest in imposing conditionalities
48

For example, a dearth of competition may make high markup pricing feasible, and/or the firm
may be able to differentiate itself from competition through less-costly efforts at marketing-based
product differentiation.
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to begin with, due to non-economic benefits to maintaining this subsidy. For example, in the case of eventual political capture, utility from political rents in exchange
for maintaining the subsidy may overpower the perceived economic gains from imposing conditionalities. The case studies in Section 2.6 illustrate a mix of these issues.

Before moving forward, it is important to note that this discussion is distinct,
in its logic, from calculations of optimal protection in the passive learning by doing
literature. Though a foray into the latter is beyond the scope of this paper, for
illustration purposes I refer to Melitz’s “When and how should infant industries be
protected?” (2005), which builds on earlier work on the subject and provides a
standard treatment of the issue.
Melitz assumes a passive learning by doing process that follows Equation (2.1),
where costs decrease automatically with cumulative production until they reach a
minimum possible cost c̄ and at which point the industry becomes mature. Initial
demand for the domestic good is zero because it is more expensive than the foreign
good, and domestic firms will not loss-finance initial scale expansion, so that government intervention is the only pathway to learning.49 A subsidy from the government
that absorbs these initial losses and allows domestic firms to produce will then automatically result in learning and efficiency gains.50 In line with passive learning, the
speed of learning (how cost falls with output) is given exogenously; the only variable
which reacts endogenously to the subsidy is the amount produced.
Consequently, the question in Melitz (2005) with respect to “optimal” subsidies
is whether the state maximizes social welfare by stimulating learning via the subsidy
49

In his model, this is not because of market failures in financing, but because firms are myopic
and do not internalize the future cost-reducing effects of their current production.
50
In equilibrium, the subsidy at each point in time will equal the difference between cost and the
minimum cost, and so will decline over time.
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relative to the option of no intervention/no learning. Learning is definitively forthcoming when protection is used; the question is whether it is desirable relative to
laissez faire. By contrast, in the above, I assume that learning is desirable from a
social point of view and focus on whether or not it is forthcoming, depending on the
incentives for effort.

2.6 Insights into the development process
Accounting for effort in experiential learning not only facilitates an understanding
of how learning operates, but also of how it is incentivized or disincentivized. Because
these issues are highly context specific, it is useful to discuss them not only in abstract
but in reference to real-life episodes of learning by doing (or lack thereof).
The two historical case studies discussed here, Bell et al (1982) and Khan (1999),
are among a few that explicitly examine incentives for effort in the infant industry
context and show how such structures are path-dependent and context-specific. These
studies are particularly useful because they focus on experiences of learning by doing
failure, which have received much less attention in the coverage of infant industries
than the success stories, while also not dogmatically attributing such failures to the
violation of free market principles.51 The first study highlights the role of specific
misguided policy choices, while the second emphasizes deeper institutional and political economy constraints, in explaining why scale did not lead to effortful learning
and productivity improvements in state-backed industries.

Steel sheet industry in Thailand

In “Limited Learning in Infant Industry: A

51

In both cases the authors recognize that protection was meant to loss-finance production and
learning which would not have occurred in its absence, due to market failures impeding the ability
of the firm to borrow against the future. Therefore, the core questions they ask are not why the
state intervened, but why it did not do so efficiently.
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Case Study”, Bell, Sott-Kemmis, and Satyarakwit (1982) study the operations of one
of the major galvanized steel sheet plants in Thailand between 1963-1969. This firm,
along with two others, was protected by 45 percent tariffs on competing products at
the time. The authors report the following findings: (p.150)
“Over the [entire] period this infant industrial firm did not improve any
of four important aspects of the production efficiency of three lines which
improved its basic standard product [..] In terms of production efficiency,
the firm seems to have remained stagnant during this period [...] There
were no signs of short term learning curves, or even of capital embodied
technical change.”
The authors link stagnating efficiency directly to a lack of effort to learn and implement continually improved and operations. Though the firm was able to replicate
some of the initially imported Japanese machinery, and to create its own lines, it did
so largely through replicating specifications provided by the single Japanese engineer
onsite, without engaging in deliberative learning from experience. More generally,
the firm continued to perform only the most rudimentary production operations with
respect to both steel- and machinery-making: (p.152)
“Little effort seems to have been made over the history of the plant to
accumulate a stock of technical resources beyond those needed for basic
operation of the plant. Even the knowledge about process operation ...
seems to have been largely confined to knowledge about the specific process used in the plant. [The firm] may have learned a little about how to
manufacture the equipment. However, it imported but did not produce
copies of the equipment specifications and seems to have learned nothing
beyond how to replicate the physical embodiments of those.”
In line with the notion of effortful learning by doing, the lack of learning was
a direct consequence of a lack of investment in resources necessary for learn from
operations, even as production itself expanded. The authors discuss the near absence of capable employees dedicated to learning from production experience through
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monitoring quality, proactively maintaining machinery, and devising solutions (in conjunction with the engineer) for problems encountered on the job. Despite employing
540 people, the firm’s quality control section only employed three people, the maintenance section employed three people with a relevant background, and the engineering
department, working with production lines, employed only one person, the Japanese
employee, who had little constructive interactions with local employees. They observe
that “with the firm having failed to invest in the resources needed to effect technical
change and to capture the experience of production, it is perhaps not too surprising
that it also failed to improve its production efficiency over the period.”(p.152)
How can such subpar investment in efforts to learn from production experience
be understood? The authors attribute the reduction in demand for technical change
(by the firm) to an initial underestimation of the resources necessary for technical
change, which was then self-perpetuated by managerial interests and by the tariffinduced uncompetitive environment.
First, the public Thai personnel involved in the initiation and management of the
firm came from commerce and finance, not technology, backgrounds, and “discussions
with the management suggested that ‘technology’ seemed to be regarded as something
fixed and given which one acquired. It was not something one changed, let alone produced.” (p.154) This orientation meant that investment in the resources for effecting
technical change within the enterprise had a low priority, with emphasis on intermittently importing the necessary goods and services for technology. Accordingly, the
firm’s response to any competitive pressure from the other two major domestic firms
was focused on product differentiation through marketing efforts, as opposed to cost
and price reduction through greater efficiency via learning on the job.
Second, the initial lack of relevant learning efforts took on a self-perpetuating
character, especially as those who had an interest in continuing to provide imported
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goods and services (including Japanese firms and local mediators) exerted significant influence over the management’s decision making. This “reinforced the inbuilt
preference of the firm’s management to seek modes of response to stimuli for change
[...] other than those involving investment in the resources which would have been
necessary for the firm itself to effect its own technical change.” (ibid)
Third, no aspect of government policy was designed to break this situation. To
the contrary, “aspects of government policy were more likely to have quite a contrary
effect.” (ibid) These included tariffs and sales tax on imported equipment which
were remitted while local purchases attracted sales tax, effectively subsidizing imported products relative to those which might have been locally supplied. Finally,
and though the authors do not linger on this point, there were no export targets to
stimulate cost reductions as a competitive strategy, while high tariffs continued to
protect the domestic market from competition.

Industrial policy in Pakistan

In “The Political Economy of Industrial Policy

in Pakistan 1947-1971”, Khan (1999) investigates industrial policy in the country at
large as it emerged and declined under the military regime of General Ayub Khan,
particularly in the 1960s. Pakistan largely consisted of non-industrial rural areas after
the partition of 1947. Ayub’s military regime, which took over in 1958, felt the need
to generate a more powerful industrial base in the country, spurred in part by the
perception of military threat from India.
The military imperative became the imperative of industrialization, and the regime,
building in part on the policies of its predecessor the Muslim League, undertook intentional policies to build a new industrial class. These included exchange rate policy
to facilitate importing necessary machinery,52 a centralized allocation of credit via
52

This included overvaluation to facilitate importing machinery, as well as foreign exchange ra-
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industrial banks, squeezing of agriculture through taxes to subsidize industry, and
high tariffs for the protection of domestic markets, particularly consumer goods markets.53 Along these dimensions, the author shows that the Pakistani state’s policies
resembled to a large degree those of the South Korean state in the same time period.
The author argues that, while these policies initially spurred a rapid expansion of
Pakistan’s industrial output in the late 1950s and early 1960s, this expansion was unable to generate sustained productivity gains by the mid 1960s. The largest firms and
recipients of state support did not demonstrate continuously improved competitiveness, and certainly not to the extent necessary to begin breaking into global markets
and to eventually grow out of the need for public loss-financing. Instead, the opposite
trend was taking hold: productivity stagnation and even reversal, with Pakistani and
South Korean firms for example eventually diverging completely in terms of industrial
trajectory.
What can account for this trajectory? Though there may have been elements of
policy failure, Khan locates the collapse of learning by doing in the Pakistani context
in the 1960s in deeper political economy constraints that eventually limited the state’s
ability to credibly condition subsidies to industry on performance.
Specifically, investments in industry represented significant reallocations of resources by the state, going primarily to about two dozen families operating large-scale
industrial firms. Despite any long-term benefits of industrialization to the wider society, such reallocations excluded broad swathes of society in the short term, including
not only farmers but also large sections of the middle class such as small merchants.
Khan argues that this was not a problem in and of itself, as the Korean state’s policies also largely benefited a small minority of firms, the chaebols, to the exclusion of
tioning in favor of nascent industrialists wanting to import capital goods.
53
For example, the rate of tariffs on consumer goods averaged 65 percent by the late 1950s. (p.15)
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other interest groups. The problem, embedded in Pakistan’s politics, was the political
strength of these groups relative to their economic power and to the politically fragile
and contested Pakistani state.54
It is this political opposition and contestation over resources, Khan argues, that
began to affect the implementation of infant industry policy and to limit its effectiveness along many fronts, including in compelling effort for learning and productivity
growth from experience. On the one hand, the state’s credibility in implementing
penalties by threatening withdrawal of subsidies to large capitalists if performance
was poor became nonexistent, as the increasingly isolated regime needed the support
of these industrialists to remain in control. On the other hand, the state’s ability to
use rewards to incentivize productivity growth began to diminish as a significant portion of subsidies and licenses had to be reallocated in response to political demands
from the excluded yet politically organized opposition groups. The effectiveness of
industrial policy unraveled, and, for the purposes of this paper, as did the components
of learning -based productivity growth that derive from scale.
To the extent that this account describes some of the major challenges facing the
Pakistani state at the time, then it was at least in part the set of compromises induced by social structure which did not allow Pakistan’s industrial policy to evolve
in direction of Korea. In this instance, therefore, the difficulty of eliciting the effort
necessary to learn from scale would not be due to policy failure per se, but to an
incompatibility of economic strategy with underlying society and politics. Khan does
not conclude that industrial policy at large is doomed in countries with adverse political economy settlements, but rather that it must be differentiated to account for
feasibility in the given environment, for example by targeting firms or industries from
54

Pakistan at the time comprised both West Pakistan (modern Pakistan) and East Pakistan
(Bangladesh), and Ayub Khan’s regime at the time was facing mounting political challenges from
West Pakistan opposition figures such as Bhutto as well as growing political unrest in East Pakistan.
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which effort for learning can be compelled.

To sum, these accounts illustrate why an explicit and systematic treatment of the
role of effort in learning on the job, and of the incentive structures necessary to generate it, can help shed light on the learning trajectories of different firms or industries.
Moreover, they demonstrate the importance of context in evaluating any of these
issues. Therefore, further in-depth case studies would facilitate our understanding of
learning successes and failures in different parts of the world.

2.7 Conclusion
Learning by doing describes the process whereby individuals or organizations learn
to perform certain tasks better as they do these tasks repeatedly. Applied to firms,
learning by doing implies that as firms gain experience, usually in the form of cumulative output produced, they figure out how to undertake and organize production
better, leading to sustained cost declines with scale. From an economics perspective,
this implies that production itself is a source of endogenous productivity growth, with
relevance to research areas including (but not limited to) development economics.
The notion of learning by doing is intuitive in that it reaffirms the common sense
that experience improves performance, or “practice makes perfect”, and this intuitiveness has formed the bedrock for the use of learning by doing in economic theory. Beginning with Arrow’s (1962) seminal paper “The Economic Implications of
Learning by Doing”, various models have proliferated whereby learning by doing
drives important macroeconomic outcomes including trade competitiveness, strategic
oligopolistic behavior, predatory pricing, and optimal state learning policies. In these
models, learning is represented by a very simple negative relationship between cu-
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mulative output and costs per unit, such that cumulative output automatically and
definitively reduces costs and improves efficiency.
This paper explores the less discussed, but no less intuitive, dimension of learning
by doing which is that individuals only learn to the extent that they apply themselves
by investing time, energy, and effort into evaluating past performance and locating
areas for improvement. After showing that the evidence on passive learning from
experience is weak, I draw on in-depth case studies of firm behavior to examine how
organizations actually learn from experience. This body of research suggests that
experience aids learning when there are tacit components to knowledge which can
be uncovered through active trial and error, with the actual production environment
providing clues on both knowledge gaps (errors) and the efficacy of possible solutions
(trials). Learning from experience, just like from other sources, is therefore an involved, deliberate, and costly search process. I show that these themes reappear in
studies of capability development in firms in developing countries, and argue that
learning by doing is especially not passive nor automatic in a development context.
The paper’s review of what I call effortful learning by doing is not an exercise in
semantics. Defining effort as a specific and distinct type of (tangible or intangible)
investment that is incurred in production and contributes to greater efficiency, then
the incentives for this investment will in part condition whether learning from experience is successful or not. Therefore, this framework triggers questions about the key
drivers of effort, something which remains poorly understood even in the literature
that documents the deliberative and costly nature of learning by doing.
Of particular interest are the implications for the infant industry argument, whose
logic relies on the assumption that (state-assisted) scale will eventually result in competitive advantage. The discussion in the paper suggests that though loss-financing
of initial production by the state may be a necessary condition to stimulate learning,
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by spurring scale, it is not sufficient unless incentives to compel effort are also in
place. In turn, the appropriate reward and penalty mechanisms may be feasible and
implemented, or feasible but not implemented due to policy shortsightedness, or not
feasible for deeper institutional and political reasons. Understanding which of these
applies to any given experience can help elaborate where it went right or wrong, and
inform the types of policy recommendations that make sense for the context at hand.
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CHAPTER

3

LAND FOR PEACE? ISRAEL-PALESTINE
THROUGH THE LENS OF GAME THEORY

3.1 Introduction
Strategic political interactions between individuals, political organizations, and
states can sometimes be understood as “games” among rational or semi-rational actors. For this reason, game theory has been increasingly applied in political science
to subjects such as public choice (Rowley and Schneider, 2004), voting theory (Acemoglu, 2010), lobbying (Aitken-Turff and Jackson, 2006), civil war (Blattman and
Miguel, 2010), and inter-state conflict (Powell, 2002).
This paper contributes to the literature on game theory applications to inter-state
political conflict; specifically, I investigate the application of game theory to one of the
most protracted conflicts of the past century, the Israeli-Palestinian one. I examine
papers that use game theoretic principles to explain key components of the conflict
and highlight what they assume about the actors’ strategic interests. I then offer
a critique of some of the predominant assumptions in the literature, and draw on
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bargaining theory to exemplify different ways that game theory can more realistically
model strategic interests and explain the endurance of the conflict.
The review of the game theoretic literature on Israel-Palestine makes three things
clear. First, the application of game theory to the subject has been limited even
though the conflict is one of the most protracted and hotly debated of the twentieth
century. The number of studies is small and many of them follow in the fifteen
year period immediately after the initiation of the Oslo Peace Accords in 1993. The
Accords, signed by Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), promised
a five year plan for Israel to withdraw from the territories it occupied in 1967 and grant
Palestinians sovereignty in exchange for Palestinian compliance with Israeli security
demands; this is referred to as the two-state solution or “land for peace” paradigm.
Figure 3.1 shows the occupied Palestinian territories (West Bank, East Jerusalem,
and Gaza) over which the Accords were negotiated.

Figure 3.1: Israel and the occupied territories
Figure 3.1 shows the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza in brown, and Israel in yellow
(it also includes Golan Heights, occupied by Israel in Syria). Source: The Palestinian
territories’ profile, BBC News, April 8 2019.
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Second, the majority of papers aim to use the principles of strategic interaction
and rational behavior to explain the increasingly obvious failure of the Oslo Accords in
generating a two-state solution. Instead of two sovereign states, the post-Oslo period
has been marred by continued Israeli settlement growth as well as episodes of violence,
including during the second Palestinian Intifada or uprising (2000-2005). Eschewing
the idea that the absence of a solution is illogical, these papers are interested in
pointing to strategic interests that can explain continued conflict between Israel and
the Palestinians. Methodologically, many use formal models though some apply game
theoretic principles to Israel-Palestine without formal modelling.
Third, when distilled to their core assumptions, many papers, and most formal
ones, assume that the Israeli state is strategically interested in withdrawing and
granting the Palestinians sovereignty over the territory occupied in 1967 pending
resolvable security concerns, but that all or some Palestinians have other objectives
and use violence to achieve them, thereby explaining the collapse of any land for
peace deal. Informed by these assumptions, the existing models largely present the
conflict as an impasse or deadlock perpetuated by short-term hostilities, with the
responsibility for this impasse falling on the shoulders of these Palestinian factions
conducting or aiding hostilities.
The assumption that the militarily strong party, Israel, is willing to withdraw
from the occupied territories in a land for peace deal is so embedded in these models
that it often goes unexplained and undefended. Instead, the main debate (and difference between the models) concerns the motivations and strategies of the Palestinians
spoiling this opportunity.
In contrast, I show that papers on Israel-Palestine that draw on the principles of
game theory and strategic behavior but informally and using interdisciplinary methods suggest alternative explanations for the failure of the two-state solution. In
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particular, these papers suggest that Israel is possibly not willing, for reasons beyond
security concerns, to withdraw from the occupied territories. However, the inference
from these papers about the strategic interests of relevant parties is often implicit,
not highlighted with clarity, and limited to the analysis of short time periods. The
informal analyses also make a comparison with more formal contributions difficult.
After examining the above literature, I argue that the predominant assumption in
the formal game theoretic models, that Israel is strategically interested in withdrawing from the occupied territories, is flawed. I do this by overviewing Israeli settlement
policy since the beginning of the occupation in 1967, since settlements are very costly
and difficult-to-reverse investments and are thus a credible signal of long-term strategic interest in the land. This analysis shows that Israel has pursued the expansion,
not retrenchment, of its control in the occupied territories as a top national priority
under all circumstances. I also show how Israel’s security discourse can be understood
in this context.
To highlight the importance of the land for peace assumption in driving any
conclusions about the conflict, I sketch the outlines of an alternative game, adapted
from Fearon (1997), that assumes that Israel instead sees the territories as highly
strategic and integral for its future. Under these modified assumptions, the game can
produce a moving equilibrium where Israel pursues nonstop settlement expansion in
the territories, effectively blocking the possibility of a two-state solution and matching
what we see on the ground. The conclusions thus become very different to those in
the formal literature, and, as I argue, more historically plausible.
I conclude that it is plausible that the militarily dominant party (Israel) is not
interested in relinquishing control over the territories but the opposite, that this is
not a temporary result of security concerns but rooted in the long term interests of
the state in a highly strategic asset, and that this can help explain the worsening
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trajectory of the conflict. Moreover, contracts like the Oslo Peace Accords would by
design fail to produce a two-state solution since they would not be self-enforced.
This paper’s contribution is twofold. First, it illustrates how game theory has
been applied to an important and ongoing conflict, driven, at least in the formal
literature, by dubious assumptions about the strategic interests of the key parties
involved. In turn, this renders the ability of these models to explain the trajectory
of the conflict poor at best, and misleading at worst. Second, the paper helps clarify
our thinking about Israel-Palestine by addressing head-on the question of strategic
national interests, using analysis at the intersection of history and game theory. To
my knowledge, this is the first paper to systematically tackle the application of game
theory to Israel-Palestine.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 examines the literature that applies
game theoretic principles to the subject, classifying papers by the assumptions they
make about Israel and the Palestinians’ strategic interests. Section 3.3 provides a
historical overview of settlement policy to critique the predominant assumption in
formal models about Israeli interest in land for peace, and situates Israel’s security
discourse in this context. Section 3.4 presents a game theoretic model where Israel
(like the Palestinians) wants to maximize its control over the occupied territories
because the territories are a highly strategic asset, and shows that this can be more
useful for understanding and predicting the trajectory of the conflict. Section 3.5
summarizes and concludes.

3.2 The game theoretic literature
The array of papers that use game theory to analyze the interdependent strategic
interest of Israel and the Palestinians can be broadly classified into two groups. One
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group adopts the assumption that Israel is interested in handing over the occupied territories to the Palestinians pending resolvable security concerns, and tends to present
formal game theory models to make the case. In this interpretation, the failure of
a land for peace deal owes to various Palestinian strategic motivations that do not
align with such a deal. The other group adopts alternative assumptions about Israel’s strategic interests and about the root causes of a failure to generate a two-state
solution. This literature tends to draw on and discuss the principles of game theory
without formal modelling (with a few exceptions) and to sometimes lack a systematic
analysis of the actors’ strategic interests, especially Israel’s. I analyze each in turn.

3.2.1 Israel as strategically interested in withdrawal/solution
As will be clear, the assumption that Israel is interested in withdrawing from
the occupied territories encompasses a delicate tradeoff. It is assumed (explicitly or
implicitly) that Israel would inherently rather retain its control over the occupied
territories, but that there is conflict with or aggression by Palestinians which is sufficiently costly such that Israel would prefer to withdraw (if it can stop this violence) to
the status quo. If Israel is strategically interested in withdrawal for peace, then logically the reason it has not withdrawn must be the interests and actions of Palestinians
that are irreconcilable with this vision. The conceptualization of these Palestinian
interests and strategies, and which Palestinians in particular are to blame for the
continuation of the conflict, is the main point of differentiation among these papers.
A few papers assume outright that all Palestinians have interests that are irreconcilable with a two-state solution. Although it is a short paper written by an
economist for the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (a think tank) rather than a
peer-reviewed article, it is useful to start with Plessner (2001). The reason is that
is that Plessner lays out very clearly, and in its most radical form, this assumption
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that Palestinians are simply not interested in peace and instead pursue a dominant
strategy of defecting from any international agreement. Even though he uses the
language of game theory and rational analysis, Plessner does not explain the logic of
this Palestinian obstruction, even noting that such mentality “cannot be construed
as part of the pursuit of everyday individual happiness” (p.5). Of Israel, by contrast,
“there can be no doubt [that it]... strives to achieve peace with insurance [and] it
is prepared to let the Palestinians create an independent state of their own [and to]
give up much of the territory occupied in the Six Day War” (p.7); the author backs
this with the unsupported claim that Israel has not constructed new settlements and
is only pursuing organic growth of existing settlements. Because withdrawing from
the land yields negative utility to Israel without a compensating benefit if Palestinians refuse to relinquish violence, Plessner suggests Israel must “get a lot tougher”
and ”exact a heavy price” on the Palestinians to alter the latter’s dominant strategy
(p.11).
Mizrahi et al (2001) take a more complicated approach that nonetheless shares
the assumption that Palestinians adopt a dominant strategy of being violent. With
respect to Israel, they posit contestation between a right-wing Israeli faction that refuses territorial concessions and a left-wing faction that supports “giving up territory
in exchange for peace” (p.52). Referencing the results of a peace index (Yaar and
Hermann, 1997) constructed from interviews with a sample of Jewish Israelis, they
suggest Israelis prefer the left-wing faction which therefore informs Israel’s strategic
interests vis a vis the Palestinians.55 In a simple 2x2 game, the authors represent
Israel’s interests as an asymmetric chicken game, such that it will concede land if
55

What territory exactly is up for withdrawal is left ambiguous, and further examination of this
peace index shows that it asks participants if they support the Oslo Accords process, not if they
support withdrawal from the 1967 territories. The ambiguity of what the Oslo Accords mean to
Israelis is discussed in Section 3.3.
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Palestinians are violent but will not concede land if Palestinians are peaceful (while
Palestinians are dominantly violent); the implication is that mutual hostilities would
be more damaging to Israel than one-sided hostility. The resultant Nash equilibrium
is that Israel cedes territory while Palestinians continue to be violent.
Jacobson and Kaplan (2007) focus more closely on the second Intifada as a ”sustained terror campaign” (p.789) and suggest that Palestinian terrorists decide on how
frequently to attack Israeli civilians and that they derive utility from killing said civilians. Meanwhile, the Israeli government decides how often to kill suspected terrorists
(”targeted killings” (p.772)) and derives utility from minimizing Israeli and Palestinian civilian casualties. Using a repeated two-period game where the Palestinian
terrorists first decide how many suicide bombings to carry out, after which the Israeli government decides how many ”hits” to carry out, the authors show the various
parameters under which the rate of terror attacks and counterterror targeted hits is
low, high, or cyclical. Though the authors do not explicitly eschew the possibility of
other Palestinian strategic interests, they do not present a meaningful discussion of
Palestinian strategies other than terror attacks, nor a discussion of the relationship
between terror tactics and interest in the land. The implication is that Palestinian
terrorism is at the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and that it is an end goal
in and of itself, offering utility from the act of killing.
The more influential interpretation in the literature, however, is not that all Palestinians obstruct a land for peace deal. Rather, it is that a specific extremist (Palestinian) faction spoils the peace process between Israel and more moderate Palestinians.
de Figueiredo and Weingast (2001) separate a dominant ingroup (Israel) from
moderate and terrorist sub-groups of the outgroup (Palestinians). They assume the
Palestinian extremists want control over all the land, including Israel proper, while the
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moderates may be content with an intermediate share such as the occupied territories.
In the second stage of the game, Israel and the Palestinians reach a bargain over the
division of the land which is more favorable to Palestinians the more extreme (closer
to radicals) the moderates are. Foreseeing this, in the first stage the extremists
may choose to terrorize Israel in order to elicit suppression on themselves that can
alienate the moderates and make them more radical, through Israeli “targeting error”
(killing innocent Palestinians) and “triggering sympathies” (p.10). If the moderates
are highly suggestible, and if the cost of terrorism to Israel is sufficiently high, it is
possible to have an equilibrium with continuous cycles of Palestinian violence and
Israeli suppression. This delays a move to a bargain and demonstrates as enduring
conflict.
While in the above model the Palestinian extremists are delaying peace to improve
the bargaining position, another conceptualization is that Palestinian extremists want
to thwart the bargain altogether and are able to do so for various reasons. Kydd
and Walter (2002) mode Israel as the government while Palestinians are split into
moderates and extremists. The authors refer to Oslo Accords and suggest that the
Israeli government most strongly prefers mutual fulfillment of the Accords. They
suggest the problem is not only that the Palestinian extremists want to overthrow
the Accords but also that the Palestinian moderates with whom Israel can make a
deal could subsequently betray it (“relaunch the struggle”, p.268).
Specifically, in the first stage of the game, the extremists may launch attacks on
Israel and the moderates may try to suppress those (successfully or unsuccessfully);
Israel cannot see the suppression effort but uses the outcome to revise its expectations
of moderates’ trustworthiness, and hence its decision to fulfill its end of the peace
deal in the second stage. Knowing this, the extremists can attack to drive a wedge
between Israel the moderates. An attack can cause Israel’s trust in the moderates to
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fall below what is necessary to implement a deal, thereby thwarting the deal. This
is what the authors suggest happened, arguing that “terrorist violence ... reduced
the value Israelis placed on peace ... [with] an opponent they increasingly viewed as
untrustworthy” (p.285).
Berrebi and Klor (2006) also draw on the theme of trust (of Israel in the Palestinians’ future actions) and use this to explain the absence of a solution despite presumed
Israeli interest. In the model, Israel would like to continue occupying the territories
but it is willing to withdraw to stop Palestinian violence. Palestinians are divided
into moderates and extremists, both with the potential to engage in terrorist violence,
but their objectives are different. Moderates want to establish a sovereign state on
1967 territory while extremists want a state that eradicates Israel. Therefore, unlike
moderates, extremists will not accept an agreement whereby Israel withdraws (only)
from 1967 territory in exchange for a cessation of violence. Knowing this, Israelis
(who face imperfect information) may believe violence is coming from the extremists
and hence be unwilling to concede territory. Therefore, the stalemate owes to extremist Palestinian objectives which fracture Israel’s trust in the efficacy of an agreement
for achieving security from attacks.
de Mesquita (2005b) focuses on the game between Israel and Palestinian moderates. In the model Israel’s utility increases with counterterror efforts and decreases
with concessions k to Palestinians, while Palestinians are all terrorists who obtain
utility from destroying Israel to two varying extents, differentiating them into moderate and extremist terrorists. In equilibrium, Israel may offer concessions to the
moderates if they aid it in counterterror efforts (against extremists) and the moderates may accept, after which the two play a simultaneous commitment game. Because
concessions are costly to Israel and counterterror aid is costly to moderates, the game
degenerates into a prisoner’s dilemma where concessions and aid are not followed
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through on. Since in a prisoner’s dilemma mutual cooperation is preferable for both
parties (but not credible), this means Israel would prefer to concede land and get
counterterror aid than neither (land for peace) and similarly for the moderates. The
author shows that in an infinite game with trigger strategies, mutual cooperation can
become self-enforcing, but opines that what thwarted peace efforts was the lack of
commitment of the Palestinian moderates.56
In another paper, de Mesquita (2005a) abstracts from the commitment problem
on the Israeli side and focuses on the (lack of) credibility of the Palestinian moderates
arising from the unobservability of counterterror effort and therefore moral hazard. In
the model the moderates play first and if they succeed in counterterror Israel grants
the agreed upon concessions. If they fail, Israel will not enact concessions and, making
deductions about the moderates’ ability and effort, may choose to “replace the former
terrorist leadership with a new negotiating partner” (p.237). The author shows that
if the threat of replacement is not sufficiently tied to counterterror performance, then
the moderates will have an incentive to exert low effort and to claim they tried but
failed, knowing Israel cannot observe effort and that the replacement threat is not
credible.57 Therefore, whereas Israel commits to peace, it may be obstructed from
withdrawal by the presence of moral hazard in Palestinians’ counterterror efforts.
56
Referring to the Oslo Accords, de Mesquita writes “as recent events have demonstrated, the
Israelis seem to have concluded that they overestimated the helpfulness of the Palestinians in counterterror” (p.165). It is unclear why Palestinians would not be “helpful” unless the trigger strategy
is not sufficiently incentivizing due to concessions being too low. The author does not elaborate
on this point, noting casually instead that information problems (not modeled) may have created
inaccurate expectations for Israel, but it is unclear why in a repeated setup and prolonged conflict
information and expectations do not self-correct.
57
The author suggests this will happen if the alternative moderates available are too weak, so that
current leadership knows it will not be replaced regardless of effort, or too strong, so that it knows
it will be replaced regardless. He suggests that this has prompted Israel to “encourage relatively
equal, rival factions within terrorist movements [...] Israelis followed precisely such a strategy during
the first Intifada by supporting extremist Islamic movements which gave rise to Hamas and Islamic
Jihad” (p.253). This leaves the question of why, if this policy was successful, a resolution has not
been forthcoming (with high effort and concessions).
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Berman and Laitin (2008) concede that there are Palestinian moderates but focus
on Palestinian terrorists and model the strategic considerations within these organizations that inform their makeup and rules, instead of modeling the interaction of
Palestinians and Israelis. Regarding strategic interests, they suggest that the goal of
Palestinian organizations like Hamas is far more extreme than a two-state solution:
”Hamas [is] adopting a nationalist position [that is] extreme, making the immediate
conquest of all Palestine (not just the West Bank and Gaza) a religious obligation”
(p.1946). Though Israeli interests are not modeled, it is plausible that these factions
stand in the way of any peace plan, since even if Israel were to withdraw from the
occupied territories, attacks would not desist. In the paper, Israel is in a neutral preemptive position (looking to thwart extremist attacks) as opposed to being a player
whose strategic considerations are important to understanding the motivations of
extremists.58

3.2.2 Israel as possessing other strategic interests
An early game theoretic exposition of Israeli interests other than land for peace
is found in Hirsch (1996), who examines the conflict over occupied East Jerusalem
and suggests that Israel is strategically unwilling to relinquish this land and is thus
involved in a zero sum game with the Palestinians.59 Hirsch does not formalize his
intuition, but to the extent that the game over East Jerusalem is a zero-sum game then
it is not a prisoner’s dilemma, and there is no room for cooperation even with trigger
58

Though the paper suggests terror is a tool of the weak resorted to when conventional warfare
is not an option and the other state is too strong, it is not clear how the operations relate to the
Israeli occupation. The authors focus on poverty and the absence of sufficient social provision by
the Palestinian Authority as creating space for Hamas, without tying those to Israel’s policies in the
territories.
59
This is not a contentious claim, as Israel (though not the international community) considers all
of Jerusalem its capital while Palestinians have repeatedly referred to international law to emphasize
that any future Palestinian state would have East Jerusalem as its capital.
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strategies because one party will value mutual defection over mutual cooperation.
If cooperation is relinquishing some of the claim over East Jerusalem, then the
party blocking mutual cooperation will be the one that benefits more from a continuation of the mutual defection status quo. This, Hirsch suggests, is inarguably Israel,
because it “currently maintains control over East Jerusalem, and this situation is expected to continue [...] Israel [insists] on preserving the present status quo”’ (p.714).
He suggests that the negative payoffs from sharing East Jerusalem are particularly
high for Israel due to the construction of new settlements, a strategy which “illustrates the technique of preemption or irrevocable commitment [... This] increases the
negative payoffs arising for the investing party [of relinquishing claim over the city...]
and reduces the likelihood Israel will adopt such a move” (p.710).
Whereas Hirsch confines the zero sum aspect to East Jerusalem, Pape (2003) suggests that there is a strong zero sum aspect over the remaining occupied territories
as well. Studying the strategic motivation of Palestinian suicide attacks in the mid
to late 1990s, Pape argues their end goal had not been to thwart a negotiated settlement where Israel withdraws from the territories occupied in 1967 but to pressure
Israel to do so, using war of attrition, when negotiations are viewed as a failure; the
implication is that extremists are different from moderates not in goal but in method.
Examining the timing of suicide attacks in 1994-1995, he shows that attacks followed
not Israeli concessions, but Israeli delays of Oslo’s agreed-upon deadlines for military
withdrawals from population centers.
On Israel, and in other occupation contexts as well, Pape argues that suicide
attacks may pressure the occupying state into granting modest and reversible concessions but “are unlikely to affect the target state’s interests in the issues at stake”
(p.355) which are usually to retain control over the occupied territories. He notes
Israel’s concessions to the Palestinians in 1994-1997 involved “temporary and partial
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withdrawal” from important areas at the same time that settlements doubled and
there was “little to hinder the Israeli Defence Forces’ (IDF) return” (p.356). Therefore, this paper overturns the land for peace paradigm on its head: it is not that
Israel wants to withdraw but is prevented from doing so by a highly successful terrorist campaign, but rather that Israel does not want to withdraw and will not be
forced to do so by weakly coercive terrorist attacks.
In a more descriptive piece than their earlier analytical work, Kydd and Walter
(2006) support the idea that suicide bombings are an attrition strategy tool employed
by weak actors and suggest that a major determinant of whether the attrition campaign works is the occupying state’s “level of interest in the issue under dispute”,
since “states with ... important interests at stake rarely do [capitulate to terrorist
demands]” (p.60). They note that these strategic interests of the state are often forward looking, with an eye to how territorial concessions today may reduce bargaining
power and result in further territorial losses tomorrow. They also note that when significant withdrawal is not under consideration, strategic responses to terrorism may
range from conceding inessential issues to targeted retaliation in the form of assassinations. Regarding Israel, they point that “Israel is unlikely to withdraw from East
Jerusalem” (p.61). However, they do not generalize this sentiment, of a high strategic
priority of the land to Israel, to the wider occupied territories.
Like Pape, Bloom (2004) questions the spoiler game theoretic accounts that suggest Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories was forthcoming but spoiled by
terrorism. Since the acceleration of attacks in 2002 “took place against a political
backdrop with few substantive peace negotiations between Israel and the PA [...] It
is unclear how effective the attacks are at spoiling a peace no one believes in” (p.64).
Bloom shows Palestinian support for military movements was low (less than one third)
but soared in 2000 once it was clear to Palestinians that they were not reaping any
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sovereignty dividends from Israel, and that the rate of attacks followed pace.
This supports Pape’s interpretation that moderate and extremist movements differ
more in method than goal, and that attacks must be understood in terms of how
the occupied population views their efficacy relative to alternatives, developing after
other tactics fail to yield results. Bloom also shows that Israel responded to attacks
post-2000 with extreme violence and not with concessions of land, even reoccupying
Palestinian territories at various points. Though the connection is not explicit in
her paper, this reifies the observation that suicide attacks are unlikely to significantly
alter a state’s national interests in occupied territories and suggests Israel is unwilling
to withdraw regardless.
Pearlman (2009) provides another critique of standard spoiler accounts and demonstrates more reasons (besides war of attrition) that persistently blocking sovereignty
would encourage the use of violence by weak actors even when these methods generate
limited concessions. Examining the history of the Palestinian national movement in
two peace negotiation episodes including Oslo, the author suggests that not everything
is driven by external utility considerations and that internal contestation dynamics
are also important especially in a non-state entity such as the occupied territories.
The dominant faction having most to gain will negotiate while those excluded may
resort to violence, particularly once it is clear negotiations have failed. Therefore,
continued absence of sovereignty is likely to fuel violence not just to pressure withdrawal but also to differentiate one’s party domestically and carve out a space in the
contested non-state entity. Like Bloom, Pearlman does not directly address Israel’s
strategic interests, but one interpretation is that continued violence is a reaction to,
and not a roadblock toward the implementation of, Israel’s strategic interests in the
territories.
Abrahams (2019) presents a qualitative discussion of principal-agent problems to
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analyze recent developments in the relationship between Israel (principal) and the
Palestinian Authority (agent), seen as the moderate faction. He argues that security
efforts by the PA have been met with financial rewards, not sovereignty, by Israel.
Between 2007-2013, the PA under Prime Minister Fayyad cracked down extensively
on militant factions, with one IDF general remarking that Israel and the PA “are close
to the ceiling of security cooperation” (p.19); Fayyad presented this to the Palestinian
people as a necessary but certain compromise for sovereignty. Though Israel welcomed
Fayyad’s security cooperation, “insofar as [his] reforms hastened the two-state solution
timetable, they put the principal, especially the Israeli army, in an awkward position
[...] funding for Fayyad’s policies from Israel’s allies fell short, leading directly to
PA fiscal debt, austerity measures, popular backlash, and Fayyad’s ejection.” (ibid)
Abrahams observes that the post-Fayyad government has continued to be compliant
with Israel’s security platform without any serious prospect for a sovereign state but
has avoided Fayyad’s predicament by increasingly using repression instead of political
legitimacy to rule. This has allowed Israel to continue rewarding the PA with private
benefits (recognition and funding) that do not reflect the Palestinian public’s priority
of territorial sovereignty.
While the above accounts shed doubt on the assumption that Israel has been
strategically interested in withdrawing from some or all of the territories but prevented by violence, Schiff (2012) provides the clearest rational-behavior exposition
and criticism of this assumption. Drawing on negotiation theory and on publicly
documented discourse within the Israeli Knesset (parliament) and between the Israeli
government and the public in 1992-1995, Schiff argues there was never a real plan to
withdraw to 1967 borders and to allow a sovereign Palestinian state to emerge, and
rather that the Accords were a tactic in continuing conflict management for Israel.
Schiff shows that Rabin presented the agreement internally as one which for Israel
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left “all options open for the negotiation process to follow” (p.78) and which did not
necessitate nor require Palestinian sovereignty. Speaking to the Knesset in August
1993, he emphasized that the Declaration of Principles (DOP), which was the interim
agreement that Israel and the Palestinians signed in the Oslo Accords, does not discuss
a Palestinian state but rather “it is about an interim agreement for five years. Our
opinion against a state is well known. Any attempt to connect the Interim agreement
to the permanent status agreement is nonsense” (ibid). By contrast, the Palestinians
supposed (or hoped) the interim agreement was paving the way for statehood by
providing the agenda and the suggested timeframes. Schiff argues that despite the
fundamental incongruence of the long-term interests of the two parties, the signing
of the Accords was facilitated technically by some of the ambiguous language

60

and

driven strategically by the desire of Rabin and Arafat to score points externally and
domestically.61
Last but not least, two exceptions to the non-formal methodology in this group of
papers are Baliga and Sjostrom (2012) and Konyukhovskiy and Grigoriadis (2019).
In Baliga and Sjostrom, the authors suggest that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is
one where the two sides would have reached a resolution but were prevented from
doing so by the provocative actions of extremists, and point to the actions of Israeli
Prime Minister Sharon whose visit to East Jerusalem in September 2000 helped spark
the second Intifada as an example of such extremist provocation. They show that
60
One example is use of “withdrawal from territories” instead of “the territories” in the English
version. Also see Zartmann (1997) on this point.
61
Schiff argues Rabin hoped that peace talks would lead to a breakthrough in the normalization of
Israel’s relationship with the Arab bloc headed by Syria, and wanted present to the Israeli public an
agreement “that could be portrayed [...] as a minimal costs agreement that brings many advantages”
(p.86). For Arafat, the recognition of the PLO as the sole representative of Palestinian people and
the creation of the Palestinian Authority gave the PLO both representation powers and funding;
Rabin knew these were crucial to Arafat given the deteriorating external context for the organization.
Domestically, Arafat could present “some achievement that would be considered a breakthrough on
the road to a Palestinian state” (p.82).
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in a simultaneous game where players in two countries A and B have stag hunt-like
coordination preferences (being dovish if they believe the other is a dove and being
hawkish if the other is a hawk), but have no information about the other player’s
type, a dove-dove equilibrium may be thwarted by the presence of a third-party
extremist that lives in A, benefits from war with B, and can send a message that
reveals information about A’s type to B. Specifically, a provocation message by the
extremist will reveal that A can be easily provoked by fear into becoming a hawk;
knowing this, B is more likely to enter a hawkish spiral, triggering A into this spiral
as well and resulting in a “cascade of fear and hostility” (p.2899).
The model suggests that in the absence of such provocation a solution in the
footsteps of the “peace process” (p. 2897) would have been possible. Core Israeli
strategic interests are still implicitly seen within the land for peace paradigm with
more hawkish tendencies being a fringe aberration, making this paper’s assumptions
a relatively nominal departure from the literature that suggests Israel is interested
in land for peace. Of course, the question here is the plausibility of framing the
interests of the prime minister of a democratic country as fringe and not representing
those of the country more broadly. It is also historically questionable whether Israeli
behavior has been different under more leftist governments and in the absence of such
provocations (see Section 3.3).
Konyukhovskiy and Grigoriadis (2019) construct an elaborate model of Israeli
Palestinian interaction as constituting a proxy war for regional and global parties,
and focus on the role of these powers in prolonging the conflict. The proxy relationship is analyzed within a principal-agent model, with the United States acting
as a primary principal for Israel and (up to the 1980s) the Soviet Union acting as
a primary principal for the Palestinians. The authors do not rely on the land for
peace paradigm to model either party’s strategic interests, suggesting instead that
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both parties benefit from an aggression parameter x but want to reduce the cost they
pay for the escalation of conflict from this aggression. In this framework, the authors show that a balanced bilateral proxy war can lead to a stable resolution of the
conflict, and argue that it is the deterioration of viable proxies for the Palestinians,
and consolidation of the US-Israel alliance, that has facilitated the worsening of the
conflict.
Despite its insight into the role of superpowers, the paper does not offer an in-depth
analysis of Israeli or Palestinian strategic interests, taking them more as a given while
focusing on the role of third parties. Also, as compared with the model presented
shortly, the relevant parameter (here, aggression) is not strategic in the sense of
affecting future bargaining power. Nonetheless, the model’s vision is closest, among
the formal literature, to this paper as it relinquishes the land for peace paradigm and
models an interaction in the spirit of noncooperative bargaining.

3.3 Strategic interests reexamined
As shown above, the majority of the formal game theoretic literature on IsraelPalestine tends to assume that Israel is strategically interested in relinquishing its
control over the occupied territories in exchange for peace but obstructed by Palestinian violence that has other objectives. Another group of papers uses game theoretic
principles to suggest alternative reasons, predominantly incongruent claims over the
land, are responsible for the failure of a solution; this group tends to rely on informal
discussion of game theoretic principles, to focus on narrow time periods, and/or to
lack a systematic analysis especially of Israeli interests.
This section argues that settlement policy demonstrates systematically that Israel
is interested in expanding, not relinquishing, its control over the occupied territo-
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ries, as a top national priority. Settlements are very costly investments, making
them a more credible arbiter of strategic interests than potential cheap talk (like
proclamations or signed agreements) which is less costly to send and easily reversible.
Therefore, because settlements in the occupied territories make Israeli withdrawal extremely difficult, it is highly instructive to examine Israel’s strategic interest in these
territories by examining settlement policy since 1967.
I show how settlement policies have been consistent across different Israeli governments, suggesting the presence of a national consensus around the strategic value
of the occupied territories, and how such policies have been largely unperturbed by
acts of Palestinian violence or lack thereof. I also briefly address how Israeli demands
for security can be understood in this context. This will then set the stage for a
discussion about ways to formalize this logic in a game theoretic framework.

3.3.1 Settlement policy since 1967
Israel began to settle members of its population in the Palestinian territories as
soon as it occupied them in 1967. Under the direction of the left-leaning Labor party,
and within weeks of winning the June 1967 war, the government demolished 160
Palestinian houses in East Jerusalem and appropriated 600 buildings so they can be
rebuilt for Israelis (UN, 1982). In July of that year, defense minister Yigal Allon
presented a plan (the Allon Plan) to the Prime Minister, the basic outline of which
was that Israel would annex the Jerusalem corridor, retain control over the western
component of the West Bank, and create separate and noncontinuous enclaves for
Palestinians in the region connected by specific roads (ECF, 1967).
Settlement drives intensified over the next ten years under Labor rule, reaching
90 settlements populated by 10,000 settlers by 1977. There was also active planning
for the road, electricity, and water networks among settlements, and discussion of
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future plans for highways that can link existing settlements and facilitate the rise
of new ones. During that time, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin (who would later be
reelected in the 1990s and sign the Oslo Accords) declared that settlements increase
Israel’s security and that it is important to “renew, expand [the settlements]” and
“establish defensible borders for the State of Israel” by bolstering settlements along
the Jordanian border, in Jerusalem and Hebron, and south of the Gaza Strip (US
Congress Committee on Int’l Relations, 1977, p.14).
There was little question of the extent of the government’s involvement in settlement expansion. The Israeli government had allocated 400 million US dollars to
settlements over that ten year period, equivalent to about 2.3% of its yearly GDP.
This included direct subsidies to encourage settlers to transfer to the occupied territories through the use of tax exemptions, inexpensive loans, and material assistance
with water, electricity, and phone services and with transportation facilities (UN,
1982). The Ministry of Agriculture also dedicated a growing portion of its budget to
settlements, as did the Ministry of Housing for the construction of new building units
in new settlements (National Lawyers Guild, 1978).
The more right-wing Likud won elections in 1977 on the platform that the territories are part of the historic Land of Israel and “no part should [...] be handed over
to foreign rule” (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs), and elaborated on the settlement
policy initiated by its Labor predecessor. Ariel Sharon, then minister of agriculture who would become prime minister in 2001, put forth a plan for an extension
of Jewish settlements, partially based on the Allon Plan, that was approved by the
government in October 1977. The plan suggested establishing settlement urban areas
in the western part of the West Bank, extending Jewish settlements in the eastern
part, building roads connecting these eastern and western settlements, and encircling
Jerusalem with a “belt” of settlements (ECF, 1977). Sharon’s long-term vision was
117

that the settlements would reach two million settlers by the year 2000 and constitute
a “second axis” of Jewish population parallel to the coastal one in Israel proper (US
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 1978).
During that period, while the Labor party supported handing over populated
centers in the occupied territories to Jordan, “its position on the existing Jewish
settlements was much less clear cut: it never declared that these should be removed
for peace” and there was approval in its political bureau of trade union participation
in building settlement infrastructure (Demant, 1983).
Though in 1973 Israel had signed the Camp David Accords with Egypt which
stipulated that Israel would grant occupied Palestinians autonomy after five years,
domestically Israeli policymakers were frank that autonomy could only mean limited population self-rule, not territorial sovereignty, and that settlement policy was
strategically meant to prevent the rise of a Palestinian state. Matityahu Drobles,
an appointee of Prime Minister Begin, head of the Settlement Division in the World
Zionist Organization, and author of the influential Drobles Plan for settlement expansion (adopted by the government), wrote a document in 1980 stating as such (UN,
1982):
“ In light of the current negotiations on the future of Judea and Samaria
62
it will now become necessary for us to conduct a race against time [...]
It is significant to stress today, mainly by means of action, that the autonomy does not and will not apply to the territories but only to the Arab
population thereof. This should mainly find expression by establishing
facts on the ground [through settlements ...] There mustn’t even be even
a shadow of a doubt about our intention to keep the territories [...] for
good.”
A year later, in 1981, Prime Minister Begin himself publicly swore that he would
never give up “Judea and Samaria”.
62

There are biblical terms for the West Bank meant to popularize the notion that they are inherently Jewish and part of the greater Land of Israel.
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The Likud government was reelected in 1981 and escalated its settlement construction endeavors, including in response to a plan by US president Ronald Reagan
in 1982 to freeze settlements. Though Reagan, in defiance of the United Nations and
the Geneva Conventions laws, suggested that settlements were not illegal and only
pushed for granting Palestinians self-rule without supporting a territorially sovereign
state, his plan was unanimously rejected by the Israeli cabinet. In a statement, the
cabinet declared that “settlement is a Jewish inalienable right and an integral part of
our national security” and emphasized that prior agreements like Camp David were
about “autonomy to inhabitants not territory” (Shipler, 1982). Immediately after the
Reagan plan was announced, Israel established seven new settlements though it denied a direct link, and there were discussions about increasing the number of settlers
from 30,000 to 100,000 by 1986 to form a bloc “strong enough to block any significant
territorial concession” (Demant, 1983).
With the first Intifada and growing organization of Palestinian protestors, a united
Likud-Labor government proposed a “peace initiative” in 1989 which stated that
“Israel yearns for peace [...] by means of direct negotiations based on the principles
of the Camp David Accords [...and] Israel opposes the establishment of a Palestinian
state in the Gaza district and in the area between Israel and Jordan” (emphasis
added) (ECF, 1989). The plan also opposed any negotiations with the PLO, and, like
Camp David, proposed a five-year interim period during which Israel would “accord
Palestinian inhabitants self-rule by means of which they will, themselves, conduct
their affairs of daily life [while] Israel will continue to be responsible for security,
foreign affairs, and all matters concerning Israeli citizens [in the occupied territories].”
The plan suggested that after five years, permanent status negotiations would be
conducted whose aim would be to achieve “a permanent solution acceptable to the
negotiating parties” and arrange for “peace between Israel and Jordan”, with explicit
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refusal of Palestinian statehood. (ibid)
In 1993, the Labor government under Yitzhak Rabin signed the Oslo Accords
which were negotiated directly with the PLO and where the refusal of Palestinian
statehood was not explicit, but domestically Rabin made it very clear that Israel was
still fundamentally opposed to Palestinian statehood and to withdrawal from or even
freezing of settlements. In a speech to the Knesset in October 1995, Rabin outlined
the desired permanent solution as the state of Israel “alongside a Palestinian entity
which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip
and West Bank [...] We would like this to an entity which is less than a state [...]
The borders of the state of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the
lines which existed before the [1967] War. We will not return to the 1967 lines.”
(emphasis added) He emphasized that “we committed ourselves before the Knesset
not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement and not
to hinder building for natural growth” and that, in the permanent agreement, his
government envisions a “united Jerusalem” as well as “the establishment of blocs of
settlements in Judea and Samaria.”
Two weeks later, his Foreign Minister Shimon Peres told the Knesset that autonomy is “not necessarily” a blueprint for a Palestinian state and can be “a framework
[for] demilitarized zones, even an arrangement for areas without sovereignty.” These
were not empty words: instead of withdrawing, Israel actually expanded the number
of settlers from about 250,000 at the beginning of 1993 to 305,000 by 1996, not just
through “natural growth” but also the construction of new settlements.
Since 1996, the Israeli government has alternated between Likud and Kadima
(a centrist faction) but settlement growth has remained strong, with the number of
settlers reaching an estimated 655,000 by 2018 and with most of the growth post-2000
driven by settlements in the West Bank. Though Prime Minister Sharon unilaterally
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pulled the 8,000 settlers out of Gaza in 2005 in the aftermath of the second Intifada,
this disengagement was simultaneous with an even bigger expansion of West Bank
and East Jerusalem settlements; therefore, it was not part of a larger withdrawal
plan. Rather, the Gaza Strip was seen as an extremely high-density region (over 2
million Palestinians over only 40 km squared by 2005) such that the demographic
threat from potentially annexing it outweighed any territorial advantages. The plan
also indefinitely maintained complete military control over the Strip, with the Israeli
army deployed on the borders of the Gaza Strip, controlling its airspace, and patrolling
its coast.
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Most recently, under the auspices of the Trump administration, Israel has entered
into mutual-benefit “peace” deals with various Arab governments, with no conditions
relating to withdrawals from the occupied Palestinian territories (or any territories).
In fact, Israel’s settlement approvals in 2020 had hit record highs by October (Peace
Now, 2020), with all signs pointing to the de jure materialization of the annexation
vision verbalized in 2019-2020 by Prime Minister Netenyahu and greenlit by US Secretary of State Pompeo.64 Annexation implies that (at least in Israel) these lands would
no longer be considered “contested” or viable for inclusion in a “land for peace” deal,
as they would become a non-negotiable part of Israel proper.
At this juncture, by the very permanence of settlements, it is very difficult to justify settlement growth as a tactical response to Palestinian violence that still makes
room for a two-state solution should violence desist. If Israel is interested in Pales63

This was announced even before Hamas came to victory in 2006.
In 2019, the Israeli government had started to openly plan to annex at least a third of the West
Bank, including all the land on which settlements are present, and with explicit support for the first
time from the White House. In April 2020, a deal was reached between the Likud government and
the Blue and White (centrist/liberal) coalition to allow Prime Minister Netenyahu to move forward
with this annexation plan, with US Foreign Secretary Mike Pompeo giving the green light by stating
that ”for the annexation of the West Bank, the Israelis will ultimately make those decisions [...]
that’s an Israeli decision” (Aljazeera).
64
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tinian commitment to a land for peace solution and needs to use a strategy to ensure
that such commitment is forthcoming, it would not be logical to use a strategy that
makes this commitment impossible to begin with.
Figure 3.2 demonstrates the growth in the settler population from 1967 to 2018;
B’Tselem (2019) estimates that 60% of growth comes not from “natural” expansion
but new settler families.

Figure 3.2: Israeli settlers in the occupied Palestinian territories, 1967-2018
Figure 3.2 shows the number of Israeli settlers in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza,
as well as the total over all territories, from 1967 to 2018. Source: Author’s construction
from B’Tselem settlement statistics, Foundation for Middle East Peace settlement population, and Peace Now settlement watch data; missing data from 1968-1971 and 1973-1975
imputed from pattern of growth.

To emphasize that this trend is secular of Palestinian violence and nonviolence,
Figure 3.3 plots the number of Israelis killed by Palestinians (Israeli fatalities) per
year from 1987-2019, the period for which data is available, showing the absence
of plausible correlation between the two trends. For perspective on the asymmetric
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coercive power of the two parties, it also plots the number of Palestinians killed by
Israeli security forces (Palestinian fatalities) per year during that period.

Figure 3.3: Number of fatalities, 1987-2019
Figure 3.3 shows the number of Israeli and Palestinian fatalities per year from 1978
to 2019. Source: Author’s construction from B’Tselem fatalities statistics.

3.3.2 The security discourse
Before using this assessment in a game theoretic model, it is useful to address
the possible critique that Israeli interest in controlling the occupied territories, albeit
demonstrable, may not be rational at all because it compromises Israel’s security,
and hence difficult to justify in a game theoretic framework that assumes rational
actors. This is usually based on the idea that retaining control over the occupied
territories (i) diminishes Israel’s security in a physical sense by inviting continued
attrition type of violence, and perhaps more importantly (ii) diminishes its security
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in a demographic sense by compromising the Jewish majority in the land under its
control. In fact, these considerations are what drive much of the formal literature to
assume at face value that Israel is committed to withdrawing in order to achieve its
security, both physically and demographically.
The issue of physical security has been partly addressed by some of the above
literature. Given the huge asymmetry of power between Israel and the Palestinians
and the internal divisions between Palestinian factions, Palestinian violence to pressure Israel to withdraw appears to be a weakly coercive strategy that has become
even weaker in recent years, as Israel has successfully outsourced much of its security
operations to the Palestinian Authority post-Oslo in exchange for financial resources,
but not sovereignty, to the organization. As shown in Figure 3.3, with exception of
second Intifada, Israel has been able to keep a very tight grip on security concerns,
partly through the cooperation of the PA but also partly through escalating attacks
on noncooperative Palestinians (see for example the 2009 and 2014 wars on Gaza).
The latter can be understood as part of a “peace for peace” strategy in which Israel
“instead of buying peace by creating a viable Palestinian state, buys peace by moving out of densely populated Palestinian areas and convincing the Palestinians that if
they are aggressive they can become the target of hugely asymmetric attacks” (Khan
2009, p.17). To sum, it appears that Israel’s vastly superior military strength and its
security cooperation with the PA allows it to suppress Palestinian attrition violence
without needing to satisfy its demands for a state.
The second argument is trickier but necessary to address, especially since Israeli
leaders have in their internal discourse emphasized that expanding settlements increases the security of the Jewish Israeli national project. Why is that? Only a
deeper dive into Israeli politics, which is beyond the scope of this paper, can answer
this question fully, but one possible explanation put forth by Khan (2005) suggests
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that, beside wanting to retain a Jewish majority, Israel is equally or even more concerned about maintaining preferential rights for the Jewish demographic whether in a
majority or not. While giving Palestinians in the occupied territories sovereignty alleviates the first concern, it is not clear that it alleviates the second concern and may
even make it worse. This would be the case if sovereignty in the occupied territories
emboldens the Palestinian citizens of Israel (around 20% of the Israeli population)
to demand equal rights which they currently do not have (Adalah, 2017) and if it
emboldens Palestinian refugees to demand their right, by international law, to return to their homelands in Israel proper. Unless Israel can force Palestinians within
Israel and in the Diaspora to accept transfers to the occupied territories, which is
very unlikely, then granting sovereignty to the Palestinians in the territories does not
guarantee ‘demographic security’ for Israel and may even make it worse.
Understood this way, Israel’s strategic interest in expanding control over the occupied territories is not orthogonal to its security concerns. Furthermore, while Israel’s
precondition of security is superficially understood to mean only the (very sensible)
demand that it not suffer from physical violence and hence a resolvable precondition
for withdrawal, it may more importantly signal very sensitive (and less internationally
acceptable) demographic security concerns which are irreconcilable with withdrawal
and Palestinian sovereignty, and where Israel’s “Palestine problem” has no permanent solution and must be perennially contained. In this case, the notion that Israel’s
security is undermined by Palestinian statehood rings both true and, from a human
rights perspective, alarming.
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3.4 A model of mutual interest over strategic territory
To bring into sharp focus how the analysis can change when key assumptions are
altered, and the possible merits of this, it is useful to provide an example of what
happens when the alternative assessment of strategic interests in Section 3.3 – which
contrasts with that of the existing formal literature – is integrated into a model.
If Israel is strategically interested in control over the occupied territories, and since
Palestinians want sovereignty over these territories, then a noncooperative bargaining
model is one example of an appropriate representation of the conflict. This is because
a key feature of noncooperative bargaining is that the parties have orthogonal interests
over a specific object: each wants to maximize its share at the expense of the other.
They attempt to bargain with one another by one player offering a specific division
and seeing if the other agrees, and so on over potentially infinite periods. In most
bargaining models there is also an outside option available, so that a player could
exit the game and attempt to impose a division some other way. However, exiting
the game is costly to both parties and so in equilibrium, an agreed upon division is
reached within the bargain. The party with the better outside option has stronger
bargaining power and obtains a larger share of the pie, without actually exiting the
game.
Since the outside option determines bargaining power and the equilibrium outcome, a crucial point in the noncooperative bargaining literature is what constitutes
and determines the outside option. The literature on bargaining between states or
political entities usually assumes the outside option is an all-out war where one side
swiftly wipes out the other, and that each party’s strength is determined by the probability p that it wins such a war and the cost c it pays to wage a war. (Powell 2002,
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2006) In most models the probability of winning and the costs are exogenous to the
model, but Fearon (1997) makes the probability of winning endogenous to the share
of the object held in the previous period. For example, if Player 1’s share is xt at
time t, then pt+1 = f (xt ) where f 0 > 0. The idea is that the object not only yields
utility today but helps improve bargaining power and therefore improves one’s ability
to obtain more of it tomorrow. Fearon calls this a strategically important asset.
I apply a slightly modified version of this model to Israel-Palestine and argue that
it is one example of a helpful formal representation of the conflict. Therefore, I am
assuming not only that both parties want to maximize their share of the occupied
territories (defended in Section 3) but also that the occupied territories are a source
of future bargaining power. The positive effect of more land on the probability of
winning a war can operate through having more military bases, a localized supportive population (in the case of Israel, the settlers, who are also heavily armed), and
potentially a more expansive intelligence network. In fact, the very placement of settlement on the hilltops has been argued to serve a security and intelligence function
for Israel (Weizman, 2007).
I add to Fearon’s model to include a second channel in which the object can be
strategic: by reducing the cost of waging a war. In the case of territorial disputes,
this can operate through the generation of economies and geographies of scale in the
use of military technology. It can also operate through reducing the cost of suffering
international consequences due to belligerency, if major world powers side with or
provide immunity to the party that more successfully acquires land should a war
break out, given that its territorial advantages and strengths make it a more desirable
ally. There is evidence that both cost channels are relevant to Israel-Palestine.65
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As a rough indicator of the potential burden of military spending for a future all-out war, one
can consider current military spending as a percent of GDP. For Israel this fell from 30% of GDP in
1975 to an all-time low of 5.6% in 2016 (World Bank), coinciding with more, not less, appropriation
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Finally, to reflect the asymmetric bargaining power between Israel and the Palestinians, I use (as in Fearon) a take-it-or-leave-it bargaining protocol whereby only one
of the two parties is in a position to make offers every time period. The other party
can either accept or resort to its exit option. In this context, this would be Israel and
the Palestinians respectively. The Palestinians are under Israel’s military occupation,
the ultimate form of asymmetric bargaining power, and it is unclear how they could
seriously “offer” Israel a land agreement. By contrast, Israel can (and does) make
effective bargains by expanding or removing settlements. Importantly, Palestinian
”acceptance” of a move by Israel does not necessarily imply they are happy with it;
rather, that due to low bargaining power they prefer to acquiesce over engaging in an
all-out, game-ending war with Israel.
The adapted model is as follows. I assume the amount of land is 1 where the share
of State 1 (Israel) is x while the share of State 2 (Palestinians) is 1 − x. Each party’s
utility increases with its own share, and I use a simple linear utility function so that
u1t = xt and u2t = 1 − xt , where uN is the utility of player N at time t. Utilities are
discounted by a discount factor δ every period. With respect to bargaining power,
S1’s probability of winning is p while S2’s probability of winning is 1 − p, where
endogeneity implies:
pt = p(xt−1 )

p0 > 0

(3.1)

Therefore, as S1’s share of the land increases, its chance of winning a war in the
next period increases while S2’s chance decreases. Endogenous costs, which unlike
of land in the oPt. Similar calculations are not feasible for Palestinians who do not have a military,
but it is not farfetched that military costs to Palestinians of fighting Israel in a game-ending war
are extremely high. Regarding international support, the US began its fervent support of Israel in
1967 when the latter successfully defeated Arab armies and Israel’s growing military strength since
has been instrumental in solidifying its position as a top US ally.
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probability do not have to add up to 1, are given by:

c1t = c1 (xt−1 )

c01 < 0

(3.2)

c2t = c2 (xt−1 )

c02 > 0

(3.3)

Therefore, as S1’s share of the land increases, its future costs for waging a war decline
while S2’s costs increase.
Starting from an exogenous initial division (x0 , 1 − x0 ), S1 first makes an offer x1
to S2 at t1 . There are two possibilities:
• If S2 accepts, the period ends with a division (x1 , 1 − x1 ) with commensurate
utilities. S1 will make another offer x2 in the next period, and the resultant
payoffs are discounted by δ.
• If S2 rejects, it will end the game by using its outside option. For S1, this means
receiving the whole pie with probability p and nothing with probability 1 − p,
so it expects p(1) + (1 − p)(0) = p. Since war is a game-ending move, it will
actually secure this payoff every period, hence p this period, δp next period, δ 2 p
after that, and so on. Summed to infinity this is

p
,
1−δ

from which we subtract

the cost of fighting c1 . Therefore, S1’s expected total lifetime utility from this
exit at time t is
S2 is

1−p(x0 )
1−δ

p(x0 )
1−δ

− c1 (x0 ). Similarly, the expected utility from this exit for

− c2 (x0 ).

Figure E1 in Appendix E demonstrates the resultant bargaining tree, with the
payoffs in brackets for S1 and S2 respectively, for the first 3 periods of this game.
One can solve for the equilibrium offer at time t by calculating the offer at which
S2, taking its future expected utility into account, is indifferent between acquiescence
and rejection. This yields the following appeasement condition, which shows the
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minimum offer xt which S2 would acquiesce to or appease:

(1 − xt ) + δ

=

1 − p(xt )
1−δ

1 − p(xt−1 )
1−δ




− c2 (xt )

(3.4)


− c2 (xt−1 )

Solving this first difference equation for a time path requires imposing a specific
functional form for the endogenous bargaining power parameters. For simplicity I
impose linear functions, so that p(xt ) = βxt + 12 (1 − β)66 and c2 (xt ) = φxt + c2 . β > 0,
since the probability of winning for S1 increases with its share, and φ > 0, since the
cost for S2 increases with S1’s share. The exogenous cost parameter for S2, c2 , is also
positive.
Substituting these linear forms into Equation (3.4) and rearranging yields the first
difference equation:



β + (1 − δ)φ
xt =
xt−1
δβ + (1 − δ)(1 + δφ)


(1 − δ)2 c2 + 12 (1 − β)(1 − δ)
+
δβ + (1 − δ)(1 + δφ)

(3.5)

We can solve for an equilibrium, if it exists, by setting xt = xt−1 = x∗ but for
the purposes of this paper an even more important question concerns the stability
of equilibrium. If the parties start at an exogenous division x0 6= x∗ , do they move
toward x∗ and stay there, or do they move away? Within the context of IsraelPalestine, these can be understood respectively as (i) some form of stable two state
solution versus (ii) an ongoing expansion by one state at the expense of the other until
one is eliminated. Since stability depends on the coefficient on the lagged variable in
66

This form guarantees that p(1/2) = 1/2, so that whomever has half the land has half the
probability of winning. The parameter β affects the slope around this midpoint (whether a small
increase (decrease) raises (lowers) the probability of winning by a little or a lot).
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Equation (3.5) being less than one, any division is stable if and only if:

β + (1 − δ)φ < 1

(3.6)

The more strategic the asset is, the higher are β and φ and the less likely is Equation (3.6) to hold. Therefore, the more important the asset is to future bargaining
power, the more likely it is that any division is unstable and that the outcome is a
moving “equilibrium” where one state increasingly dominates; in turn, which state
expands depends on the initial conditions relative to the equilibrium. Starting with a
more favorable scenario for S1, so x0 > x∗ , will generate increasing movement up from
x∗ so that S1 gradually grabs more land, acquiesced to by S2 until S2 is eliminated.
Therefore, x0 < x1 < x2 < x3 and so on until xt → 1 as t → ∞. Fearon calls this
the “salami tactics” (p.1) approach to expansion. By contrast, starting with a more
favorable scenario for S2, x0 < x∗ , will lead to growing movement down from x∗ and
hence compounding concessions by S1 to S2.
The stability condition is illustrated more clearly in Figure 3.4. The combination
of β and φ under the blue line, such as point O, generates stability but anything above
it such as point N generates the increasing dominance of one party.
Albeit highly stylized, this noncooperative bargaining game can, when applied to
Israel-Palestine, help explain the endurance of the conflict as well as the worsening
prospects for a two-state solution. The model is appropriate if Israel and the Palestinians are both strategically interested in maximizing their control over the occupied
territories and if these territories are important in determining future bargaining
power. As argued above, there is evidence to support both of these propositions. In
this case, the model shows that if the land is highly strategic then a stable division
is unlikely, and predicts that one state will consistently grow stronger by gradually
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Figure 3.4: The instability condition
Figure 3.4 captures the model’s implications about equilibrium (in)stability. Combinations
of β and φ below the blue line indicate a low-level strategic object and ensure that the
system is stable and offers converge toward an intertemporal equilibrium if one exists.
Combinations of β and φ above the blue line imply a highly strategic object; the system is
unstable and offers diverge if the initial starting point is not at equilibrium.

making land grabs that its opponent acquiesces to as it becomes increasingly weaker.
These salami tactics are an accurate description of Israel’s policies in the occupied
territories since 1967, illustrated in Figure 3.2.
Most importantly, this model suggests that the absence of a solution is not contrary to but aligned with the strategic interests of the militarily dominant party, and
that it is the natural result of incongruent demands over highly strategic territory.
In doing so, it paints a bleak picture about the future progression of the conflict,
especially for the Palestinians, barring a drastic shift in the strategic interests of the
Israeli state. In addition, in contrast with the majority of the literature on political
conflict, the model shows that conflict can occur not only with the breakdown of
a bargain but also with the continuation of an adverse bargain through the “calm”
intensification of the status quo. This allows us to explain the broad trajectory in
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Israel-Palestine without reference to information problems, communication problems,
irrationality, or other phenomena that lead to bargaining breakdowns (Blattman and
Miguel, 2010).
The model’s high level of abstraction leaves many details wanting when applied
to a historically entrenched real-world conflict, but this does not necessarily negate
its usefulness. One issue is that the full information aspect does not allow us to
examine episodes of violence on both sides, which may be understood as signaling
mechanisms to showcase strength in an attrition conflict. However, abstracting from
these information problems may be helpful; for example, if the second Intifada was
a failed attempt by the Palestinians to signal strength to Israel (Shang, 2003) then
because that signal was not credible it does not alter the broader dynamic of the
conflict.
Another issue is that the focus on land does not allow us to examine other types
of exchanges between the parties such as security cooperation by the Palestinian
Authority in exchange for recognition, funding, and private benefits from Israel, as
effected by the Oslo Accords. Still, Oslo may be understood as an outside factor
that increased the exogenous cost c2 to the Palestinians of entering an all-out war
with Israel, due to the PA’s role in crushing armed movements; therefore, non-land
exchanges can be understood through their effect on the ultimate bargaining power
over the territories.
Finally, another limitation is that the game only has two players, Israel and
Palestine, masking the heterogeneity of different players within each political entity. Nonetheless, this allows us to focus on the broader national interests of Israel
and the Palestinians in the territories, which, irrespective of method of the faction
involved, plausibly coalesce around maximum control or sovereignty.
To sum, this model is one example of a formal game that, while highly stylized, is
133

relevant to Israel-Palestine because its core assumptions measure to historical scrutiny
and whose results therefore mirror key facts on the ground.

3.5 Conclusion
The conflict in Israel-Palestine is one of the most protracted of the contemporary
period, with past mediation efforts failing spectacularly in producing a two-state
solution, seen internationally as the legally just and feasible resolution to the conflict
over the occupied territories. Since game theory is the study of the interdependent
strategic interests of rational actors, applying the principles of game theory to this
conflict seems apropos for understanding the broad trajectory of the conflict, in a
methodical way that does not resort to concepts of irrationality or zealotry nor to
wishful thinking about the motivations of the parties involved. By investigating
rationally the root causes of the continuation of the conflict, game theory can help
point to likely future trajectories as well and to the probable success or failure of
different solution paradigms moving forward.
This paper reviews the existing applications of game theory to Israel-Palestine,
highlighting their assumptions about the interests and strategies of the parties involved and therefore the core roadblocks to a mutually acceptable solution. It shows
that the application of game theory to the topic has been limited and, especially
in the formal literature, highly reliant on the assumption that Israel is prepared to
withdraw from the occupied territories pending resolvable security concerns. In this
“land for peace” paradigm, Israel is obstructed from fulfilling its withdrawal plans
by Palestinians whose strategic interests and actions are irreconcilable with this vision. Most papers offering an alternative assessment do not offer a formal framework,
making comparisons with the formal literature difficult, and they sometimes lack a
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systematic assessment of Israeli strategic interests.
Using a systematic overview of Israel’s settlement policy since 1967, the paper
reassesses this assumption on which most formal models are based and argues that
Israel has in fact pursued the expansion, not retrenchment, of its control over the
occupied territories as a top national priority under all circumstances. To formalize
this argument, I draw on a model of noncooperative bargaining where the actors have
orthogonal interests in an object which is important for future bargaining power.
The model suggests that if the occupied territories are highly strategic, then a stable
division of the land is unlikely to materialize in equilibrium, with one state instead
making gradual land grabs to which the other acquiesces as it grows increasingly
weaker. This mirrors the pattern of settlement expansion in the occupied territories
since 1967. It also reifies the notion, supported historically, that settlement expansion
is the result not of Palestinian violence or lack thereof but of the core strategic interests
of the Israeli state, and helps make sense of the ongoing push by the Israeli government
for outright annexation over parts of the territories.
The prognosis offered in this paper, that the lack of a two state solution fits in
with rather than contradicts the strategic interests of the militarily dominant party, is
at once plausible and extremely bleak. It sheds doubt not only on the assumptions of
some of the academic literature on the subject but also on the broader approach to a
resolution based on an unwavering yet wishful belief in “land for peace.” Nonetheless,
though bleak, this prognosis can help make sense of the prolonged and worsening
nature of the conflict, as well as reifying the usefulness of game theory to political
conflict when applied in congruence with historical evidence.
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CONCLUSION

This three-essay dissertation has used microeconomics, coupled with interdisciplinary analysis where appropriate, to examine questions of learning and conflict in
specific parts of the developing world. The first two essays have explored how producers in developing countries (farmers and firms, respectively) can learn from production experience in order to overcome information failures and to improve productivity.
The third essay has explored the continuing and escalating conflict in Israel-Palestine
through the lens of game theory, because this framework is useful for highlighting the
role of strategic behavior and interests in informing the trajectory of political conflict.
In the first essay, Imperfect Information and Learning: Evidence from Cotton
Cultivation in Pakistan, I investigate the extent to which farmers can use cultivation
experience to redress information problems about their crops, taking Pakistani cotton
farmers as a case study. I find that these farmers, who are unable to confirm an
important characteristic of their seeds at purchase point, are also unable to uncover
this information through observing cultivation outcomes ex-post. Specifically, they
are unable to distinguish whether good pest-resistance performance of the crop is due
to the biotechnology of the seed (a good-quality seed) or to other favorable exogenous
conditions, and vice versa. This limits their ability to deduce information about the
biotechnology and to switch out of low-quality seeds in the next season. I also show
that, under such persistent information failures, poor seed qualities are likely to persist
in the market, leading to significant productivity losses in the industry as a whole.
The findings of this essay shed light on a number of issues. First, as described,
the information failures in the Pakistani cotton seed market originate from the hap136

hazard mixing of US-based pest-resistance biotechnology with local varieties, which
makes it difficult to accurately identify, track, and label seed quality at purchase
point. Therefore, the persistence of the information failure documented by the essay
reflects how problems of technology transfer and adaptation in developing countries
can persist and hinder effective use thereafter. Second, irrespective of where the
information problem originates, the results support the notion that, in agricultural
activities, cultivation experience alone is unlikely to fill information gaps about input
quality because yield signals are usually noisy (Bold et al, 2017). Third, to the extent
that farmers are unable to independently redress information problems through experience, then external information provision by the government becomes particularly
valuable, and the question turns to the institutional feasibility of such policies.
In the second essay, Effortful Learning by Doing: A Preliminary Synthesis, I investigate how firms use production experience to improve their know-how and competitiveness, particularly in developing countries. I argue that the way the economics literature has traditionally conceptualized learning from production experience, termed
learning by doing, as passive and automatic is unconvincing and obfuscates important challenges at the firm level. I synthesize evidence from case studies of learning
behavior in management studies, organizational theory, and evolutionary economics
to show that firms learn from production experience only when they exert significant
effort to uncover tacit information, to learn from trial and error, and to continuously
monitor and evaluate their resulting strategies. I term this costly search process
effortful learning by doing and distinguish it from other modes of knowledge acquisition. I also explain why it may be integral to the ability of nascent developing
country firms to effectively acquire and adapt nonlocal technologies and to improve
their competitiveness accordingly.
The essay’s systematic analysis of learning by doing as a deliberate and costly
137

process is valuable in a development context, because it helps explain why this mode
of learning, albeit an important vehicle of productivity growth, may not always be
forthcoming nor successful. Of particular interest is the issue of infant industry and
public learning policy. In the presence of market failures that prevent initially uncompetitive firms from loss-financing initial production on their own, learning by doing
is invoked as a principal reason for public loss-financing in these initial stages, since
the resultant scale is assumed to trigger learning and competitiveness. The efficacy
of such policies in triggering learning and productivity growth has, however, varied
widely across industries and regions (Bell et al 1984; Amsden, 1989; Mlawa, 1995;
Khan 2010). The discussion in this essay suggests that it is important to ask not
whether infant industry support is desirable in principle, but the extent to which
different learning policies can and do elicit effort alongside scale and why.
Therefore, the first two essays highlight information and knowledge failures in
different sectors in developing countries, arising largely from problems of technology
transfer and adaptation, and explore the extent to which producers utilize their experience to learn how to overcome these problems and to improve productivity. A
key question concerns the challenges producers face toward successful experiential
learning in these contexts. The first essay emphasizes challenges stemming from the
fundamental characteristics of the (small farming) production process. The second
essay highlights, in addition to challenges inherent in the knowledge problem, strategic considerations that learning agents take into account when deciding their levels
of investment in learning.
In the third essay, Land for Peace? Israel-Palestine through the Lens of Game
Theory, I turn fully to strategic considerations, and ask how the theory of games and
strategic behavior can help explain the enduring conflict in Israel-Palestine. I find
that the majority of formal game theoretic models of the conflict are underpinned by
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unsupported assumptions about what the main actors are trying to achieve, and are
therefore unhelpful to understanding the endurance and deterioration of the conflict.
In particular, they presume that Israel is strategically interested in withdrawing from
the occupied Palestinian territories pending resolvable security concerns, understood
as “land for peace”, but obstructed from doing so by Palestinian violence. I show
that this does not fit in with the historical evidence of Israel expanding its settler
presence in the occupied territories under all circumstance and as a national priority.
Other work draws on game theory principles informally to suggest that the conflict
is sustained by directly competing claims over the land, which is more historically
plausible, but this literature does not present a systematic analysis of these issues.
I show that integrating historically plausible assumptions about the actors’ strategic interests into a formal game can help clarify the key issues. In a game where the
occupied territories are a highly strategic asset for both Israel and the Palestinians,
it is possible to see an unstable dynamic equilibrium where one state makes land
grabs to which the other acquiesces as it grows increasingly weaker. This mirrors the
pattern of Israeli settlement expansion in the occupied territories since 1967 that has
obliterated the geographical possibility of a two-state solution.
This essay offers the prognosis that the lack of a two-state solution fits in with,
rather than contradicts, the strategic interests of the militarily dominant party, Israel,
and that it is the direct outcome of asymmetric contestation over a highly strategic
resource. This prognosis sheds doubt not only on the prevailing approach in formal
economics to the subject, but also on the broader wishful belief in and attachment to
the likelihood of “land for peace”. In reality, the progression of the conflict looks bleak
especially for the Palestinian people in that, barring a drastic shift in the strategic
interests of the Israeli state, an internationally acceptable resolution along the lines
of a two-state solution is highly unlikely to materialize. More likely is continuing in139

tensification of the status quo, including settler expansion in the occupied territories,
with unsetting implications for the political future of the region.

To conclude, this dissertation uses microeconomics, in conjunction with interdisciplinary analysis and evidence where appropriate, to provide insight into two themes
relating to specific parts of the developing world. The first is why knowledge acquisition and technology change are difficult, both in a rural and industrial setting, and
how producers may use their experience to overcome these difficulties. The essays
highlight different potential challenges producers may face in leveraging experience
to learn, with implications for technology and learning policy. The second is why
conflict over territory may endure and escalate and how this relates to the strategic
interests of the key actors. The essay demonstrates the usefulness of strategic behavior analysis which builds on historical evidence, and outlines implications from the
discussion for the likely progression of the conflict in Israel-Palestine.
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APPENDIX A
THEORETICAL MODEL DETAILS FOR CH. 1

The expected value of Bt in the next period for each farmer is the expected
outcome for switching or not, Equations (1.1)-(1.2), weighted by that probability:
h
i
Ei (B˜2i ) = P rob(S) [E(B1 )] + (1 − P rob(S)) pB˜1i + (1 − p)E(B1 )
(A.1)
= E(B1 ) [1 − p(1 − P rob(S))] + p(1 − P rob(S))B̃
To find the expected change in outcome from t = 1 to t = 2 for a farmer with initial
realization B˜1i , we subtract B˜1i from (A.1):
Ei (∆B̃i ) = Ei (B˜2i ) − B˜1i
= E(B1 ) [1 − p(1 − P rob(S))] + p(1 − P rob(S))B˜1i − B˜1i
h
i

∗
˜
˜
= E(B1 ) − B1i 1 − p(1 − g(B1i − V1 ))

(A.2)

Expected change in Bt content across the market is found by taking expected change
for each initial realization B˜1i , (A.2), weighing it by the probability of its occurrence
in the first period P rob(B˜1i ), and summing across:
E(∆B̃) =

X

=

X

P rob(B˜1i ) ∗ Ei (∆B̃i )

i


h
i
P rob(B˜1i ) ∗ E(B1 ) − B˜1i 1 − p(1 − g(B˜1i − V1∗ ))

(A.3)

i

A simpler expression can be obtained for (A.3) - the expected change in Bt averaged across all farmers - which also allows us to see how it is affected by various
141

parameters. To see that, assume g takes a specific functional form: a linear form
g = −α(B˜1i − V1∗ ) + 0.5, where α > 0; the parameter α is the learning parameter. This form guarantees that for values at the expectation switching is a tossup,
g(0) = 0.5, though having any constant g0 instead of 0.5 does not affect any results. Furthermore, allowing for a discrepancy between expectations and true market
averages, V1∗ = E(B1 ) + γ. Substituting into (A.3):
E(∆B̃) =

X

=

X


h
i
∗
˜
˜
˜
P rob(B1i ) ∗ E(B1 ) − B1i 1 − p(1 + α{B1i − [E(B1 ) + γ]} − 0.5)

i


h
i
P rob(B˜1i ) ∗ E(B1 ) − B˜1i 1 − 0.5p + αp(E(B1 ) + γ − B˜1i )

i

(A.4)
(A.4) can be written in continuous form. Replacing the summation with integration,
and letting f (B˜1i ) be the probability density function, then:
Z
E(∆B̃) =


h
i
˜
˜
˜
f (B1i ) E(B1 ) − B1i 1 − 0.5p + αp(E(B1 ) + γ − B1i ) dB˜1i
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(A.5)

When simplified, this equation reduces to a very simple expression. To see that:
Z
f (x) (E(x) − x) [1 − 0.5p + ap(E(x) + γ − x)] dx
Z
Z
= f (x)(E(x) − x)dx − 0.5p f (x)(E(x) − x)dx
Z
+ αp f (x)(E(x) − x)(E(x) + γ − x)dx
Z
= 0 + 0 + αp f (x)(E(x) − x)(E(x) + γ − x)dx
Z
Z
= αp f (x)(E(x) − x)(E(x) − x)dx + γαp f (x)(E(x) − x)dx
Z


= αp f (x) (E(x))2 − 2E(x)x + x2 dx + 0


Z
Z
Z
2
2
= αp (E(x))
f (x)dx − 2E(x) f (x)xdx + f (x)x dx


Z
2
2
= αp (E(x)) (1) − 2E(x)E(x) + f (x)x dx


Z
2
2
= αp −(E(x)) + f (x)x dx

E(∆x) =



= αp −E(x)2 + E(x2 )


= αp E(x2 ) − (E(x))2
= αpV ar(x) ≥ 0
Therefore, by assuming a linear form for g, and since V ar(B̃1 ) = σ 2 , we get:
E(∆B̃) = αpσ 2
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(A.6)

APPENDIX B
CALCULATING BENEFIT TO FARMERS FOR CH. 1

Since Bt imbues resistance to bollworms and improves cotton yield, higher average Bt quality on the market due to experience-based learning and selection should
improve overall industry performance. How would Bt content improvement translate
into monetary gains for the farmers?
This estimation proceeds in three parts. First, I estimate the size of Pakistan’s
cotton cultivation industry in the 2014-2015 season, the year for which I test learning
and heuristic response by farmers. Second, I estimate the effect of varying levels of
Bt on cotton yield and revenue. Third, I calculate changes in Bt content for different
learning parameters α - with varying ranges of p and σ - and apply the results in
Steps 1-2 to derive monetary benefits to farmers.
1. Calculating the size of the industry is straightforward. According to the Pakistani government, cotton production in Pakistan in 2014-2015 totaled 13,960,000
bales, equivalent to about 2.37 billion kg. From my data, the average price, in
Pakistani Rupees, that farmers received for their 2014 crop per 40 kg mound
of cotton was about 2313 PR, or 23 USD. Since 2.37 billion kg is equivalent to
59.3 million (40 kg) mounds, multiplying that amount by the price received per
mound totals 1.364 billion USD, or 0.5% of the country’s GDP for that year.
Of course, this is only what the farmers receive - there is more value added
downstream.
2. Calculating the effect of Bt improvement on yield and revenue is more complicated. Ma et al (2016) suggest the following breakdown of lethality:
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Table B.1: Bt content and pest lethality
Bt content (µg/g)
0.60
0.70
0.88
1.06
1.34
1.59

Lethal level (% pests killed)
50
60
70
80
90
95

Table B.1 can be used to extrapolate differences in lethality based on Bt
content. For example, an improvement in mean Bt content from 0.88
µg
g

µg
g

to 0.97

would raise killing effectiveness from 70% to 75%. The question is how this

corresponds to output gain. Research suggests that Bt can protects half of all
yield from destruction; if a maximum lethal level of 100% effective Bt improves
yield by 50%, then 5% increase in lethal levels improves yield by 2.5%, or, given
the size of the Pakistani cotton cultivation industry, about 34 million USD.
3. In this way, we can translate estimated improvement in average Bt content
in the next year, E(∆B̃) = αpσ, into monetary gains. For example, Figure
B.1 below shows monetary gains, on the vertical axis, in millions of USD for
α ∈ [0, 0.2], p ∈ [0, 1], σ = 0.57 (this is the standard deviation in my data). Take
a specific point such as α = 0.1 and p = 0.8. E(∆B̃) = 0.1 ∗ 0.8 ∗ 0.57 = 4.56,
so that average Bt shifts from 0.88 to 0.926

µg
.
g

In turn, using the methodology

in Steps 1-2, this would generate monetary gains of about 17.4 million dollars,
shaded in bluish green on the figure. With higher σ the graph would tilt further
up, generating more gains for any combination of learning and variety integrity.
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Figure B.1: Illustrating monetary gains for farmers
Figure B.1 plots an example of market-wide monetary gains in one year in millions of USD
as a function of both the learning parameter (axis from 0-0.20) and variety integrity (axis
from 0-1), with σ=0.57.

This method, though based on the short run, also provides a rough back-of-theenvelope estimate of maximum possible gains from learning in the long-run. If Bt improves in the long run from the in-sample level of 0.88
level of 1.59

µg
,
g

µg
g

to the maximum-effectiveness

this 25% improvement in percent of lethal pests killed results in 12.5%

improvement in yield (According to Step 2), and therefore gains of up to 170 million
USD in 2014. Actual long term gains would of course depend on shifts in relative
prices between less and more effective varieties.
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APPENDIX C
VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION FOR
CH. 1
The personal, price, and input controls are constructed as follows.
Education is the number of years of schooling of the household head by 2013.
Farming experience is the years of general farming experience of the head by 2013.
Years Bt grown is the total number of years that the household has grown (what they
think are) Bt varieties, including and up to 2013. Years variety grown is the number
of years in total that the farmer has grown the specific 2013 variety, including and
up to 2013. Land owned is the amount of land, in acres, owned by the household in
2012.
Seed purchase price is the price, in 2013 Pakistani rupees, at which the farmer
purchased one kilogram of seeds of the target variety in 2013. Selling price is the
price, in 2013 hundreds of Pakistani rupees, at which the farmer sold one 40 kilogram
mound of the variety cultivated and harvested in 2013.
Irrigation is a measure of the total minutes of irrigation per acre of cotton cultivated in 2013. Fertilizer measures the extent of nitrogen-fertilizer used, as kilograms
per acre of cotton cultivated in 2013. I calculate it by multiplying the nitrogen percent
of each type of fertilizer with the amount (in kg) used. Seed amount is the amount of
seeds sowed for that variety in kilograms per acre of cotton cultivated in 2013. Labor
measures the total number of labor hours that were reported worked, per acre, during
the 2013 season.
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Table C.1 provides a summary of the distribution of key variables in the data,
including the dependent variables. Variety change between 2013 and 2014 occurred
in 55.8% of the sample. The average level of Bt expression is 0.877 micrograms of
cry protein per gram of plant tissue. This is only moderately high: a measurement of
0.598 means the plant has 50% chance of killing bollworms at specific conditions while
a level of 1.59 offers a 95% chance of doing so. Therefore, on average, the farmers are
not cultivating very effective Bt varieties. With regard to perception, 18% of farmers
rated the bollworm resistance performance as poor, 40% as moderate, and 42% as
very good.
The table also shows that the average farmer sampled has 5 years of education,
16 years of general farming experience, 4 years of experience cultivating Bt varieties,
and has cultivated the 2013 variety for 2 years (including 2013); owns 6.5 acres of
agricultural land; purchased seeds for about 280 rupees ($1.80) per kilogram of seeds
and sold the crop at 2,700 rupees ($17.30) per 40 kg mound of cotton; irrigated each
acre cultivated for 23 hours total; applied 85 kilograms of fertilizer and 0.56 liters of
effective pesticide per acre cultivated; sowed 7 kilograms of seeds per acre; and put
in 161 hours of labor total per acre.
The histograms in Figure C.1 illustrate these distributions.
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301
301
301
301
301
301
301
301
301
301
301
301
301
301

Changed
Bt level (non-standardized)
Education (years)
Farming experience (years)
Years variety grown
Years Bt grown
Land owned (acres)
Seed purchase price (PR per kg)
Selling price (100 PR per 40 kg)
Irrigation (mins per acre)
Fertilizer (kg per acre)
Seed amount (kg per acre)
Labor (hours per acre)
Pesticide (effective L per acre)

0.558
0.877
4.977
16.213
2.023
4.110
6.516
280.7
27.863
1,385
85.598
7.01
161.3
0.563

Mean
0.497
0.692
4.811
10.768
1.091
1.735
8.859
135.1
2.542
771
36.159
2.81
90.3
0.430

St. Dev.
0
0.000
0
2
1
1
0.00
83.3
18
120
0
2.00
36.0
0

Min
0
0.484
0
8
1
3
1.50
200
26.4
810
59.7
5.00
104.0
0.285

Pctl(25)

1
1.163
9
22
2
5
7.00
350
29.7
1,840
103
9.00
197.3
0.725

Pctl(75)

1
4.260
20
50
7
11
67.00
840
34
4,620
236
16.00
967.5
2.437

Max

Table C.1 summarizes the distribution of the key variables used in the analysis.

N

Statistic

Table C.1: Distribution of Variables

BtLevel

CHANGED

40
30
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150
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0
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Figure C.1: Distribution of key variables
Figure C.1 illustrates the distribution of the key variables used in the empirical
methodology, across the 301 farmers in the sample. Values are on the x-axis while
counts are on the y-axis. For example, the first plot shows that Bt content ranges
between 0 and 4 micrograms of the Bt protein per gram, with the most common value
(mode) for a farmer being about 0.5.
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APPENDIX D
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS AND ROBUSTNESS
FOR CH. 1
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Table D.1: Including a measure of peer learning
Dependent variable:
CHANGED
Bt level
Other-variety neighbors

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.001
(−0.101, 0.103)
0.133
(−0.268, 0.534)

−0.011
(−0.113, 0.090)
0.187
(−0.227, 0.600)
0.008
(−0.005, 0.021)

−0.00001
(−0.001, 0.001)
−0.029∗
(−0.064, 0.005)

−0.010
(−0.108, 0.088)
0.173
(−0.206, 0.553)
0.017∗∗∗
(0.004, 0.031)
0.009∗∗∗
(0.002, 0.016)
−0.092∗∗∗
(−0.157, −0.028)
−0.062∗∗∗
(−0.103, −0.022)
−0.010∗∗
(−0.018, −0.001)
−0.0001
(−0.001, 0.0004)
−0.027
(−0.062, 0.009)

−0.010
(−0.104, 0.083)
0.302
(−0.079, 0.683)
0.016∗∗
(0.003, 0.030)
0.008∗∗
(0.001, 0.015)
−0.101∗∗∗
(−0.163, −0.038)
−0.059∗∗∗
(−0.101, −0.018)
−0.011∗∗∗
(−0.018, −0.003)
−0.00002
(−0.001, 0.001)
−0.027
(−0.064, 0.010)
−0.0001
(−0.0002, 0.00004)
−0.0005
(−0.002, 0.001)
0.039∗∗∗
(0.013, 0.065)
0.001∗
(−0.0001, 0.001)
−0.00000
(−0.0001, 0.00004)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

233
0.126
0.066
0.474 (df = 217)

233
0.139
0.067
0.474 (df = 214)

233
0.233
0.153
0.452 (df = 210)

233
0.275
0.180
0.444 (df = 205)

Education
Farming experience
Years variety grown
Years Bt grown
Land owned
Purchase price (seed)
Selling price (cotton)
Irrigation
Fertilizer
Seed amount
Labor
Pesticide
District FE
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error

∗

p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Table D.1 includes a rough measure of peer effects: the average Bt of farmers who cultivated
a different variety in 2013. If the variable captures real peers, then social learning implies
the coefficient on this variable would be positive, with farmers more likely to switch varieties
when they learn that the Bt of peers who purchased a different variety is high. Though
another peer variable could be the average Bt of possible peers who cultivated the same
variety (on which we expect the coefficient to be negative with learning, with farmers less
likely to switch as a result), most farmers have 0 or 1 other villagers who cultivated the
same variety, so this is not feasible.
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Table D.2: Including farmers with multiple varieties
Dependent variable:
CHANGED
Bt level (standardized)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.008
(−0.056, 0.071)

0.004
(−0.059, 0.067)
0.011∗
(−0.0004, 0.022)

−0.0003
(−0.001, 0.0002)
−0.021
(−0.048, 0.007)

0.008
(−0.055, 0.071)
0.016∗∗∗
(0.005, 0.026)
0.007∗∗
(0.002, 0.013)
−0.069∗∗∗
(−0.122, −0.017)
−0.021
(−0.055, 0.012)
−0.007∗∗
(−0.014, −0.0001)
−0.0004∗
(−0.001, 0.0001)
−0.021
(−0.049, 0.008)

0.007
(−0.056, 0.070)
0.013∗∗
(0.002, 0.024)
0.007∗∗
(0.001, 0.012)
−0.069∗∗
(−0.122, −0.016)
−0.025
(−0.059, 0.008)
−0.008∗∗
(−0.015, −0.001)
−0.0003
(−0.001, 0.0002)
−0.020
(−0.049, 0.009)
−0.00005
(−0.0001, 0.00004)
0.0001
(−0.0002, 0.001)
0.026∗∗
(0.001, 0.052)
0.0001
(−0.0003, 0.0005)
−0.00001
(−0.00002, 0.00001)

342
0.202
0.136
0.462 (df = 315)

342
0.246
0.172
0.452 (df = 311)

342
0.264
0.180
0.450 (df = 306)

Education
Farming Experience
Years grown variety
Years grown variety
Land owned
Purchase price (seeds)
Selling price (cotton)
Irrigation
Fertilizer
Seed amount
Labor
Pesticide
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error

342
0.190
0.129
0.463 (df = 317)

∗

Note:

p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Table D.2 includes farmers who farmed more than one Bt variety on their main plot in 2013,
with each variety being counted as a single observation (20 farmers across 41 observations).
The Bt level for these farmers per variety cannot be known from the biophysical sample
survey, so it is approximated as the average of the Bt level of that variety for farmers in
the original single-plot sample during that same year. Another challenge is that the input
variables are for the entire plot per acre. I approximate inputs per acre per variety by
multiplying total inputs per acre, by the percent of acreage in the plot dedicated to that
variety. As can be seen in the table, the coefficient on the Bt variable is still null, implying
the results are robust to this sampling dimension.
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Table D.3: Including farmers with other beliefs
Dependent variable:
CHANGED
Bt level (standardized)
Belief (”Don’t know”)
Belief (”Yes”)
Bt level x ”Don’t know”
Bt level x ”Yes”

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

−0.115
(−0.256, 0.026)
−0.016
(−0.234, 0.202)
−0.065
(−0.267, 0.136)
0.126
(−0.054, 0.305)
0.126
(−0.030, 0.282)

−0.102
(−0.246, 0.042)
−0.029
(−0.246, 0.189)
−0.062
(−0.263, 0.139)
0.121
(−0.063, 0.305)
0.109
(−0.050, 0.268)
0.007
(−0.004, 0.018)

−0.0004∗
(−0.001, 0.00003)
−0.016
(−0.042, 0.010)

−0.091
(−0.238, 0.056)
−0.040
(−0.265, 0.184)
−0.032
(−0.247, 0.183)
0.138
(−0.050, 0.326)
0.103
(−0.060, 0.265)
0.013∗∗
(0.002, 0.024)
0.006∗∗
(0.001, 0.011)
−0.065∗∗∗
(−0.113, −0.017)
−0.022
(−0.053, 0.010)
−0.006∗
(−0.013, 0.001)
−0.0004∗∗
(−0.001, −0.00002)
−0.014
(−0.041, 0.013)

Yes
400
0.217
0.144
0.462 (df = 365)

Yes
400
0.253
0.173
0.454 (df = 361)

−0.100
(−0.250, 0.050)
−0.066
(−0.294, 0.163)
−0.056
(−0.275, 0.163)
0.137
(−0.050, 0.324)
0.114
(−0.052, 0.279)
0.012∗∗
(0.001, 0.023)
0.005∗∗
(0.0004, 0.010)
−0.068∗∗∗
(−0.116, −0.019)
−0.019
(−0.050, 0.013)
−0.007∗
(−0.014, 0.0001)
−0.0004∗
(−0.001, 0.0001)
−0.014
(−0.042, 0.014)
−0.0001∗
(−0.0002, 0.00001)
−0.0005
(−0.002, 0.001)
0.026∗∗
(0.004, 0.049)
0.0003
(−0.0003, 0.001)
0.00001
(−0.00003, 0.00005)
Yes
400
0.273
0.184
0.451 (df = 356)

Education
Farming Experience
Years grown variety
Years grown Bt
Land owned
Purchase price (seeds)
Selling price (cotton)
Irrigation
Fertilizer
Seed amount
Labor
Pesticide
District FE
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error

Yes
400
0.206
0.139
0.463 (df = 368)

∗

Note:

p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Table D.3 includes farmers who believed they were not cultivating Bt (37) and who did
not know if they were or not (62). The assumption that each of these is a “fixed” belief
is questionable for the “don’t know” group but allows us to roughly test the robustness of
the main results. The belief variable is interacted with Bt level to allow for both different
intercept and slope effects, but coefficients on all are null, showing that the results are
robust to the sampling choice of belief.
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Table D.4: Farmer characteristics - In sample vs out of sample
Statistic
Head Age
Head Education
Farming Experience
Main Plot Area
Land Owned
Province:
PUNJAB
SINDH

Out of sample, N=426
47.3
4.45
14.6
6.18
6.01

(12.0)
(4.59)
(12.9)
(9.82)
(10.6)

297 (69.7%)
129 (30.3%)

In sample, N=301
46.3
4.98
15.9
6.14
6.52

(11.4)
(4.81)
(11.1)
(7.59)
(8.86)

p. overall
0.257
0.136
0.134
0.944
0.483
<0.001

262 (87.0%)
39 (13.0%)

Table D.4 compares key characteristics of the farmers in the sample, N = 301, to all the
other farmers that were not included in the sample but were part of the Pakistan Cotton
Survey, N = 426 (total N = 727). For the non-region variables, means are provided with the
standard deviation in brackets. The last column reports the p-value for the null hypothesis
that the means are the same for both groups. A sufficiently small p-value implies rejection
of this null.
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Table D.5: Accounting for measurement error
Dependent variable:
Changed variety
(1)
BtLevel - leaf average

(2)

−0.019
(−0.082, 0.045)
−0.024
(−0.163, 0.114)

BtLevel - instrumented leaf

0.015∗∗
(0.003, 0.026)
0.008∗∗∗
(0.002, 0.014)
−0.073∗∗∗
(−0.127, −0.019)
−0.040∗∗
(−0.075, −0.006)
−0.007∗
(−0.014, 0.001)
−0.0003
(−0.001, 0.0002)
−0.024
(−0.054, 0.007)

0.015∗∗
(0.002, 0.028)
0.009∗∗∗
(0.003, 0.015)
−0.076∗∗∗
(−0.133, −0.019)
−0.043∗∗
(−0.078, −0.007)
−0.007∗
(−0.015, 0.001)
−0.0004
(−0.001, 0.0002)
−0.025
(−0.057, 0.007)

−0.020
(−0.120, 0.080)
0.024∗∗
(0.002, 0.047)
0.019∗∗∗
(0.008, 0.031)
−0.101∗
(−0.202, 0.0003)
−0.130∗∗∗
(−0.181, −0.078)
−0.015∗
(−0.031, 0.002)
−0.001∗
(−0.002, 0.0002)
−0.030
(−0.086, 0.026)

Yes

Yes

Yes

301
0.284
0.202
0.444 (df = 269)

290
0.269
0.181
0.450 (df=258)

72
0.607
0.379
0.384 (df = 45)

BtLevel - correlated leaf only
Education
Farming experience
Years variety grown
Years Bt grown
Land owned
Seed purchase price
Selling price
District FE
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error

(3)

∗

p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01
Table D.5 demonstrates the results from reconstructing the Bt variable to reduce measurement error and re-estimating the effect of Bt content on variety change. In Column 1 I
reconstruct Bt content as an average, for each farmer, of the leaf values only because they
are more strongly correlated with each other than boll values. In Column 2 I use one leaf
value as an instrument for the other to eliminate (the correlated) measurement error. In
Column 3 I keep Bt content as the average of the leaf and boll values but apply it only to
a limited set of observations (72) where the two leaf values are almost identical. In all, Bt
still has an insignificant effect on variety change.
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Table D.6: Alternative specifications to check effect of Bt levels on variety choice
Dependent variable:
Changed variety
Bt level (standardized)
Bt level squared
Education

(1: LPM)

(2: LPM)

(3: LPM)

(4: Logit)

0.018
(−0.077, 0.114)
−0.008
(−0.038, 0.022)
0.014∗∗
(0.001, 0.026)

−0.007
(−0.071, 0.057)

0.001
(−0.061, 0.063)

−0.023
(−0.364, 0.310)

0.015∗∗
(0.004, 0.027)

0.072∗∗
(0.011, 0.137)

0.008∗∗∗
(0.002, 0.013)
−0.075∗∗∗
(−0.130, −0.020)
−0.040∗∗
(−0.074, −0.005)
−0.007∗
(−0.014, 0.001)
−0.0003
(−0.001, 0.0002)
−0.023
(−0.053, 0.008)

0.014∗∗
(0.002, 0.026)
0.003
(−0.008, 0.014)
0.008∗∗∗
(0.002, 0.014)
−0.074∗∗∗
(−0.129, −0.020)
−0.040∗∗
(−0.075, −0.006)
−0.006∗
(−0.014, 0.001)
−0.0004
(−0.001, 0.0002)
−0.023
(−0.053, 0.008)

0.007∗∗
(0.002, 0.013)

−0.040∗∗
(−0.075, −0.006)
−0.007∗
(−0.014, 0.001)
−0.0004
(−0.001, 0.0001)
−0.016
(−0.046, 0.014)

0.041∗∗∗
(0.013, 0.071)
−0.366∗∗∗
(−0.635, −0.114)
−0.201∗∗
(−0.388, −0.024)
−0.032∗∗
(−0.064, −0.0001)
−0.002
(−0.004, 0.0007)
−0.146∗
(−0.319, 0.021)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

301
0.284
0.199
0.445 (df = 268)

301
0.284
0.199
0.445 (df = 268)

301
0.310
0.216
0.440 (df = 264)

301

Bt:Education
Farming experience
Years variety grown
Years Bt grown
Land owned
Purchase price (seed)
Selling price (cotton)
District FE
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error

∗

p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Table D.6 introduces different specifications to Column 3 in Table 1.2 to test the effect of
Bt content on variety change. Column 1 adds a Bt squared variable to allow for nonlinear
effects, Column 2 adds an interaction term between Bt content and education to allow for
different effects by education, Column 3 uses a sequence of dummy variables the planting
history (omitted from table) to allow for nonlinear effects, and Column 4 uses a bias-reducing
logit instead of a linear probability model. In all specifications, we still cannot reject a null
of no effect of Bt on variety choice.
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Table D.7: Ordered logit to check effect of Bt on perception formation
Dependent variable:
Perception (Ordered)
Logit
Bt level (standardized)

0.037
(−0.246, 0.321)
0.036
(−0.020, 0.093)
0.003
(−0.023, 0.030)
0.009
(−0.227, 0.245)
−0.034
(−0.203, 0.134)
−0.001
(−0.003, 0.002)

Education
Farming experience
Years variety grown
Years Bt grown
Seed price
District and sowing-time FE

Yes

Observations

301
∗

p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Table D.7 estimates the effect of Bt on farmer perceptions by including all three levels of
farmer perceptions in the dependent variable, with an ordered logit. This is in contrast
with the results in Table 1.4, which use a linear probability model and cluster perceptions
into a binary ’poor/moderate’ versus ’very good’ variable. As shown, the basic results are
the same: Bt has no discernable effect on farmer perceptions of bollworm resistance.
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ChangedSupplier

No

Yes

4

BtLevel

3

2

1

0
No

Yes

Figure D.1: Supplier change
Figure D.1 considers behavioral responses to learning besides variety switching and shows
it is unlikely that farmers reacted to low Bt level by switching suppliers in the next year.
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No land
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CLCV

Pest attack

Heat stress

Poor germination

Water logging

Not profitable

Excessive rain

Late harvest

Other farmers

Water shortage

Financial constraint

0

Figure D.2: Reasons for exit
Figure D.2 rules out the possibility that farmers reacted to low Bt levels by exiting cotton
production, by showing the reasons the farmers who exited gave for their decision.
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DidGrow2014

No

Yes

4

BtLevel

3

2

1

0
No

Yes

Figure D.3: Correlation between Bt level and exit
Figure D.3 complements the result in Figure D.2 and shows no correlation between the
farmer’s Bt level and the decision to exit production.
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Figure D.4: Specification curve analysis - Effect of Bt on variety change
The x-axis is the number of specifications, and the y-axis is estimate of the effect
of a one standard deviation increase in Bt on the probability of variety change in
each specification. Black denotes an insignificant effect while red denotes a significant
effect, at the 5% significance level. The specifications combine all the possible controls
(farmer characteristics, planting history, prices, input use, and district controls) in
thousands of different ways. In all of these specifications the effect of Bt on the
probability of variety change is close to zero and insignificant.

Figure D.5: Specification curve analysis - Effect of perception on variety change
The x-axis is the number of specifications, and the y-axis is estimate of the effect of
viewing perception resistance as very good, relative to poor, on the probability of variety change. Black denotes an insignificant effect while red denotes a significant effect,
at the 10% significance level. The specifications combine the possible controls (farmer
characteristics, planting history, prices, pesticide use, yield, and district controls) in
thousands of different ways. In the majority, the effect of very good perceptions on
the probability of variety change is negative and significant. The exceptions in the
upper right corner are the specifications that omit district controls, which is not a
valid omission since district-specific cultivation attitudes are likely correlated with
both perceptions and seed selection behaviors.
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Figure D.6: Specification curve analysis - Effect of Bt on perceptions
The x-axis is the number of specifications, and the y-axis is estimate of the effect of
a one standard deviation increase in Bt on the probability of viewing resistance as
very good instead of poor/moderate. Black denotes an insignificant effect while red
denotes a significant effect, at the 5% significance level. The specifications combine the
controls (farmer characteristics, planting history, seed price, pesticide use, and sowing
time and district controls) in hundreds of different ways. In the specifications that
exclude district controls (the lower left corner), the estimated coefficient is negative
and significant. However, in the more plausible specifications that include district
controls (upper left), the estimated effects of Bt on resistance perceptions are closer
to zero and insignificant, consistent with the regressions.

Figure D.7: Specification curve analysis - Effect of Bt on pesticide use
The x-axis is the number of specifications, and the y-axis is estimate of the effect of
a one standard deviation increase in Bt on the use of pesticide per acre cultivated.
Black denotes an insignificant effect while red denotes a significant effect, at the 5%
significance level. The specifications combine the possible controls (farmer characteristics, planting history, area cultivated, seeds sowed per acre, and controls for soil
type, sowing time, and district) in thousands of different ways. In all specifications
the estimated effect of Bt on pesticide use is close to zero and insignificant.
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APPENDIX E
GAME TREE FOR CH. 3
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Figure E.1: Game tree
Figure E.1 illustrates the structure of the game in Section 3.4, for the first three periods.
The payoffs at each node are for S1 and S2 respectively.
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